Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

267. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, August 12, 1958, 3–4:30 p.m.¹

New York, August 12, 1958, 3–4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.K.—Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Sir Pierson Dixon, Messrs. Hayter, Beeley, Laskey, Rose, and Moore
• U.S.—The Secretary, Messrs. Lodge, Dillon, Reinhardt, Rountree, Wilcox, Bergus (Reporting Officer)

SUBJECT

• Forthcoming Special Session of the UNGA

The Secretary advised Mr. Lloyd that the President was coming to the General Assembly. It had been arranged that he would speak on August 13, at 10:30 a.m. after which he would return to Washington. The Secretary then reviewed the latest draft of the President’s speech² with the British Foreign Minister.

In the course of the review Mr. Lloyd discussed briefly a conversation he had had on August 10 with Mr. Robert Murphy.³ Mr. Murphy had been uncertain as to whether any UN action “neutralizing” Lebanon was necessary. Mr. Lloyd felt that it was essential that some UN action with respect to Lebanon’s status be taken, otherwise it could well develop that after the departure of U.S. forces and the UN observers, Lebanon could be swallowed up. If, in such a case, this action were a violation of some sort of a treaty obligation that would be one thing, otherwise, it would be a major Western defeat.

In the course of the review the Secretary pointed out that the speech was more vague with regard to Jordan than was the case with Lebanon. Mr. Lloyd felt that there might emerge a common interest in keeping Jordan in existence. Perhaps the Egyptians and other elements would not like to see Jordan disintegrate at this time. Mr. Lodge reported briefly on a conversation he had had that morning with Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi who had seemed to imply that the UAR did not wish Jordan to accede to it now. Fawzi seemed to feel that perhaps Jordan should be linked with Iraq, then both of these states could ultimately come into the UAR.

In discussing that portion of the President’s speech dealing with economic development the Secretary pointed out that Mr. Dillon had been consulting with American oil companies. He believed these companies would be willing to contribute to an Arab development fund after it had been established by the Arabs themselves. The President’s statement that we would support such a fund implied U.S. financial support. We felt that such a fund should be operated by the IBRD. The Arabs seemed to get along with the IBRD and the Russians were not members of it. Mr. Lodge commented that Fawzi had indicated that Egypt would welcome assistance through the UN but would reserve its right to seek bilateral assistance from individual countries including the USSR.

The Secretary said that after careful consideration it had been decided to omit any reference to the Palestine refugees in the President’s speech.

The Secretary then read verbatim that portion of the President’s speech which dealt with possible UN arms control. It was put in terms of a suggestion that if the Near East countries themselves wished the UN to study the arms problem the U.S. would support a UN Commission. We had been rather dubious as to this position but had finally decided to put it in. If you were able to get a UN force in the area, a means of dealing with indirect aggression, a mechanism for economic development, then you might want to consider disarmament. This was, however, a matter which could raise complex problems.

A final point in the President’s speech was that the U.S. would continue to support national development programs. Regional programs would receive our support should the countries directly concerned desire it and if they took the initiative in developing sound projects.

There followed a brief discussion as to whether the USSR would raise the question of Chinese representation.

The discussion then turned to next steps in the Assembly. The Secretary stated that we had a number of draft resolutions but had not yet come to a decision as to whether they should be presented. His disposition ran toward suggesting that the Japanese reintroduce their resolution on Lebanon.⁴ The Secretary made clear that this was a tentative view on his part.

Mr. Lloyd said that British preliminary thinking with regard to Jordan was to give the Secretary General fairly wide latitude to arrange for a UN presence there and ultimately U.K. withdrawal. In the course of this discussion there was general agreement that an Indian draft resolution which “called for” the U.S. and U.K. to withdraw their forces or one which “requested” the withdrawal of forces would be unacceptable.

Mr. Lloyd returned to the need for maintaining momentum in the Assembly after the President’s speech. He was concerned that a great many resolutions might be introduced. The Secretary General’s feeling was that an interim resolution or resolutions covering Lebanon and Jordan should be passed authorizing the Secretary General to discuss with the governments of Lebanon and Jordan the means of expanding the United Nations presence so as to facilitate U.S. and U.K. withdrawal. The Secretary General then felt that the Assembly could adjourn for four weeks to resume its special session a week before the regular session was due to meet.

The Secretary inquired if Mr. Lloyd felt the position in Jordan could be held for four weeks. Mr. Lloyd said he did not know, that the situation was really “pretty ropey”. The King appeared to have a fair measure of support. Admittedly there was a great deal of opposition to him, but elements like the Palestine refugees would oppose any government. There was a chance that if they thought we would succeed in a UN arrangement for Jordan, the regime would survive. He did not like to leave the gap which the Secretary General’s plan would involve, where for a period of weeks there would be doubt as to the future of Jordan.

The Secretary commented that he did not think that more could be attained with regard to Jordan than a mandate to the Secretary General. None of us could make a case for a solution which the General Assembly could adopt. The only reason for Jordan’s existence was that it was preferable to its non-existence. The state was unviable, had a terrible refugee problem and had no tradition or history.

Mr. Lloyd felt there was just a chance that even the Egyptians would prefer Jordan’s existence to its non-existence for a while. The Secretary said that the question was that if Jordan collapsed, would the Israelis move in? What was important was what the UAR thought the Israelis would do. If the UAR thought the Israelis would touch off a big war, it was doubtful if the UAR would want Jordan. In such a war the UAR would suffer an initial defeat by the Israelis. The UAR would then need aid from the USSR. Aid to Israel would be forthcoming from Western countries. The area would be off to what would at least be something like the Spanish Civil War.

Mr. Lloyd said that he had spoken to Mrs. Meir on the previous day. She had left the impression that if Jordan collapsed, Israel would march in. She was concerned at the prospect of Israel taking jurisdiction over territory on which 850, 000 Arabs were living and seemed to recognize that there would be no prospect of these Arabs leaving that territory. She would be happy if the U.K. was remaining on. She had said that the present frontier between Israel and Jordan would be tolerable if there were some sort of international permanence in Jordan. The Egyptians also might feel they should let Jordan continue to exist. The Russians, however, might behave mischievously.

The Secretary commented that he was seeing Gromyko at six o’clock that afternoon.⁵ He had nothing particular to say to him but was acting primarily to return the courtesy of Gromyko’s call on the Secretary of last October.

Mr. Lloyd commented on discussions he had had with the Secretary General who had said that he already had pretty wide authority with regard to Lebanon. As to Jordan he was prepared, among other things, to stretch the authority setting up UNTSO. Would this give permanence to Jordan? It would depend on Egyptian good will. It might last.

Mr. Wilcox commented that the Secretary General would really have to stretch the authority of the UNTSO to place it on the border between Syria and Jordan. Mr. Lloyd said that the Secretary General felt he could do this. He wished some vague formulation which he could carry forward for some distance. He did not feel, when he spoke to Mr. Lloyd, that he could create a new UNEF.

Sir Pierson Dixon reported on a subsequent conversation he had had with the Secretary General, who seemed to be developing more ambitious plans for Jordan. He was now thinking in terms of something on the order of a new UNEF with perhaps as many as 4, 000 men in it. He was attracted by the fact that such a UN force would need a supply line through Lebanon and Syria. Mr. Hammarskjold wished to try out this idea on Fawzi. The Secretary General felt that it was to the UAR’s interest to sustain Jordan’s independence.

In the following discussion there appeared to be general agreement that Jordan should be handled in one stage by the General Assembly rather than the two-stage manner proposed by the Secretary General. We might wish to press the Secretary General to drop his idea of recessing the special session of the UNGA. Sir Pierson Dixon said that if it was decided to put a UNEF into Jordan, the two-stage operation would be necessary. If it were to be handled in any other way a single stage operation would be preferable.

Mr. Lloyd commented that the timing was connected with developments in Lebanon. It would be impossible for the U.K. to remain in Jordan after U.S. forces had left Lebanon.

The Secretary said that it was hard to predict how long our forces would be remaining in Lebanon. Some troops at least would probably leave when General Chehab came into office. We had taken one Marine battalion out this morning.⁶ It was being rotated back to the United States. We were, however, keeping another battalion afloat with the Sixth Fleet. Mr. Lloyd said that he had been asked at the airport whether the U.K. intended to follow the U.S. example and remove some of its forces from Jordan. He had replied that the U.K. would not have as many troops in Jordan as the U.S. in Lebanon. The Secretary said that we had about 15, 000 troops in Lebanon. Mr. Lloyd said there were about 3, 000 British troops in Jordan. Their situation would be extremely tenuous if matters got bad there. There might have to be a forceful evacuation involving the use of British airpower stationed on Cyprus. Mr. Rountree pointed out the possible consequences should there be British flights over Israel, at the same time Israel was attacking Jordan.

Mr. Lloyd returned to the question of tactics. The British had planned along the lines of first the Secretary speaking, then Gromyko, and then Mr. Lloyd, perhaps on Thursday.⁷ Mr. Lodge felt that Mr. Lloyd could still plan to speak on Thursday if he wished to make the necessary arrangements with Sir Leslie Monroe. Mr. Lodge inquired as to whether the Lebanese and Jordanian delegations had arrived. Sir William Hayter said that he was seeing Abdul Mun’im Rifa’i at 5:00 p.m. Mr. Rountree reported that according to our latest information the Government of Lebanon still had not worked out the composition of its delegation. Mr. Lloyd inquired as to when the Secretary planned to speak. The Secretary replied he would be speaking at some stage in the proceedings, perhaps toward the end.

Mr. Lloyd commented that the Russian objective was to turn the whole Assembly into an operation to get us out of Lebanon and Jordan. We should get the Assembly to take some action with respect to indirect aggression and hostile propaganda. Mr. Lloyd asked how sinister would the Indians be. Sir Pierson Dixon stated they would be a nuisance. He reported that Gromyko had that day had lunch with the Indians and the new Iraqis. He felt the Indian behavior was sympathetic of the behavior we would observe from a number of nations. This pointed up the need for our taking a positive line quickly.

There followed a brief discussion as to when we should introduce resolutions. The Secretary commented that if we sought to have the Japanese reintroduce their resolution we would have to wait until the arrival of Foreign Minister Fujiyama on Thursday. Mr. Lodge felt that we should not sponsor any resolutions. He believed the President’s speech would be the first step in the proper direction, then we would arrange for others to introduce resolutions.

Sir Pierson Dixon thought that our resolutions might be introduced Thursday or Friday. There was a need to consult further with the Secretary General, who was thinking along the lines of perhaps four resolutions. The first would be a general statement of principles, a resolution on Jordan, a separate resolution on Lebanon, and finally a resolution on the withdrawal of U.S. and U.K. forces. Mr. Lloyd said he did not like the idea of a separate resolution on withdrawal.

At this point Mr. Lodge read the text of a resolution which the Soviet Union had just submitted.⁸ It recommended that the U.S. and U.K. withdraw their forces without delay. It authorized the Secretary General to expand the activities of the observers in Lebanon as recommended in the second UNOGIL report.⁹ It proposed that the Secretary General despatch observers to Jordan to observe the withdrawal of British forces after which they should observe the situation along the frontiers of both countries. The Secretary commented that the USSR resolution was an extremely able piece of drafting.

The discussion returned to the problem of whether there should be separate resolutions on Jordan and Lebanon. Mr. Lodge said that he would like to see a combined resolution including language covering non-interference and economic development. We would then seek middle-of-the-road sponsorship for such a resolution. Mr. Lloyd suggested that a working party be formed to draw up such a resolution. There was further discussion as to whether economic development should be included in such a resolution. No decision was reached on this point. The Secretary felt it would be useful to set up a couple of people to draw up one resolution covering Lebanon and Jordan and the problem of indirect aggression and a separate one on economic development. On the question of a radio monitoring unit a separate resolution would probably be required. The Secretary said that while we would like to see such a resolution get through the Assembly, he had grave doubts as to its prospect of passage.

The final portion of the meeting was taken up with the discussion of our possible reaction to the Soviet solution. Mr. Lloyd pressed hard for the joint introduction as quickly as possible of a resolution which would clearly set forth the positions we had taken on Jordan and Lebanon. He felt this would put us in the best tactical position before the Assembly and allow for a compromise between our and the Soviet Union’s resolutions more nearly to our liking. The Secretary outlined briefly the points that such a resolution might contain. It was agreed that a draft of such a resolution would be prepared for further consideration.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1087. Secret. Drafted by Bergus. The source text indicates that the conversation took place in the Secretary’s suite in the Waldorf Towers.
2. See Document 269.
3. See Document 265.
4. See Document 195.
5. See infra.
6. On August 11, General Twining reported to the President that the Joint Chiefs were making plans for the withdrawal of troops from Lebanon. He thought that any withdrawal of U.S. troops should be done quietly and with dignity, without making a fanfare. Eisenhower agreed, commenting that he would have to look at any specific proposal. (Memorandum of conference with the President; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)
7. August 14.
8. U.N. doc. A/3870, August 12; printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, p. 1031.
9. U.N. doc. S/4069, July 30; printed in part ibid., pp. 1006–1009.