Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

221. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 23, 1958, 3 p.m.¹

Washington, July 23, 1958, 3 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Dulles
• Mr. Allen Dulles
• Mr. Rountree
• Mr. Reinhardt
• Secretary Quarles
• General Twining
• General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of the problems involved in dealing with Arab nationalism, and evolving a viable policy to protect U.S. interests in the Middle East while maintaining support for Israel.]

Secretary Dulles next took up the draft of a possible answer to Prime Minister Macmillan’s letter requesting that we send troops into Jordan.² The President asked whether we expect to be able to get a line of communications operating through Aqaba before the end of the week, and Mr. Quarles and General Twining told him that we do, with use of road and railroad between Aqaba and Amman.

Regarding Jordan, the President said the question in his mind is what kind of outcome we can foresee in the long run if the government is kept in power simply by outside troops. Mr. Dulles recalled that we had not wanted the British to go in. The President saw difficulty in continuing to back Hussein since we do not have as strong a legal basis as we do in Lebanon. Mr. Dulles said that in a sense Jordan lies in the main stream of the flood of which he had spoken. However, we cannot abandon them. Also, we must think of what Israel would do if Jordan goes down. It is clear they would act, and would win initially. The Soviets probably would aid the Arabs, however, and war would widen, with great pressure on the United States to support Israel. He added that the overflights are troubling the Israelis very much, and that they have suggested we bring out that we are taking food and medical supplies to the Jordanian people. Mr. Dulles added that the British may decide not to stay on if we do not send in forces.³ He said an Israeli had told him that if Jordan falls into chaos the armistice becomes inoperative. While it is not wise to prop up Hussein in a nonviable state, it is clear that Israel would take over much of Jordan in the event of revolt. There was then discussion as to how to get Britain out of Jordan without starting a general war in the area. Mr. Rountree suggested looking to the United Nations, indicating he could not see how to achieve a British withdrawal without a loss of face on their part. The group then edited passages in the proposed message referring to this matter.⁴

In a final comment Secretary Dulles observed that we are laboring under an inherent disadvantage in this area in that we are trying to protect interests of long standing.

G
Brigadier General USA

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The full text of this document is scheduled for publication in volume XII.
2. Document 214.
3. In a telephone conversation with Dulles earlier in the day, Eisenhower commented that it looked to him as if Macmillan had lost his nerve. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. Infra.