Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

105. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 23, 1958¹

Washington, June 23, 1958

SUBJECT

• The Situation in Lebanon

PARTICIPANTS

• Senator Green
• Senator Fulbright
• Senator Sparkman
• Senator Wiley
• Senator Hickenlooper
• Mr. Carl Marcy
• Secretary Dulles
• Mr. Macomber
• Mr. Farley (first part)

The Secretary led off the conversation by mentioning that the Euratom agreements had been sent to the Congress this morning by the President and stressed the importance he attached to their receiving prompt attention and action by the Congress.

The Secretary said that he wished to discuss the situation in Lebanon. He recalled the meeting which he had had with this group (and others) at the Capitol last May 15 and indicated that he wished to bring them up to date on developments which had taken place in the intervening period. The Secretary explained that the threat to the integrity of Lebanon continued but that the situation had become somewhat more complicated since his earlier meeting with the group. There was no question but what there had been considerable infiltration of personnel and equipment into Lebanon across the border from Syria and that this outside help had made a marked contribution to the disorders which have taken place in the country. The major source of outside agitation, however, was by radio broadcasts calculated to arouse the dissident elements against the government. The UN observers could be helpful in deterring further arms and personnel from coming across the border but this would not in itself solve the situation because of the personnel and arms which were already in place within the country.

The Secretary said that up to now we had difficulty in getting the government to move effectively against the dissident forces within their country. He then described the internal political situation among the pro-Western elements in Lebanon and discussed, in particular, the relationship between President Chamoun and General Chehab. He mentioned the possibility of the situation deteriorating into what is known in the area as a “confessional war.” He added that there were beginning to be some desertions of Moslems from the Army.

The Secretary said that as he had indicated at the earlier meeting, we had, some five weeks ago, given assurances to Chamoun that under certain conditions we would be prepared to send troops to Lebanon. These conditions included, among others, that there would be an official request by the Lebanese government for us to do so and that the government of Lebanon would have taken their case to the United Nations.

The Secretary said that if we should be called upon to send troops to Lebanon, we would be faced with a very serious dilemma. If we did send troops, the repercussions elsewhere in the Arab world would be extremely serious and the position of our friends in other countries in the Middle East would be jeopardized. Our move would be supported by a number of the governments of these states but it would not be popular with large portions of their populations. In addition, he pointed out that once we went in, we would probably have to stay in the Middle East until Nasserism had run its course. On the other hand, if we did not send troops and Lebanon was taken over by the UAR, the position of other friendly governments in the Middle East would also be in great danger and it probably would only be a matter of time before they, too, would be taken over by the UAR. In addition, if we failed to take action when one of our friends in the world was jeopardized, it would have a very serious effect on certain of our allies around the Soviet-Sino periphery. In this connection, he mentioned Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Viet-Nam, and the Republic of China, who would all view our failure to act as an indication of lack of willingness to support our friends when they are in trouble. The overall consequences of not going in if asked would therefore be extremely damaging—probably more so than if we did go in.

But the Secretary went on to say that it was clear that difficult consequences would follow regardless of which course we chose in the face of a request by Lebanon for American troops. For this reason, we were at the present time devoting our efforts to trying to prevent the situation from developing to the point where such a request would be forthcoming. In this connection, we were supporting the present United Nations effort and doing what we could to strengthen the effectiveness of the Lebanese government in dealing with the disorders. We are hoping that a combined United Nations effort on the borders and the government effort within the country can bring the situation under control.

The Secretary mentioned that the strongest card we have to play with Nasser in the present situation is the fact that if he does not discontinue UAR efforts to take over Lebanon, President Chamoun may cash the check which we gave him five weeks ago. The Secretary said that if we do have to send troops to Lebanon, we would not do so under the Middle East Resolution but on the grounds of protecting our interests in the area. (In this connection, however, the Secretary referred to the language in the Middle East Resolution which declared that the “United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.”)

The Secretary then talked generally about Nasser’s tactics and objectives in the Middle East. He likened Nasser’s Pan Arabism to Hitler’s Pan Germanism. Nasser is a demagogue who can stir up the crowds with his speeches but he has not demonstrated, and probably does not have, any capacity to consolidate the gains he has made. The Secretary cited the fact that he had succeeded in taking over Syria but instead of going to work on the legal, administrative, and economic problems involved in consolidating this accomplishment, he had directed his attention to taking over another country. The Secretary felt that in the end Nasser would become over extended and he would be brought down by the problems which he had created for himself. In response to a question, the Secretary said that he thought that the Russians probably had made a similar assessment of Nasser’s future. He thought the Russians were quite willing to use Nasser to displace the pro-Western elements in the Middle East and then plan on moving in on the heels of his downfall and taking over the area for themselves.

The question was asked why Syria seemed to go into the Nasser camp so easily. The Secretary said that he thought this has been the result of fear on the part of many Syrians that if they did not go over to Nasser, they would be taken over by the Communists.

The question was asked that if we sent troops into Lebanon would we not eventually have to send them into other countries in the Middle East such as Jordan and Iraq. The Secretary said that this was a possibility and was another reason why we hoped we would not have to go into Lebanon.

The Secretary was asked whether we had any ability through CIA to organize our own indigenous forces which could be used to combat the insurrectionists. It was suggested that many Turks and others from the area looked like Lebanese and could perhaps be infiltrated as counter forces. The Secretary did not give a direct answer to this question, although he did mention that consideration had been given sometime ago to the formation of a freedom corps made up of nationalities which could be used for occasions such as this. He also made reference to the difficulties of this kind of covert activity, citing the humiliating experience which King Saud had recently undergone when an operation of his backfired.

The Secretary was asked whether DeGaulle was making progress and he replied that the French Premier was making considerable progress. The Secretary paid a tribute to the work done by Mr. Murphy during the Beeley–Murphy good offices and pointed out that the recent Tunisian-French settlement was along the lines worked out by the good offices mission. With regard to Algeria, Senator Fulbright made the suggestion that the French ought to send Governor Munoz-Marin to Algeria to convince the Algerians of the advantages of a Puerto Rican type of solution to their situation.

The question was asked whether Ambassador Malik had been active in the Lebanese situation and the Secretary said that Malik was in constant touch with the Department and was spending his time shuttling back and forth between New York and Washington. In response to another question, the Secretary indicated that the size of the Lebanese army was between 5, 000 and 6, 000 men.

The question of President Chamoun’s running again was raised. The Secretary said that it was out of the question and this was generally understood in Lebanon. However, Chamoun was reluctant to make any formal announcement to this effect as he felt it would completely undercut his influence during the remaining period of his term. The question was asked whether there was any suitable successor to Chamoun and the Secretary replied in the negative. He said there were a number of educated and intelligent people in Lebanon who could take over under normal circumstances but he did not see any leader who was up to the extraordinary requirements of the present situation. The Secretary explained that the Parliament was scheduled to elect a new president in July and that Chamoun’s term ran out in September.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–2358. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Macomber.