402. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1
2368. Following advice afternoon 14th Hussein wished see me immediately, I spent hour and quarter in first tour d’horizon with King.
Obvious King had received report from Majali of his visit with Wright and me 13th.2 In view this assumption I launched into what I believed was most on King’s mind, namely question of Nasser. I drew on extremely helpful appraisal given me by Assistant Secretary Hart in conversation about April 20 stating among other things US extremely pleased that Nasser had come to realize Communism and USSR principal menace to Mid East today and that we encouraged Nasser in maintaining this stand.
Hussein spoke at length of past efforts Nasser to undermine governments in other Arab States including Jordan and asked several times whether we convinced we could trust Nasser. I replied we could trust Nasser to follow policy he considered in his own best interests, as well as in interest of Arab world as he sees it, and we would spare no effort to reinforce and maintain Nasser’s present attitude towards Communism and Soviet Union. Hussein replied difficult believe Nasser really opposed to USSR since he continues receive Soviet economic aid and permit Soviet technicians roam freely in Egypt and Syria.
Hussein stated he has solid information Nasser arming tribesmen in Syria for incursion into Iraq. At end of conversation he translated report he had received from Beirut that incursion into Kirkuk area with participation Iranian tribesmen being planned and UAR had requested USG to deposit in Syrian banks $500 million to finance such effort and USG favorable. I replied USG has no such massive sums available without going to Congress and such statement to my mind suggested spurious character such report. King said story undoubtedly will be carried on Baghdad radio in day or two.
I told Hussein I believed Iraq situation was under constant review by USG and I could not anticipate what lies ahead. I believed at moment US would do everything possible to discourage “adventures” by neighboring states. I could conceive of situation deteriorating to [Page 716] point where Iraqi Communists perhaps with Soviet assistance set up Soviet satellite regime either open or disguised, and if this occurred US would have to decide what should be done. But at moment seemed to me any military adventures by Iraq’s neighbors would be unfortunate in extreme. Tenure of Hussein’s comment was that UAR was preparing just such a military adventure.
Apparent Hussein convinced Nasser largely responsible for bringing about July 14 overthrow in Iraq and intended doing same in Jordan. I was able to tell King that our Ambassador in Cairo convinced that Nasser and UAR at present time wish see maintenance stability in Jordan. I said I also learned from Ambassador Hare Nasser attempting mend fences with Arab countries with which relations have been bad, such as Sudan and Tunisia, but supposed no approaches made to Jordan. King said Nasser had made approaches. But question is one of principle and again asked how we could trust Nasser. I replied we often had to take foreign leaders as we find them and if even belatedly they adopt policies considered helpful for survival free world, then we forget past and cooperate in new situation.
King most friendly and invited see him at any time. I of course told him I would be available whenever he wished see me.
As I was leaving from call on Turkish Ambassador morning 14th (during which I had voiced “no adventure” theme), latter stated I should not be worried by what King had said to Wright (Embtel 2341)3 (report on which he had received from Ankara) and promised to elucidate later.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/5–1459. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv.↩
- Mills reported on this meeting, which was similarly an initial tour d’horizon, in telegram 2365 from Amman, May 14. (Ibid., 785.00/5–1459; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- Supra.↩