410. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1
347. Reference Embtel 339. UK Ambassador Johnston saw King Hussein evening of eighth as planned. I have seen UK Ambassador’s report to HMG [2½ lines of source text not declassified]. Sir Charles’ impression was that King heard him out but UK Ambassador not sure what impression he had made at end of talk. Sir Charles told me that for first time since he has been in Jordan he is “shaken” by present course of events.
I obtained appointment with King 1:00 p.m. on ninth directly before Spinelli also saw His Majesty. I told King I had come to see him on matter of considerable concern not only to myself personally but [Page 737] also to my Government. We had heard reports concerning extensive troop movements from Jordan along Syrian frontier that appeared particularly disturbing at this time. I had come to His Majesty personally without authorization from my Government because USG had not had sufficient time to react to news of border build-up, but I said we would appreciate any clarification he could give us concerning present situation.
[1 paragraph (15 lines of source text) not declassified] I said that in last 10 days I had had Jordan’s problem constantly in mind. I had tried to visualize all possible actions and solutions. Natural impulse was certainly to strike out in fury. No one could blame Jordan for anger after series of incidents of last ten days. At same time, if Jordan acted out of emotion in present affair and tried to use forces across border, I personally could see only blow-up of disastrous proportions ahead. [5½ lines of source text not declassified]
[1 paragraph (10 lines of source text) not declassified]
I continued that more I had thought about this problem the more it came back to solution through channels of UN. Speaking personally I saw no helpful role for any individual third country in this affair. Equitable solution required prestige of some supra-national body and only organization which fitted this description was UN. King indicated he had already assured me Jordan would take no precipitate action before informing his close friends US and UK. I said I very much appreciated this reassurance, especially at this time and could His Majesty assure me that Jordan would rely on UN action before taking matters into its own hands? He [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] assured me that Jordan was moving “step by step” in complete consultation with UN and he was shortly going to see Ambassador Spinelli who, he supposed, would be talking to him about same problem.2 In parting I again thanked King for his reassurances.
Comment: Like UK Ambassador I am not sure what impression this démarche made on King. He received my comments attentively but I could feel underneath a sense of strain and tension. Since he remains highly emotional over whole series of UAR-inspired incidents, I would imagine he has not been preceptive to pressures of those favoring across border action.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project “Clean Up”, Jordan. Secret; Niact; [distribution indicator not declassified]. Received at 4:56 p.m.↩
- Spinelli subsequently indicated that his conversation with Hussein had run along lines similar to the conversation which Kocher had with the King. Kocher, Spinelli, and U.K. Ambassador Johnston agreed that the best course to follow was to seek and use messages of concern from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld in an effort to restrain military action on the part of Jordan. (Telegram 348 from Amman, September 9; ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)↩