Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

106. Memorandum From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State¹

New York, June 26, 1958.

Following is substance of what Hammarskjold said to Lodge:

1. The situation can perhaps best be summed up by the statement of Gallo Plaza that “the world is being taken for a ride”.

2. In essence, it is a squabble which revolves around Chamoun, who has not been a clever politician and has prevented people accustomed to sharing in the spoils of office from getting their share. This has made enemies out of them and is the basis of the opposition. There appears to be no other common bond between the members of the opposition—certainly not a desire to throw in their fortunes with Nasser.

3. Chamoun has not during this entire period spoken to the people or the opposition.

4. No definite orders have ever been issued to the Army concerning the rebels. As far as the Army is concerned, Chamoun adopts a “Gandhi-esque” attitude.

5. It took the Lebanese authorities six days to produce for interrogation by the UN group the two so-called Syrian staff officers about whom Malik spoke to me almost a week ago. Both of them turned out to be minors, both illiterate, and both said the testimony that they gave was given under duress. They are not Syrian staff officers.

6. The only non-individual weapon which the UN Observer Group has found is one 120 mm. mortar.

7. If the UN Observer Group were to report today its report would explode the whole government case—which the SYG thinks would be a very poor thing to do.

8. While there is “the most solid collusion” between the rebels and Syria, no one produces any evidence which the UN group can report.

9. Ben Gurion calls the Lebanese crisis a “bad melodrama”, the Jerusalem Post entitles it “the phoney war in Lebanon”.

10. On Monday Fawzi told him Nasser had called Prime Minister of Syria and given categorical instructions that as of Tuesday morning, June 24, no further supply of men or material should be made or permitted to be given to the Lebanese rebels. These instructions were given after the SYG’s five hour meeting with Nasser on Sunday during which the SYG says he “pulled no punches”, used “no anesthetics”, and had “never gone so far”. SYG said Fawzi had never lied to him before. The SYG said that he had not the slightest doubt such orders had been given.

11. SYG was certain that information on these orders had gotten straight through to opposition leaders in Lebanon. His reason for this was that they had had a very important meeting Monday night which he understood to have been stormy. In any case, he said it would seem that information would inevitably soon get through when Syrian army received orders in accordance with Nasser’s instructions.

12. The SYG said Fawzi had asked him whether he intended to tell the Lebanese about these orders. Hammarskjold said he would not, because he did not want to be in the middle-man position, and understood why Nasser would not like publicity which created impression that SYG, in one visit, had talked Nasser into changing his policy. Fawzi said this was good, because if there was no amnesty for the rebels, it would be difficult for the SYG to imagine what kind of position he (Fawzi) would be in. The SYG told Fawzi he did not think it was likely, in light of Lebanese psychology, that rebel leaders would be punished.

13. The SYG started his conversation with Nasser by reviewing the Security Council resolution.² He told him he believed it was strongly in Nasser’s interest that the resolution succeed. He told Nasser he did not think the Russians wanted to intervene in the Middle East, but if the UAR got heavily involved, it might, and the whole area would become an area of Western-Soviet conflict. The SYG said he thought Nasser was very much afraid of the Middle East becoming such an area.

14. The SYG said Malik had told him that Nasser had greatly stepped up UAR intervention in Lebanon when Lebanon made the complaint to the Arab League and the Security Council. Nasser told him that all he had done at that time was to lift the ban previously placed against Syrian activities. SYG told Nasser he was not interested in whether the UAR was committing sins of omission or commission. Either was bad. The SYG told Nasser that if he could assume the role of UAR Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he would tell Nasser that he had overplayed his hand very badly and that the best thing for him to do would be to get out and get out quick. Nasser made no comment. The SYG told Nasser that he did not want promises from him but wanted him to consider the situation and act upon it in light of these conclusions. Nasser’s call to Syria and Fawzi’s report to the SYG followed this meeting.

15. He showed us letter he had just written for transmittal to Fawzi. The letter referred to conversations he had had with Nasser and information Fawzi had given him about Nasser’s orders to Syria. The SYG had also spoken to Nasser in very blunt terms about Cairo Radio propaganda and the letter strongly urged that propaganda be stopped immediately. He did not give us a copy of the letter, which he is presumably sending today. The letter also included a statement that the SYG thought that if the UAR carried through with its plans, all foreign intervention would be avoided in Lebanon.

16. The SYG did not reveal to Chamoun this interview and Nasser’s instructions. He told Chamoun only that he was optimistic with “strong sense of responsibility and full integrity” and that he did not think any further UN steps needed to be taken at this time. Contrary to newspaper reports, the SYG said Chamoun had not given him any request for UN police force or asked him for any further action at this time.

17. In his conversation with Chamoun after returning from Cairo, Chamoun asked whether authority of the observers could be strengthened without a new SC decision. The SYG replied that it would not because to strengthen UN position would require it to be able to use force. The SYG thought effects of Chamoun calling on UN to assume this authority would be very bad internally and Chamoun agreed. SYG said SC decisions to give UN observers authority to use force required a decision that aggression had been committed, which he was doubtful could be sustained. He also said he did not feel the SC could delegate its authority under Chapter 7³ to the SYG, i.e., that decision to use force had to be clearly made by the SC.

18. Chamoun asked whether the UN could put a UNEF on the border. The SYG said he could not really judge this question because the big powers would have to make up their minds in light of their own interests. However, he questioned whether there was need for such action, pointing out again that it would mean use of force under Chapter 7. In order to carry out such an operation effectively one to two divisions of troops would be required or the operation would not be worthwhile. It would only be possible to get that many troops from the big powers, which in itself raised many political questions. He also pointed out that the number of troops would be two to three times the size of the Lebanese Government forces, with obvious political overtones. Such force would be bound to run into clashes with unorganized elements of Syrian frontier. He thought this would be opposed by communist agents who he was sure were in Syria and that it might ultimately end in “communist volunteers” arriving.

19. He told Chamoun he thought Chamoun should be very sure about imperative need before he asked for such help. He said Chamoun agreed. Chamoun had commented that he could, of course, ask for help under Article 51 of the Charter.⁴SYG agreed that he could, but pointed out that this also had major political repercussions, and that it would exclude progress which he had reason to expect. Chamoun then said he was not asking SYG for anything at the moment. Gora (?), an assistant to Chamoun, said at the airfield that “if there is no more infiltration we are out of it.”

20. The SYG told Chamoun that if he wanted to wreck everything he felt he had accomplished, best way to do this would be to have newspapers start speculating that Nasser was backing down as a result of the SYG’s visit to Cairo. Fawzi had mentioned this problem to him before he left. Just before SYG’s departure Wednesday, Lebanese Government official had come to him and asked him whether he did not think that they had handled the press situation well. This was obviously a reference to the fact that the press was continuing to treat SYG’s trip to Cairo with great skepticism.

21. SYG said that his plan for settlement of the Lebanese situation included three elements:

(a) Lock internal Lebanese situation into stalemate by fact of the presence of UN observers throughout the country;

(b) Get to Egyptians and tell them that they had to get out quick, including radio propaganda and including actions of both commission and omission, and

(c) Get situation into position where the opposition cannot count on UAR backing and Chamoun could not expect to receive outside aid by simply pressing button. He thought under these circumstances Lebanese would resolve situation themselves.

22. He hoped that the situation could be played out for another week while we watch the results of his Cairo visit. The situation should then settle down considerably, although some shooting would continue until the elections were held on July 24.

23. Lodge referred to the opinion of Plaza that Chamoun apparently hoped to use the trump of Western intervention to maintain himself as President for another term. SYG said he hoped, in view of the results he looks for from his talk to Nasser, if such request for external assistance came, that we would give Chamoun a conditional answer which would not result in immediate intervention. The answer could point out that Chamoun had not made a public statement of his intention not to run, that Army was not vigorously defending the government, that he had not even ordered the Army to do so, etc.

24. SYG regarded the present political situation in Lebanon as an absolute stalemate. He said the Army could not be trusted to support the government. The rebels were not united in action or ideas except in opposition to Chamoun. Both the government and the opposition had about equal strength. Everyone was thinking about what the situation would be tomorrow and were therefore sitting back. No one wanted to do anything irrevocable. The opposition and the government were also keeping in touch with each other through many subtle ways. If foreign influences could be eliminated—if the Lebanese were alone “in one goldfish bowl”—he thought there was a very good chance that a satisfactory political compromise could be achieved.

25. SYG said the main mood of the rebels was anti-Chamoun, whom he described as a very inept politician. While it probably included some strong Arab nationalist elements, the mood was not anti-Western. He could not say the revolt had been “staged” by UAR. Probably both sides were taking a stronger position than they would otherwise because of expectations of outside backing. Neither had revolt been “spontaneous”. It was brought about by cliques of important Lebanese leaders whom Chamoun had removed from office. Cliques had gone to “street” while Nasser was in Moscow. Probably there had been Syrian participation at the outset, but he did not seem to think Nasser had actively condoned intervention until Lebanon had complained to the Arab League and the SC.

26. He thought Druzes were getting some supplies from within Syria by mules over old hashish routes. In north of Lebanon there is also some movement back and forth across borders. He also thought some supplies were coming directly from Damascus. As far as Cairo was concerned he thought it was more situation of letting a situation go on than starting it.

27. UN observers had received practically no concrete evidence of UAR involvement. Chamoun proudly told SYG that Lebanese Army had destroyed two 81 mm mortars with its first salvo in position near Baalbek. SYG asked whether this had been reported to UN observers and commented that two days later (now) Lebanon still had made no report on it.

28. On his general attitude toward situation, SYG said that although he was used to Arab world, he would have to say that he was “shocked”. SYG pointed out extraordinary approach of Chamoun. He told others he would not run for President again but had not told this to Lebanese people. He had not tried to reach opposition leaders to arrange settlement. Opposition leaders were given safe conduct passes through army lines, and were allowed to contact each other by telephone. The Government had not even shut off electricity to rebel centers in Beirut. Chamoun has not made any direct appeal or speech to Lebanese people and he had not taken firm hand within the government. SYG had impression Samei el-Solh was fully loyal to Chamoun. He also was staying on as Prime Minister in order to prevent situation from becoming Christian–Moslem conflict. SYG said all three of the UN Observer Groups and Labouisse concurred in his analysis of the situation.

29. SYG said he was not going to tell this story fully to others (presumably he meant primarily UK and that he does not intend to tell them full story of Nasser’s orders or possibly also his completely frank estimate of the situation. He was very anxious that information about his conversation with Nasser not be revealed).

30. SYG recommends earnestly that we give a chance for the progress he had made with Nasser and Chamoun to produce results.

31. At the conclusion of the SYG’s statement I said that I was astounded at his picture of the situation, which conflicted in so many ways with what we understood to be the case. For example, I said that I was preparing a speech of several hours’ duration consisting of what we believe to be hard facts showing massive infiltration and attempts by Nasser to take over the state.

32. The SYG’s answer was that none of these facts which I had were being given to the UN group and that all that Loutfi, the Egyptian representative, would have to do would be to ask why these facts had not been made available to the group.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–2658. Top Secret. Lodge sent the memorandum to the Department from USUN following his discussion with Hammarskjöld of the results of the Secretary-General’s trip to the Middle East. After meeting with Nasser and Fawzi in Cairo June 22–23, Hammarskjöld went back to Beirut on June 24 for a final discussion with Chamoun before returning to New York on June 26. For background information and public statements relating to Hammarskjöld’s trip, see Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. 4: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1958–1960 (New York, 1974), pp. 106–120.
2. Reference is to the Security Council resolution of June 11; see Document 66.
3. Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter is entitled “Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. For text of the Charter, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949, pp. 95–110.
4. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter preserves the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”