350. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
1931. I made my rounds last night as indicated final paragraph Embtel 1921.2Chehab was prudently optimistic after his attempt at forming a military government presided over by a neutral Moslem had failed yesterday. He confirmed reports we had earlier reported that Basta mob got somewhat out of control, threatening Karami with death if he turned in his resignation. (I suspect, however, mob was incited to this demonstration and that Karami and company did not need much urging to hang on to their cherished portfolios.) At all events, formula which had been accepted by Phalange and Moslem opposition fell through. Chehab thought there was a good chance of returning to former course of action, namely to widen membership in Karami Cabinet to include pro-Chamoun loyalist and perhaps representation from the Phalange. He said Gemayel was meeting with Karami that evening to discuss these possibilities.
I next called on Saeb Salaam who was smooth as oiled-silk. After proudly showing me his arsenal of home-made submachine guns (“the Basta has the best”), he said that morning a committee of 25 Moslem leaders had met to discuss what to do next. Abdullah Yafi tabled a motion calling for no modification whatsoever in Karami Cabinet; but other leaders of a more moderate stripe had later privately agreed they would go along with a compromise for a widened Karami Cabinet along lines suggested by Chehab.
Perhaps most significant thing Saeb Salaam told me was that mobs on both sides, Christian and Moslem, were getting very tired and increasingly impatient that their leaders find a solution. He added it was significant that during day Beirut had been quiet and there had been no retaliatory kidnappings.
When I called on Gemayel after leaving the Basta, I found him on verge of desperation. He said a three-hour meeting with Karami had produced no result. He was convinced Karami and his backers were not sincere in their professed readiness to have a truly representative cabinet. They were only willing to take in a few face-saving personalities [Page 606] but would not honestly seek for an arrangement of “no victor, no vanquished.” Under these circumstances, said Gemayel, neither the Phalange nor their followers could agree to a Karami Cabinet.
I inquired what would happen if Chehab could resuscitate idea which had so nearly proved successful previous day of a military government of officers presided over by a civilian. Gemayel, who was accompanied by Secretary of the party and by former Minister of Finance Joseph Chader, said with their concurrence that Phalange would support such a cabinet. Gemayel said that after his conversation with Chamoun previous evening he had Chamoun’s agreement to an immediate lifting of strike if a military government were formed, Chamoun to restrict his opposition to a purely parliamentary one. Phalange leader told me if such a government were appointed, it would receive a vote of confidence, as Chamoun could not corner more than 20 votes against such a grouping. Gemayel implored me to seek Chehab again that night to announce that he create such a government forthwith. He thought this would have such a magical effect on country it would eliminate strike and restore order provided Chehab stood firm.
I thereupon resumed my weary journeying to Junieh and called on Chehab at 10 p.m. He was interested in negative result of Gemayel–Karami interview and in possibility of resuscitating idea of a military cabinet; but said his concern now was not to upset Moslem apple cart in Tripoli and Saida. He speculated as to possibility of a military cabinet presided over by Karami but agreed when I pointed out Christians would be up in arms at such an arrangement unless there were a balance of strongly pro-loyalist Christian ministers.
President concluded a long day by saying he thought both sides were now so groggy with fatigue they would eventually stumble to some sort of live and let live solution. He noted (and our individual observation corroborates it) that, despite continuance of Christian strike, town is slowly opening and main thoroughfares are free of barricades. Chehab said he thought there would be a long weekend of continued negotiations ending Monday or Tuesday with formation of a compromise government, with parliament to meet immediately thereafter.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–1158. Secret; Priority. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Cairo and London.↩
- In telegram 1921 from Beirut, October 10, the Embassy summarized developments in the unfolding political crisis, and noted that McClintock had appointments that evening with Chehab, Saeb Salaam, Gemayel, and former President Beshara El-Khoury. (Ibid., 783A.00/10–1058; included in the microfiche supplement)↩