Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

Addis Ababa, August 8, 1958—3 p.m.

165. Cairo for Hare from Murphy. After a curious day of waiting August 6 for Nasser to make up his mind we received word at 7:30 p.m. that he would receive Hare and me at Nasser’s residence at 9 p.m. Reasons for delay were explained in my message from Cairo² and related to Nasser perturbation when he was informed by somebody at 7 a.m. August 6 regarding Lodge’s procedural reference to July 18 US resolution on Lebanese complaint plus Secretary’s statement at Rio.³ We were informed by Mustapha Amin and Ali Sabri that Nasser’s immediate reaction was that he was to be made the whipping boy in what was essentially conflict between US and USSR. He was indignant and uneasy. Hare and I decided to sit out convinced that by evening realities would become apparent to Nasser. This proved to be the case.

At beginning of conversation Nasser was ill at ease and I thought uncomfortable because of his hasty morning reaction. There was a brief reference to “such things will happen” which we shrugged off as unimportant with a tactful suggestion we were happy our interpretation conveyed to him earlier proved correct. We also referred to constructive and friendly attitude toward ME problems manifest in President Eisenhower’s press conference yesterday.⁴ Hare read excerpts to which Nasser lent attentive and I think appreciative ear.

Conversation opened on rather heavy note when replying to our words of thanks for interrupting his vacation plans on our account Nasser stuffily said always glad to see anyone who came with understanding of dignity, equality, etc. He was even stuffier when he added that after Lodge’s reference to July 18 resolution he had asked himself whether any useful purpose would be served by talking to me in friendly fashion while USG was preparing to attack him in SC.

I said my visit to Cairo was simply another bit of evidence of desire of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles to work cooperatively for solution of ME problems which will not only bring peace and stability but better living conditions and understanding of US purposes to the area. We welcome his views and ideas. Nasser pointed out Hare’s past efforts to convince him regarding peace and stability which had he said become stock words.

I asked whether he was interested in my conversations in Lebanon and other points visited. He seemed eager to hear about them and visibly relaxed when he felt he was receiving confidential fill in. (Mustapha Amin later said Nasser had in mind confining to courtesy call but that our forthcoming approach changed his mind.)

Lebanon: I described situation as I saw it, giving reasons US military intervention with references to public explanation of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. I referred especially to latter’s July 31 statement re withdrawal US forces.⁵Nasser inquired why US build-up in Lebanon continued. I said “well you are a military man and President Eisenhower has, you will agree, a fair amount of experience in that field. When he decided to respond to the urgent appeal of the friendly Lebanese Government for military intervention, he was obliged to plan it on an urgent basis and to make provision for all contingencies. President Eisenhower is not in the habit of conducting military failures.” Beyond Lebanon itself was the problem of possible reaction from other sources. At time of Suez we had heard many threats of Soviet “volunteers” etc. We did not pretend to know what Soviet reaction would be to this test. Soviet reaction thus far had been a revelation to me personally and I thought Nasser also might have learned something from the operation. (He agreed with a smile that he had.) I said I was sure that he understood how a military pipeline operated once an operation had commenced, and the extent of the logistic features. Much equipment, administrative, medical items now necessity would continue to flow even after the primary purpose of the operation had been achieved as I firmly believed they had been in present case. He should relieve his mind if he entertained anxieties which Cairo press seemed to manifest over “aggressive” US intentions in ME. The foregoing seemed to be well received and led to a detailed discussion of Lebanon. Nasser demonstrated he fully acquainted with details of Lebanon political situation and personalities.

He declared UAR fully supports Lebanon independence and integrity. He personally convinced it in his best interest for Lebanon remain independent. His grievance rested in use of Beirut as center for anti-Nasser activity and propaganda spearheaded by Chamoun. He volunteered opinion that Chamoun because of hostility he had generated on part many Arabs would be well advised to take long vacation outside Lebanon. Even the lives of Chamoun’s children might not be safe. He deplored this but said it was a fact.

For Chehab whom he does not know personally he expressed respect and even admiration. He recognized the complications of Lebanon political and social structure. He would cooperate and there should be no fear he said of evil UAR intentions. He preferred to see Lebanon independent but did not want it hostile to Cairo. He indicated exaggerated information re US build-up at Adana. Again I said we had a strong striking force there because we did not want any risk failure.

Nasser said frankly as a military man he just could not believe it earlier but was quite willing now to be convinced that US military intervention limited to Lebanon. He honestly believed he said we originally intended to attack Iraq. I asked him why he thought so and he shrugged his shoulders. He just could not believe we were interested only in Lebanon. I said while we had to be prepared for all contingencies once operation started, in my personal opinion last thing President Eisenhower desired was to have US forces scattered all over area in Iraq, Syria, etc. Flying last Sunday over the inhospitable wastelands which make up part of Iraq I was convinced of the wisdom of that point of view. He said he thought unless evacuation process started soon he feared danger of incidents involving US soldiers and feared we would blame him.

[Here follows discussion of Iraq.]

Jordan: This subject became the center of our talk. It recurred several times. I expressed concern over the fragility of present position; told Nasser something of my impressions during recent Amman visit; Hussein’s abhorrence of the Baghdad brutalities and his obvious dread of assassination; Hussein’s confidence in fidelity of his army; his statement he would not abdicate and his reference to temporary character of British troop presence; the acute political and economic problems; Israeli sensitivity. I expressed opinion if UAR intervention should occur Israel would attack and that would be situation US could not control. I said I thought Jordan at present represents febrile point in ME complex. I inquired whether he had any solution in mind which would relieve tensions in area. Did he foresee some form of international guarantee of Jordanian independence in which for example UAR could participate? Nasser became grave and reverted to subject several times thereafter. He declared we could be assured UAR and he especially were not promoting an uprising or disturbance in Jordan and did not intend to do so. Jordan is a liability and is not viable. He failed to see how Hussein could survive with over 90 percent of population opposed to regime and a most adverse economic situation. Nasser said he personally abhors assassination and is opposed to it as a political means. He understands Hussein’s natural repugnance. He attributed his differences with Hussein to latter’s mother who he said blames Nasser for overthrow monarchy in Egypt. Nasser said overthrow of Farouk is in itself best example how wrong Hussein may be in his confidence in fidelity of army. Plot against Farouk regime had existed for ten years in secrecy before it was executed. Same thing was true in Iraq where even Nuri Said’s military aide was involved. As suspicious as Nuri was even he was completely caught by surprise by the Baghdad coup. Thus he felt sorry for Hussein who was a nice young man in an impossible situation.

He said he really does not know the answer to my question what solution for Jordan would be best and promote relaxation of tensions. Anything might happen and he said he is fully aware of Ben Gurion’s attitude. Of course if Israel attacked UAR would counter attack. That could be very serious. The danger is a source of grave preoccupation. Yet he fails to see how an international guarantee can cure an internal situation. At same time Hussein incapable he thought of action to cure it. Obviously Hussein cannot recall Nabulsi who is still under house arrest although he learns that Hussein considering doing just that. Large numbers of officers and civilians are in prison for security reasons. Many others he said daily are fleeing into Syria. He complained of scurrilous Jordanian radio attacks on UAR and himself.

We finally left the subject with my suggestion that if he develops any helpful ideas for solution of Jordanian problem which affects his own security much more than ours we would be glad to hear from him. He seemed to take kindly to this and to be rather flattered by it.

[Here follows discussion of a variety of issues relating to the Middle East: Israel, Arab nationalism, collective security, arms, Soviet and U.K. involvement in the area, propaganda, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.]

However, in final survey of situation Nasser noted that causes for US–UAR conflict might be in process reaction as result Iraqi revolution, prospective solution of Lebanese situation and hope for improvement UAR-Saudi relations, although Israeli problem of course remains and corruption in Jordan could have unpredictable consequences.

I came away also convinced effective US military intervention in Lebanon may exercise excellent effect on Nasser’s outlook and attitude.

Bliss

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/8–858. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo. Murphy traveled from Beirut to Cairo on August 6 and left Cairo for Addis Ababa on August 7. For his own account of the background to and meeting with Nasser, see Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 498–506.
2. Telegram 427 from Cairo, August 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.13–MU/8–658)
3. For text of Lodge’s statement and the draft resolution of July 18, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 990–991; for text of Dulles’ address at Rio de Janeiro on August 6, see Department of State Bulletin, August 25, 1958, pp. 304–309.
4. For the transcript of President Eisenhower’s press conference on August 6, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 587–597.
5. At his press conference on July 31, Dulles was asked to discuss the conditions under which U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Lebanon. Dulles indicated that a number of factors would bear on that decision, but he stressed that “we would not remain in Lebanon after we had been asked to withdraw by the duly constituted Government of Lebanon.” For the transcript, see Department of State Bulletin, August 18, 1958, p. 271.