220. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 23, 1958, 11 a.m.1
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Under Secretary
- Mr. Reinhardt
- Mr. Rountree
- Mr. Berry
- Mr. Jandrey
- Mr. Macomber (latter part)
- General Twining
- Mr. Quarles
- Mr. Sprague
- Mr. Allen Dulles
- Mr. Norman Paul
SUBJECT
- Jordan
The Secretary opened the meeting by stating that he wished to discuss with those present the letter to the President from Prime Minister Macmillan which had just been received urging us to send US troops to Jordan.2 The Secretary said he wanted to obtain the views of those at the meeting prior to his discussion of this subject with the President this afternoon.
The Secretary said that he had been dubious of the utility of sending forces to Jordan from the very start. He said that he had suggested to Prime Minister Macmillan last week that the British wait until our large air sortie had been flown over Jordan, to see whether this show of force was sufficient to stabilize the situation. However, before the air mission was flown, the British had already commenced to send in their forces.
The Secretary said that the primary problem as he saw it was the question of what the Israelis would do if the Western military forces are withdrawn from Jordan. The Israelis, of course, assume—as we do—that in that event the present Jordan Government would fall. Would they then move into Jordan, at least up to the West bank of the Jordan River, and would that start a general war? Mr. Rountree said that the Israelis would not necessarily move; General Twining felt that they would.
The question arose about the type of government which would appear in Jordan after Hussein was overthrown, and with whom it would probably be allied. It appeared highly probable that a leftist government would gain power and, according to Messrs. Rountree and Berry, its orientation would be toward the Egypt–Syria axis rather than toward Iraq.
[Page 375]Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that he felt sure that Israel would readjust its frontiers to the West bank of the Jordan River if the present Jordan Government went out of power. The Secretary asked if this would re-commence an Arab-Israel war. Mr. Allen Dulles said “maybe”. Mr. Rountree indicated, however, that the Arabs would have to fight or their treasured “one-nation” concept would be finished. Mr. Rountree also said we must keep in mind that a Saudi Arabian coup is most likely soon after there is clear evidence of our withdrawing support from the Jordan Government and its consequent downfall.
Mr. Quarles asked about the northern-tier-plus-Jordan threat to Iraq; had it been fully forestalled. The Secretary thought that it had, as did Mr. Rountree.
General Twining spoke of the military situation in Lebanon and indicated that our posture there was now such that we could withdraw gracefully (in the military sense) if it became desirable to do so. The Secretary stated that he felt that the Lebanese situation might work out all right. In particular he alluded to the fact that Lebanon was, in itself, a viable state, whereas Jordan was not, and could not stand by itself economically. Lebanon, however, may survive under some form of UN umbrella.
Mr. Allen Dulles and the Secretary agreed that the Soviets were very much afraid of a war commencing in the Middle East at this time. The Secretary said that this being the case, we could risk a great deal there if we so desired, but he saw no possibility of concrete gain in doing so.
Mr. Allen Dulles said that Jordan might be at least retained by us until a Summit meeting took place, so that we could use it as a pawn in any settlement. He asked whether we could not send a MAAG mission there to maintain a facade of troop support without overly committing ourselves. The Secretary replied that, if you commit US prestige sufficiently to satisfy those requesting men and matériel, you then lose too much if and when you are forced to withdraw.
Mr. Quarles stated that he thought the British would keep their troops in Jordan if we only provided them with logistic support. Mr. Allen Dulles concurred, but said that the British alone could only retain control in Amman, not the remainder of the country.
The consensus of this portion of the meeting seemed to be that: the British can hold the portion of Jordan around Amman if they have logistic support; probably they can be convinced to remain there if we take over this aspect of the problem; and they can only be dislodged if the larger portion of Hussein’s army defects and, with aid from the outside, attacks.
[Page 376]There was then some discussion on the problem of logistic support. General Twining said that the British were now sending in 20 of their aircraft each day. If we took over the Jordan supply problem, they said they would need 6 C–124’s a day until July 26, and 4 C–124’s a day thereafter. General Twining stressed, however, that this British estimate was probably much too low and they would raise it once they had us committed. In particular, they would aver that they had landed their forces with only small arms and what they carried in their packs, and they required their armour to retain control of the situation.
Several expressed their understanding that the supply problem could eventually be licked by making use of the ramshackle railway line which goes south from Amman to about 70 kilometers from the Port of Aqaba. Mr. Quarles mentioned in this regard that the British themselves should be able to take over the supply problem once that route was repaired (possibly by our engineers) and British commercial shipping could transport the supplies to Aqaba. Therefore, continued Mr. Quarles, the only question is how long we need send in supplies by air before the British can take over the supply route by ship.
The question was raised of whether the Egyptians would possibly close the Suez to ships bringing supplies for the UK troops in Jordan. Mr. Rountree said he thought that they would not.
[Here follows discussion of problems created by the loss of Baghdad Pact documents as a result of the coup in Iraq.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/7–2358. Top Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted in S/S–RO by R.A. McKinnon and approved as accurate by Reinhardt.↩
- Document 214.↩