Office of the Historian

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State1

Beirut, July 12, 1958—3 p.m.

325. Ambassadorial SITREP.

(1)
British Chargé who had instructions similar to Department’s 1042 called on Chamoun yesterday. President was in a more relaxed mood than when he saw me as reported Embtel 2583 and gave me exactly same answer that General Chehab was only man who could receive sufficient votes July 24 to be elected President. Chamoun also pointed out as he had to me day before yesterday that whoever was next President of Lebanon would have to rely on Chehab as head of Armed Forces. He thought Chehab could probably do better job with intimate support of army than some other President who might have same experience he had gone through during past two months.
(2)
British Chargé asked Chamoun if it would help if three Ambassadors should separately indicate to Chehab their hope he would accept presidency. Chamoun nodded and said he had no objection.
(3)
French Ambassador, British Chargé and I concur in Chamoun’s assessment Chehab is only potential candidate who can muster sufficient votes July 24. It is likewise highly significant that speaker of Parliament (cf. Embtel 317)4 has “guaranteed” Chehab unanimous vote in House. Three chiefs of mission concur that despite Chehab’s vacillation and susceptibility to advice from cronies with special axes to grind he perhaps is not much worse in this respect than other possible candidates.
(4)

Mood of country is definitely not to tolerate any delay in finding solution to civil war through election of a new President on July 24.

If industrialists turn their workers penniless onto street July 25 conditions of anarchy will prevail. In consequence we recommend we be authorized separately to see Chehab and tell him that since it seems [Page 207] apparent he is only candidate who can command almost universal support and whose acceptance of office might end fratricidal strife we believe as patriotic duty he should accept the presidency.

(5)
All three of us agreed that at times of opportunity we should make it clear to Chehab we are opposed to any dissolution of Parliament and general elections as being conducive to reopening civil strife. We would also oppose any trick formula from opposition for Chehab to become “head of state” on a temporary basis until some other president could be elected.
(6)
If Sami Bey maintains attitude expressed Embtel 2445 he may contribute to easing problem of amnesty by stepping down in favor of a more neutral Prime Minister. This would go far toward appeasing inflamed passions and reestablishing an atmosphere of calm in which we would hope Chamoun could exit gracefully September 23.
(7)
French Ambassador sees Chamoun this evening to make representation similar Deptel 104.
(8)
Please instruct re attitude Department wishes me to manifest on candidacy of Chehab.
McClintock
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–1258. Top Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, and USUN.↩
  2. Document 118.↩
  3. Supra.↩
  4. The reference is in error; it should be to telegram 318 from Beirut, July 12, which reported on a meeting between General Chehab and Speaker of Parliament Adel Osseiran. Osseiran indicated that he had assured Chehab of Chamoun’s support and told him that he was the unanimous choice of the Parliament to succeed Chamoun. Chehab expressed reluctance but did not refuse. He also agreed to use the army to guarantee the security of elections on July 24. The Embassy concluded that Chehab was now willing to accept the presidency if it was offered without conditions attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–1258; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  5. See footnote 3, supra.↩