Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

400. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, May 7, 1959—3 p.m.

2336. Beirut pass Ambassador Mills. Prime Minister Hazza Al-Majali² called me at 0630 this morning apologized for not being able see me last night due necessity finalize formation his new Cabinet³ and requested I come his home 0900 today. Following is digest our conversation lasting nearly two hours.

(A) Prime Minister began by reciting in schoolboy fashion an obviously prepared statement which followed very closely the “line” he asked me to convey to Washington on night he was appointed.⁴ It was laudatory of all things American, reiterated Jordan’s strong anti-Communist policy both at home and abroad, stressed need for “even greater cooperation between US and Jordan in future”. Majali said as evidence importance he attaches USG/HKJ relations he wished tell me I was his first foreign visitor since he took office. He said wished to clear up one very important matter. He was well aware many persons considered him be strongly pro-British even inferred that as Prime Minister he would welcome a return to modified Glubb Pasha era. This was not true. Jordan unlike other Arab States and certain Arab leaders has never tried play East off against West. Its record is 100% for the free world. The recognized leader of the free world is the US, its greatest ally is the UK the preference be only natural Jordan should enjoy close relations with both, however, he personally leaned more toward US because in dark days following Glubb Pasha ouster termination treaty with UK only US came Jordan’s rescue. However, despite his appreciation US role during that crucial period and substantial assistance since that time he wanted it clearly understood he was neither pro-American or pro-British but only pro-Jordanian. I remarked jokingly that he had made no mention being pro-Nasser as some people said he was (this was designed draw him out on most important foreign policy subject). Majali replied he recognized desirability united front among member Arab States but this could only be achieved if all those concerned really wanted to cooperate. He then launched into impassioned speech extolling virtues King Hussein, his destiny as future leader Arab anti-Communist world, concluded by saying “I am only the shadow. King is the power, no one but the King can lead, all others must follow.” He replied “Nasser is a snake who has bitten our King, who in turn cracked Nasser’s head; until both wounds are healed there can be no talk of reconciliation.”

(B) Prime Minister said as his friend he wanted me know something concerning reasons which influenced choice certain Cabinet Ministers. Minister Interior Wasfi Mirza had been selected because he is Turk (Embassy records him Circassian), extremely wealthy therefore above bribery, he has no blood relatives in Jordan (his sister however is married to Under Secretary Minister Finance Munirar-Rifai, brother former Prime Minister), “will follow without question wishes His Majesty King Hussein.” Anwar Nashashibi was chosen for Defense Minister because he is West Banker (Jerusalem) whose appointment will tend silence charges East Bank Beduins completely control military. I pointed out Nashashibi was also designated Minister Development and Reconstruction which seemed to me like heavy load for one man. Prime Minister put his hand on my arm said “my good friend we both know except for period when Rifai took over Defense portfolio Defense Minister was mere figurehead with all important decisions made by C-in-C Armed Forces. This is the way it will be from now on with King himself keeping in close touch on defense matters.” Re Foreign Minister, Majali said first choice was Musa Alami but unfortunately he was difficult man pin down, furthermore at present time he was in US. Decision has been reached Prime Minister will hold both portfolios time being. If Musa Alami accepts appointment Majali will release it, if not he will continue act dual capacity foreseeable future.

(C) I told Prime Minister in view number of problems involving economic assistance we were very much interested in knowing who he intended appoint as Vice-President Jordan Development Board and when. He said having held that post himself he recognizes its importance therefore in order there should be no slowdown in Board’s operations he had directed the new Minister of Economy Khulusy Al-Khairy temporarily assume responsibility its operations. In a few days he hopes have chosen new Vice-President replacing Anastas Hananiya now Minister of Justice and Communications. He intends appoint someone who is able, energetic and with whom US officials will find it easy to work. He said when appointment finalized he will invite acting USOM/J Director, myself sit in with him have frank discussion Board’s policies/programs particularly its relations with US officials Jordan.

(D) I took opportunity clarify as part new Prime Minister’s indoctrination subject US budgetary aid pointing out $10 million already given HKJ would be last which could be expected until after US FY–60 budget passed by Congress which in practical terms meant no more US money before late August or September. Majali confessed he is deeply concerned over budget as a whole and particularly over certain supplementary requests which he understands will shortly be brought forth by various government departments particularly Defense. He said he intends to rely very heavily on his personal friend Budget Director Adib for whose professional competency he has great respect. I took occasion to point out necessity that ARMA Colonel Delaney be provided as soon as possible with a complete breakdown of the military sector of the budget in order that Washington might be apprised of the exact status and future requirements of the Jordan Armed Forces. I said Colonel Delaney in his dual capacity as Military Assistance Advisor as well as Military Attaché needed this detailed breakdown at the earliest possible moment to ensure that Jordan’s needs might be given the proper consideration by the military in Washington.

I said our USIS people were interested in knowing whether or not Abdul Munim Ar-Rifai, Director National Guidance, would remain on since they had now reached the point in working out a program with him where such information was essential. Majali said he considers Munim Ar-Rifai as his own brother and has asked him if he would be willing to continue in his present post not only because of the specific need in the propaganda field but equally as much in the role of foreign affairs advisor. Prime Minister explained that Rifai as Jordan’s most experienced diplomat cannot be spared particularly at a time when the Foreign Ministry is vacant or may possibly be filled by a completely inexperienced person. It is Majali’s intention to send Rifai as Jordan’s representative to any international conferences which may come up in the near future. He said Munim Rifai has agreed to stay on.

I thanked Prime Minister for his consideration in giving me so much of his time when I knew there were such heavy demands on him. As he walked me to the car he said “I want you to know that you may call me at any hour day or night on any subject on which you believe I may have information that will advance the mutual interests of our two countries.” I thanked him once again for his generous offer pointing out that I would soon be leaving Jordan and I interpreted his offer as extending to our new Ambassador⁵ and to such other officers in USOM/J and USIS as could profit from it.

[1 paragraph (21 lines of source text) not declassified]

Wright

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.13/5–759. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, Tel Aviv, and Beirut.
2. King Hussein asked former Prime Minister Hazza Al-Majali to form a new cabinet on May 5 after Prime Minister Rifai submitted his resignation in a dispute with political opponents over the question of whether to require the removal of the Chief of Staff of the Army. (Telegrams from Amman: 2285, April 29; 2312, May 4; and 2329, May 6; ibid., 785.00/4–2959, 785.00/5–459, and 785.13/5–659, respectively; all included in the microfiche supplement)
3. A nine-member cabinet was established by Majali on May 6, but the Embassy felt that it was not a strong cabinet and would not last very long. (Telegram 2339 from Amman, May 7; Department of State, Central Files, 785.13/5–759)
4. In telegram 2328 from Amman, May 6, Wright reported that new Prime Minister Majali had taken him aside at a dinner the previous evening to assure him that there would be no change in Jordan’s foreign policy under the new government being formed. Majali asked Wright to convey to Washington the assurance that Hussein continued to be the effective ruler of Jordan, and that Jordan would continue to stand firmly with the United States against the Communist menace in the Middle East. (Ibid., 785.13/3–659; included in the microfiche supplement)
5. Sheldon T. Mills was appointed Ambassador to Jordan on February 16, 1959, and presented his credentials on May 12.