Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

266. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, August 12, 1958—5 p.m.

468. King Hussein summoned British Ambassador Johnston/myself Palace 1400 local time today. On arrival found Prime Minister Rifai with King [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Hussein opened conversation by saying he concerned with press reports effect US/UK likely put forward proposal GA meeting calling for UN police force protect Jordan against external aggression/infiltration, same time request creation UNOGIL type organization guard against internal subversion. He said he had called in Ambassador Johnston/myself in order clarify HKJ position:

[2 paragraphs (41/2 lines of source text) not declassified] [6 lines of source text not declassified] Re external aggression it will welcome UN declaration guaranteeing its frontiers but from practical standpoint it will continue rely principally on US/UK assurances.

(D) HKJ endorses any UN attempt halt misuse radio, press other mass media means propaganda as instrument one government interfere internal affairs other. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

(E) In view persistent reports US/UK delegations UN engaged working out acceptable formula deal Jordan/Lebanon problems with representatives other friendly states Hussein requested HKJ be informed any such proposal which directly affects Jordan before it is presented GA or even seriously discussed other powers.

Ambassador Johnston said while he fully appreciated Hussein’s views speaking personally and not officially felt UN could make substantial contribution Jordan security. Rifai snapped back Jordan’s experience UN past ten years was not such encourage faith/ability UN discharge any duties assigned it. [21/2 lines of source text not declassified] Ambassador Johnston made two or three additional attempts sell idea UN might have useful role to play in present situation but failed get any agreement from either Hussein/RIFAI except expression of willingness have UN monitoring group visit Jordan if UAR willing do likewise.

RIFAI said both King and he becoming increasingly concerned over foreign press reports effect Hussein should abdicate, internal security situation critical, impossible present government last another six months. He felt this approach not only reflection on HKJ but equally on intentions US/UK support country to which they had given unqualified assurances. I replied that although several stories Anglo-American press painted grim picture Jordan future HKJ is not entirely free blame. Cited complaint presented me by New York Times representative on behalf American correspondents pointing out English version King’s speech² not available in time clear for morning state-side papers, censor received text only ten minutes before normal closing hour, result only coverage available American press was that picked off Reuters ticker. This most unfortunate for Jordan since initial impact millions American readers lost by purely mechanical breakdown HKJ Public Relations Office. Rifai apologized for foul-up, said he unaware conditions, made notes correspondents request that I remembered, promised he would institute immediate steps correct situation. Hussein asked that both Johnston/myself urgently convey his position re UN activity Jordan to our governments order forestall any proposal which might prove embarrassing if they were such as to require rejection by HKJ order protect its national sovereignty, avoid charge it unable deal with its own security problems.

Comment: I detected more than slight suspicion on part both Hussein/RIFAI they feel major powers might be tempted sacrifice Jordan interest in order achieve wider agreement entire ME problem. They left little doubt HKJ determined resist any attempt use UNEF for UNOGIL type organization deal Jordan problem and on basis UN record to date one can hardly blame them.³

Wright

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/8–1258. Secret; Niact. Also sent to USUN.
2. The speech was delivered on August 11 on the seventh anniversary of the King’s succession to the throne. (Telegram 466 from Amman, August 12; ibid.)
3. The Delegation in New York responded directly to this telegram, in telegram 3 to Amman, repeated to the Department as Secto 4, August 14. The delegation noted that the British thought they had dissuaded the Jordanian Government from its strong opposition to U.N. involvement in Jordan. The Embassy in Amman was instructed to make another attempt to do so. (Ibid., 785.5441/8–1458; included in the microfiche supplement)