349. Letter From the Chargé in Jordan (Wright) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Rockwell)1
My Dear Mr. Rockwell: Thank you very much for your most interesting and informative letter of October 2 and the enclosed copy of the “Talking Paper”2 prepared for the Secretary’s use in possible discussion with Dr. Fawzi.
Unfortunately, since your letter was not remarked “Personal”, it was opened as another piece of official correspondence. I have warned all those who handled the document of its very sensitive nature and will carefully refrain from any reference to it even among members of the country team.
May I take this opportunity to heartily endorse the Department’s latest approach to the knotty problem of our future relations with the Arab states. I have already made known my feelings on this subject in commenting on the draft Middle East policy paper now in preparation as requested by the Department a few days ago.
It is quite apparent that Jordan as a non-viable state cannot long endure unless it reaches some accommodation with its Arab neighbors, all of whom are in some degree hostile to the present Hussein/RIFAI regime, although admittedly for different reasons. In my own opinion, despite all the current talk here in Amman about lifting martial law, the actual facts are that any such undertaking is impossible without endangering the security of the country and setting the stage for some kind of coup d’etat. This will apply equally to any successor government to the Rifai administration which does not have a decidedly pro-Nasser coloration. Furthermore, Jordan is no Iraq. It would be quite impossible for a single brigade to walk into Amman in the early hours of the morning and seize control of the vital installations without having to fight those Jordan army units already on duty in the city, unless, of course, a deal had been made among the senior army officers to effect such a coup. However, in such a case, it would most likely result in a military junta taking over, since the only civilians are retread politicians of doubtful integrity seeking only to gain personal political advantage for themselves and their followers.
At the moment Prime Minister Rifai, despite his admitted unpopularity not only among the general public but also the members of Parliament and even his own cabinet, appears to enjoy King Hussein’s favor. Furthermore, it must be recognized that the King is the only [Page 604] person who can remove him. It is my belief Rifai will in all probability enjoy the King’s favor so long as he can “keep the lid on” internally and, what is even more important, continue to demonstrate to Hussein’s satisfaction his ability to get American aid without which the armed forces cannot be paid. If and when Rifai fails on either one of the foregoing counts, then he will have outlived his usefulness to Hussein and probably will be dumped. This in turn will necessitate Jordan finding another “angel” or drastically reducing the size of its armed forces, either of which will invite opposition forces both from within and from without the country to make a bid for power.
It is possible that a series of caretaker-type governments may succeed Rifai, each in turn having to give up as its inability to satisfy the demands of the extreme nationalists becomes apparent. This process could only take place, of course, providing the Jordan army was either neutralized through internal dissension or chose to take a neutral position so long as nothing was done to unseat the King, providing they elect to remain loyal to him. This will to a large degree depend on how far the Nasser influence has penetrated the army or whether the Bani Sakhir, largest of the Bedouin tribes, decides to replace the monarchy with a paramount sheikh of their own, a process which would be quite readily understood by the predominantly Bedouin population of the East Bank. Incidentally, this is not too far fetched because of the traditional tribal jealousy among the northern and southern tribes, some of which believe that the Hashemites should never have been set up as the supreme ruler in the first place. No matter what means are used to bring about a change in the present Jordan government it is most unlikely that the process can run its natural course toward Arab nationalism of the Nasser variety without some bloodshed and disorders. If and when that time comes, there is a distinct possibility that any symbols of “western imperialism” may become the natural target against which the Jordanian public, long held down by martial law, may vent their spleen.
Under these circumstances it is not improbable that unless or until U.S. policy toward the Middle East in general and Nasser in particular is modified the position of our mission in Amman, including Point IV and USIS, may well become similar to that in the U.A.R. and Iraq.
I didn’t really intend to make this letter so long but once having begun it, I felt that you might like to have on a personal and unofficial basis the benefit of my thinking on what I consider to be a potentially explosive situation.
Sincerely yours,