Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

268. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 12, 1958¹

New York, August 12, 1958

SUBJECT

• Lebanon and Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.
• Mr. Arkady Sobolev, Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations
• Mr. Valerian Zorin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.
• Mr. G Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor
• Mr. Edward L. Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs Soviet Interpreter

The Secretary said he had wanted to talk with Mr. Gromyko in an effort to do something constructive about the situation of the Middle East. Things could happen there which could have serious consequences. The Secretary was particularly concerned about what would happen if Jordan collapsed—from the standpoint of the Arab-Israeli dispute. There was a lot of recrimination over the Arab-Israeli question and differences were serious. He had no real answer to the question. Jordan was not a viable country. The only reason for assuring its existence was that if it disappeared suddenly, there might be serious effects that could have other consequences. He hoped that it would be possible to find some solution to that situation.

Gromyko pointed out that the Secretary had mentioned Jordan. He asked, what about Lebanon?

The Secretary said that it was his belief that it might be given a neutral status somewhat along the Austrian pattern. It was a state that, because its population was half Christian and half Moslem, had always existed with a precarious balance between the two groups. They got along all right as long as they were not involved in troubles with the other Arab states. It has not historically been a part of Arabia. The Secretary said he thought a solution to the Lebanese problem could be found. It has a possibility of independent existence. It has been getting along well economically. Its currency is sound. It exists on trade and tourist business. He could see a stable situation in Lebanon. Jordan was more difficult and more dangerous. Its significance lay in its relation to the problem of Israel. He did not see clearly how to keep Jordan going or how to face the consequences of its collapse. Jordan was originally created by the British as a base as an alternative to the one they had at Suez. It was subsidized by them. After they left, it was subsidized by three Arab states. Now the United States is supporting it. It has no resources. No solution has been found for the problem of Arab refugees. It is nothing but a headache. The Secretary said that he had been unable to think of any program that would not reopen the Israeli war.

Gromyko said that it was one thing to touch upon the problem of the existence of Jordan and Lebanon. It was another question to achieve stability in the area where there was danger of serious conflict. There was the question of withdrawal of United States troops from Lebanon and British troops from Jordan. How could one deal with the question of Lebanon and Jordan without dealing with the question of the troops. He pointed out that the Soviet position remained unchanged. They believed the United States should withdraw its troops from Lebanon and Great Britain from Jordan. When the withdrawal took place, in spite of the difficulties and complexities of the situation, it would be possible to insure the independence and integrity of both states. It could not be impossible, between the United States and the U.S.S.R., to insure the existence of these countries as independent states. The basic question was how to solve the problem. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the solution would be the withdrawal of United States and British troops. This would in no way affect the prestige of the United States or even less its security. The action would serve as a good example and would get good words, not only from the Arab states, but others as well. With regard to the internal questions of Lebanon and Jordan, which worry the United States and Britain, Britain seems more worried about the situation in Jordan. Let the Jordanese themselves solve their own problems. This goes for Lebanon as well.

The Secretary said that there was no problem in United States troops coming out of Lebanon—assuming a situation in which the continued independence of Lebanon was provided. He did not believe that the United States felt its prestige was enhanced by the presence of its troops in Lebanon. It has had its troops all over the world. It had withdrawn them and not sent them back anywhere unless they were invited. We are proud of this record. The first thing the United States wants to do is to get out of Lebanon. With regard to the latter’s independence, it has just chosen a new government. Thus, the allegation that we moved in to perpetuate Chamoun proved unfounded as had the allegation that we intended to attack Iraq. We had only one purpose—to stay in Lebanon only so long as our troops were needed and wanted by the Government of Lebanon to protect it against the danger of indirect aggression. As soon as the danger was removed, the troops would move right out. We did not feel that our prestige was engaged. The Secretary said he agreed that Jordan was a more difficult matter.

Gromyko asked that if the United States did not desire to keep its troops in Lebanon, what hindered their withdrawal right now, today.

The Secretary said that there was no adequate insurance that efforts from the outside would not be resumed if we withdrew. Not only have we not been asked to withdraw from Lebanon, but we have been requested to stay there.

Gromyko asked whether the question was one of penetration through its borders by arms and personnel. Although there was a different attitude toward the United Nations Observer Group in different quarters, the Group’s report² seemed adequate. Why was it not so for the United States? What other danger was there?

The Secretary said that there had been some strengthening of the Observer Group and in view of the improved situation, we had announced today that one battalion was being withdrawn.

Gromyko said that, regarding this argument, there can be a difference in opinion as to whether or not the situation has improved or worsened. However, if it is considered improved then the situation is more propitious than ever for the withdrawal of American troops. Gromyko said that the withdrawal of one battalion lacks the force of conviction on our part. First, troops were put in and then one battalion withdrawn. This cannot make an impression on serious-minded people, not only those in the Soviet Union. The United States’ withdrawal would not only not aggravate the situation, but would pave the way for the settlement of various problems as he suggested a year ago should be done. If the United States is interested in moving in this direction, it cannot but take such a step. The Soviet attitude is well-known—it supports the withdrawal of American troops. It seems to the Soviets that the United States will have to face the question as to whether it should withdraw now and demonstrate good will rather than wait for the pressure of the Arabs, and not only the Arabs, which will bring this about. The presence of American troops there is contrary to the interests of the Arabs and contrary to the peace of the rest of the world.

The Secretary said that there was a difference of opinion about this. We considered that the presence of our troops there was, and still is, an important contribution to peace. There is nothing wrong with having troops in another country at the request of the government of that country.

Gromyko said that he would like to put a question to Mr. Dulles. He said the United States apparently claims that its action does not violate the United Nations Charter. He asked what provision of the Charter allows such action. The Soviet Union knew the Charter very well having taken part in drawing it up. There was no provision for sending troops to a country as a means of interfering in its internal affairs, even if this is done by the most legitimate request. This was not envisaged in the Charter, never was, nor never could be—leaving aside the question as to whether or not the request were legitimate.

The Secretary remarked that he had asked whether it was an international crime to have troops in other countries.

Gromyko said yes.

The Secretary asked whether or not the Soviet Union had troops in other countries.

Gromyko said when this is done in accordance with negotiated treaty obligations, this is a different matter. The United States also has troops in Europe. But you say the presence of your troops in Lebanon does not contradict the Charter. When troops are sent for the purpose of interfering, this is not in accordance with the Charter. It is a crime even when it is done at the request of the country concerned.

The Secretary said, yes, it is a crime to interfere in internal affairs. We did not go to Lebanon for that purpose. We have been accused of going there to keep Chamoun in office. This has been proved false.

Gromyko asked whether or not it was interference in internal affairs to bring about the election of this or that person inside another country.

The Secretary said, certainly it was—but we did not interfere in the election in Lebanon. Chehab was not our candidate.

Gromyko asked why the United States had landed there?

At this point, the Secretary strongly remarked that there was no use getting into a debate on pre-determined positions. He had come to talk with Mr. Gromyko hoping to achieve something constructive. There was no use in arguing and going over standard views. This could be done in the Assembly; we know the public position of the Soviet Union very well. He had hoped for something constructive.

Gromyko replied that the Secretary had referred to our reasons for introducing troops into Lebanon and that he had been answering the remarks made by the Secretary. As to finding a constructive basis, there was no lack of desire on the part of the Soviet Union. He asked what the Secretary had in mind. The Secretary said that we hoped to create the basic conditions for stabilizing the situation in Lebanon and making possible our withdrawal.

Gromyko asked what these conditions were. If it were a question of prevention penetration from the outside, then the Observer Group existed for this purpose. If there was dissatisfaction with the Group, it would be logical to reinforce it. There had been no proposal made by the Secretary and he had merely come to a logical conclusion.

The Secretary said that he was thinking along the lines that there should be some change in the character of the Observer Group. This was more important than any increase in numbers. Also, the neighboring states should make it clear that they intend to let Lebanon alone. Under these conditions, the Secretary thought that it would be possible for the United States to withdraw. It was not practical to have a large and continuously functioning Observer Group in order to patrol Lebanon’s borders and protect Lebanon by it alone. If there were some reliable indication that its neighbors really would let it alone, the numbers of the Group could be reduced. It would, however, be important for United Nations presence to remain there for some time. This would not require a large patrol if the neighboring states lent some cooperation. The newly-elected Government would be more acceptable perhaps than the previous one. The latter had been pro-Western and while we cannot criticize it on that score, the new one coming in in September would be less vulnerable to outside attack. If there were assurances from Lebanon’s neighbors and the character of the Observer Group strengthened, the resulting situation would permit our withdrawal.

Gromyko said that if it is assumed that the states the Secretary had in mind made statements indicating that any doubts about their furnishing aid to parties in Lebanon lack foundation—specifically, the UAR, which has made such statements—would these statements be enough to arouse the necessary confidence from the viewpoint of the United States Government? A second question: What did the Secretary have in mind when he said that the nature of the Observer Group might be changed? Perhaps that was something that could be discussed.

The Secretary said that, with respect to the first question, the UAR had been deeply involved in the Lebanon affair. Its efforts were largely suspended when Hammarskjold went to Cairo. The situation was better in that regard. If there were clear pledges in that respect and if there were enough of a United Nations presence to show its interest and create a good chance the violations might be exposed, he thought this would create the situation he had mentioned. In this view, United Nations interest and presence were enough. The frontiers could not be protected by surrounding the country. If the people outside wanted to penetrate the frontiers they would find some way of doing so. He attached more importance to whether or not there was a sincere willingness on the part of Lebanon’s neighbors to let Lebanon alone and to the United Nations showing continued interest even if on a lesser scale. If the Government of Lebanon considered this enough, we would withdraw quickly. The present Government might not ask us to do so, but he thought the incoming one would.

Gromyko asked whether this would mean postponing measures to withdraw our troops.

The Secretary said that it would, although we are already beginning to cut down.

Gromyko said supposing the two conditions the Secretary mentioned were met—that referring to the attitude of the neighboring states and that referring to the interest of the United Nations—would our withdrawal still be postponed.

The Secretary said that, if we were assured of these two conditions, we could move rather rapidly.

Gromyko asked, what about the British?

The Secretary said this would be more difficult.

Gromyko remarked that the British seemed to want to continue sitting on a war horse, but all that they had was a dead horse.

The Secretary observed he was not sure that the horse would stay dead. It might revive and even involve the Russians. The Jordanian problem was interlocked with Israel. Neither of us should want the British to withdraw until we see that the result will not be the reopening of the Arab-Israeli armistice. The Secretary said he did not see how this could be done. He then said that he was due to see Hammarskjold at 7:30 p.m., and would have to leave. He observed that he thought the talk was beginning to be more constructive.

Gromyko said that, if it were assumed that the United States and the U.S.S.R. would exert joint efforts, make some joint statement perhaps about the borders of Jordan being menaced, take some decision, perform some form of joint act—would that not remove doubts about the international affairs of Jordan? Then the Jordanese could be allowed to settle their own domestic affairs.

The Secretary said that there was a fiscal problem involved. We were putting up $50 million a year to maintain Jordan and did not want to do this forever.

Gromyko said that, if it were possible to reach agreement on the basic questions, it would be easy to settle the economic problem. This would not be serious if the others were settled.

The Secretary observed that there was a time when three Arab states—Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt—subsidized Jordan to the extent of $10 million each per year. Perhaps the financial problem could be solved. There was an even chance, however, that Israel would move in to take over the right bank and war between her and the Arabs would follow. The Arabs would appeal to the Russians for help and Israel to the French and ourselves. (At this point, the Secretary arose to depart.)

Gromyko said that he believed the conversation had been useful.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1087. Secret. Drafted by Freers. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Sec saw.” The source text indicates that the conversation took place at the Soviet Delegation headquarters.
2. An apparent reference to the second report of the U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon; see footnote 9, supra. The third UNOGIL report, covering the period July 15–August 11, was submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General on August 14. (U.N. doc. S/4085; printed in part in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1039–1041)