Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

283. Telegram From the Delegation at the United Nations to the Embassy in Jordan¹

New York, August 20, 1958—7 p.m.

7. Embtel 564, August 19.² FYI. We are of course conscious of deep concern which King and Rifai must have over present situation and their uncertainty that any action taken by GA can assure continuation Jordanian independence. We ourselves are far from clear as to what future holds for Jordan. Nevertheless, we consider it important that King and Rifai be given maximum encouragement particularly since any adjustments which situation might require can best be made by retaining in control during crucial period immediately ahead regime unwilling simply to turn country over to UAR, which among other things would involve risk of hostilities with Israel. It should be somewhat easier to decide upon our future policy vis-à-vis Jordan after smoke has cleared from current GA debate and, as result talks which we propose having with UAR, we have better idea of what to expect from that quarter concerning Jordan. End FYI.

In light foregoing, suggest you respond to Rifai and inform Hussein along lines set forth below, which have been coordinated with UK representatives in New York.

1. Interest of US and UK in preserving Jordanian independence has been demonstrated in many forms, and our sincerity in this regard cannot be doubted by King and Rifai. Presence of British troops in Jordan, large US military, economic and political assistance and role we are now playing in GA are examples our willingness to support Jordan. We have greatest admiration for courage and leadership exercised by King and Rifai and every confidence that their determined efforts will continue. We can say with all sincerity that we see today better prospect for Jordan than at any time recently.

2. While it has not always been possible for us to meet specific requests of GOJ, our action has helped King and his govt retain Jordanian independence against efforts of formidable opposition. We believe that certain further measures may be extremely valuable in this regard:

(a) It expected that outcome of GA consideration will be establishment of greater UN presence in Jordan and thus a greater moral responsibility on the part of the UN as a whole with respect to the preservation of Jordanian independence and integrity as against outside interference;

(b) We hope that there will emerge from Assembly as well as from separate talks with UAR in undertaking on part of UAR to refrain from interference in Jordan and from efforts to overthrow present regime. While we cannot now estimate accurately the degree of success which we might expect in this regard, we have reason to believe that something really constructive might be achieved. GOJ can be sure US would work strongly to see to it that UAR lived up to any commitment it might make in this respect.

(c) Although we do not believe that solution can be found in strengthening Jordanian armed forces, we are not unmindful of importance which King and Rifai attach to this matter. Notwithstanding heavy costs already being borne by US in maintaining existing Jordanian armed forces, we are nevertheless giving urgent consideration to joining with UK to support additional program involving establishment of new units. Study of requirements to support such new units now underway and we will shortly be communicating further with King and Rifai.

3. We regret that it is not feasible at this time for us to consider mutual defense treaty with Jordan, an important factor being that US constitutional procedures would involve Congressional consideration and approval which not possible in view imminent Congressional adjournment. As GOJ knows, one reason why US has not adhered to Baghdad Pact is that such action likely give rise to strong pressure to undertake treaty relationship with Israel. This consideration would apply also to treaty with Jordan. As practical matter, however, US policy with respect Jordan has been made clear, and joint Congressional resolution on Middle East³ set forth US determination to assist nations in their efforts to preserve their independence.

4. While we can understand Jordanian concern re continued presence UK forces, we believe it would be serious mistake to take unduly hasty action with respect to their withdrawal. Objective of all of us should be as quickly as possible to establish situation in which UK forces can withdraw with prudence, and without undue jeopardy to Jordan. We believe that GOJ, UK and US should maintain closest consultation as situation unfolds in days and weeks ahead, and we hope that with developments set forth above it will be possible not only for UK forces to be withdrawn from Jordan but also for US forces to be withdrawn from Lebanon. We fear, however, that our objective with respect to Jordanian independence could be rendered unattainable if there should be unduly precipitate action by GOJ in this regard.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/8–2058. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated to the Department as Secto 11. The source text is the Department of State copy.
2. Document 281.
3. Reference is to the joint Middle East resolution, signed by the President on March 9, 1957. (P.L. 7, 85th Congress, printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, pp. 829–831)