121. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1
358. President summoned me this morning. He said “Your government” had consistently underestimated this warning of danger in Middle East. They had thought he was exaggerating for reasons of personal ambition. Now however developments in Baghdad2 had proved him right and US wrong.
[Page 208]President apparently had no hard intelligence on developments in Iraq; certainly none from his own sources. He quoted a fairly extensive message which British Chargé had shown him from Baghdad which said was far more comprehensive than Baghdad’s 82. Chamoun said lines were open to Amman but he had had no information of troubles there following arrest of Radi Abdullah.
Chamoun said in addition to our governments having underestimated his warnings UN had been “blind” and Hammarskjold had by his actions given carte blanche to Nasser. Only thing which surprised Chamoun was that Nasser had not waited until Lebanon had been gobbled up but was now starting against Iraq with Jordan next.
In these circumstances President said he wanted US military intervention in Lebanon within 48 hours.
Chamoun said he did not wish any more inquiries or specifications or conditions re our intervention. He would interpret our intention by our deeds. He wanted 6th Fleet here within 48 hours or else he would at last know where he stood re assurances of support from West. So far as he was concerned he was determined to go down fighting.
I asked if he had made a similar request of British and French. He said he had already called in British Chargé and made such a request; he was seeing French Ambassador at 11:30 and would likewise ask for French intervention which he understood would be largely symbolic because of French lack of means.
I asked if General Chehab had been informed of these appeals and if he was in agreement. He said Chehab had been informed and whether he agreed or not was of no consequence. “He will carry out government’s orders—or else”.
President was in a highly wrought-up mood, obviously angered and filled with a somewhat venomous feeling that events had now vindicated him against erroneous judgments of Western governments and Western press. Department will note he is making this momentous request orally and without other intelligence than what he has heard from Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad radios plus one telegram from British Embassy Baghdad.
I am consulting with French and British colleagues 1 p.m. Will send further comments.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–1458. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, Ankara, Baghdad, Amman, Tel Aviv, Jidda, Damascus, and USUN. Received at 8:35 a.m. and passed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force at 9:30 a.m.↩
- In telegram 82 from Baghdad, July 14, the Embassy reported that at 5:30 that morning a group of young army officers, headed by Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim, executed a coup against the Royal family and the government of Nuri Said, and proclaimed the establishment of the Republican Government of Iraq. (Ibid., 787.00/7–1458)↩