Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

262. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, August 9, 1958—2 p.m.

1017. London for Murphy. Yesterday I visited Jumblat at latter’s urgent request. Meeting took place in the Chouf at a village not far from Barouk.

Druze rebel leader said opposition were disappointed at inability of General Chehab to persuade Chamoun to form an interim government as a necessary prerequisite to immediate pacification of Lebanon. An even greater stumbling block was continued presence in Beirut of President Chamoun.

Upon questioning it became clear that Jumblat is now prepared to make a deal whereby Chamoun might leave country in invitation by some friendly government or even on an official mission, e.g. to UN, but without necessity of resigning as has been opposition’s consistent and most strident claim. At the same time Chamoun would appoint a caretaker government to be agreed upon between himself, Chehab and opposition. If these conditions were fulfilled, Jumblat said he could persuade other opposition leaders such as Rashid Karame, Sabri Hamade and Saeb Salaam to go along and indicated Lebanon could promptly be pacified through efforts of caretaker government, General Chehab and opposition leadership.

I said I had been consistent throughout Lebanon insurrection in stating belief that principle should be adhered to of Lebanon’s Presidents fulfilling their constitutional terms of office. In consequence, we had always felt Chamoun should remain President until September 23. As to formation of caretaker government, this was a matter of Lebanon’s domestic politics. However, it seemed essential if any compromise were to be worked out that one should know identity of Ministers who would make up Cabinet successor to present government. Although principles, as Jumblat was first to acknowledge, were important, in a country like Lebanon personalities frequently came first. I was certain that both Chamoun and Chehab would have to know who would replace Sami Solh and company before President could be asked to consider a mission abroad.

I gave no encouragement to Jumblat’s suggestion and made it explicitly clear that although I was interested in listening to his proposals, US was not a go-between.

Comment: If Jumblat indeed speaks for opposition leadership, his suggestions mark a significant shift in opposition attitude. I believe Department should give serious consideration to possibility of extending an invitation to Chamoun for an informal visit to the US. With such an invitation it is highly possible President might indeed absent himself from Lebanon throughout brief remainder of his term. Since it would be Chamoun who would appoint caretaker Prime Minister, his face would be saved and there could be a deal negotiated between Chehab, incoming Prime Minister and opposition leaders for prompt pacification of the country.

Key to such a compromise is Chamoun. I should not wish to approach him even indirectly (i.e. through Chehab or some other Lebanese personality) without knowing Department’s views. If I may be so bold as to offer a suggestion, I should say that a friendly invitation from President Eisenhower for Chamoun to visit him at Gettysburg would be eagerly accepted.

It is fairly clear that if some such compromise is not found, Lebanon will continue its present hazardous course until September 23 and task of new government in re-establishing security and national unity will be made more difficult.²

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/8–958. Top Secret. Repeated to London.
2. McClintock expanded on this prediction in telegram 1077 from Beirut, August 12. He noted that the situation in Lebanon had grown worse on the domestic political front, despite the fact that Chehab had persuaded the opposition to curtail their insurrectionary activities. McClintock concluded that he was becoming persuaded that, unless Chamoun left the country in response to an invitation from abroad, the situation in Lebanon would continue to worsen with prospects for the success of the Chehab administration after September 24 becoming correspondingly more difficult. (Ibid., 783A.00/8–1258; included in the microfiche supplement)