Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

109. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, June 28, 1958—5 p.m.

5194. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] called at noon today on President to deliver message from Malik indicating he expected little or nothing from UN “and therefore our being able to ask for foreign aid.” Chamoun put very dark interpretation on this message and told [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] it seemed to confirm his suspicion US was wavering in its resolve to give assistance, ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] full account of interview separately.)² President went on to say refusal of Secretary to permit him paraphrase of oral message set out Deptel 4890³ corroborated his suspicion as he “could not even read to his Cabinet message from the Secretary of State.”

General tenor of interview was Chamoun’s conviction matters are rapidly reaching a head in Lebanon. He described intensive night fighting in Tripoli yesterday and several times during interview spoke of an “impending massacre.” However he said he would be steadfast not to ask our intervention unless all his resources had been expended and the “massacre” was upon him.

President revealed complete distrust of Hammarskjold saying he was either “the most conceited man in the world or the most deceitful.” On suggestion GOL should make utmost effort to provide immediate evidence to UN observers he dismissed this as useless.

Minister Finance Edde told me last night Chamoun informed him he was certain of British intervention.

Reasoning set out in Embtel 5180⁴ is, I believe, still valid; but tempo is increasing. We have now established a confidential voice radio link between Chamoun [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and myself. Although I do not expect an oral request for intervention this weekend as Chamoun underlined his forces were still fighting, we do conclude he has given up hope of successfully resorting to UN and that Malik’s message has caused him to doubt bona fides of our offer of military intervention.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–2858. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, and USUN.
2. Memorandum to the Ambassador, June 30. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Beirut Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5159, June 21, 1958–June 30, 1958; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Document 97.
4. In telegram 5180 from Beirut, June 28, McClintock indicated that he had learned from Ambassador Middleton that London intended to recommend a joint démarche to Chamoun on the part of the three Western Ambassadors suggesting a political settlement of the crisis. He noted that all three Ambassadors concurred that under existing circumstances, Chamoun was not inclined to move toward a compromise settlement. McClintock recommended waiting an additional week to determine the success of the Hammarskjöld initiative in reducing UAR intervention in Lebanon. If it succeeded, the three Ambassadors could then build upon that success with a joint approach to Chamoun to propose a political solution. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/ 6–2858; included in the microfiche supplement)