Office of the Historian

104. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 23, 19581

Washington, June 23, 1958

SUBJECT

  • Lebanon

PARTICIPANTS

  • Mr. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
  • Mr. Guy Toffin, First Secretary, French Embassy
  • NEA—Mr. William M. Rountree
  • NE—John Dorman

Mr. Lucet said he was calling on urgent instructions from the Foreign Office.

Mr. Lucet recalled that in a meeting with the French Ambassador last Friday, the Secretary had described the complications which might arise if French troops were to participate in a US–UK military intervention in Lebanon.2 The Foreign Office had now instructed the French Ambassador to inform the Department on an urgent basis that (1) it would, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, be far better if military intervention in Lebanon could be avoided altogether, and (2) if Western military intervention were decided upon it would be necessary for the French to participate in it. As the Department was aware, a French cruiser and patrol boat were now off the shores of Lebanon. If a request from President Chamoun for military intervention were received, the ships would be obliged to enter the port of Beirut. France has 4000 nationals in Lebanon as well as important economic and cultural interests which it must protect. If military intervention is undertaken by the West, even without a request from Chamoun, either inside or outside the UN, the French would wish to participate.

Mr. Rountree said he appreciated the promptness of the French Embassy in bringing this to our attention since it would be an important consideration in any decision we might take. The complications involved in French participation in military intervention in Lebanon had already been explained to Ambassador Alphand by the Secretary. At best a response to a call for military intervention would present many complications. The problem was to incur as little unfavorable [Page 171] reaction as possible not only in Lebanon but in other Arab countries. These considerations had no doubt been taken into account by the Foreign Office prior to the despatch of its message.

Mr. Lucet said that on May 16 President Chamoun had asked the French Government to be ready to intervene should the need arise. More recently, the Ambassador had talked with Prime Minister Malik, who had stated that it would be absolutely necessary for the French to participate in any western military action in Lebanon. The Lebanese, Mr. Lucet added, would be pleased to have the French participating.

Mr. Rountree pointed out the necessity for evaluating the effects of intervention not only on the Lebanese but also on the Iraqis and Jordanians and, to a lesser extent, on the Saudis and the Sudanese. In concluding that French participation would complicate military intervention, we were primarily concerned with the adverse reaction not so much in Lebanon as in the other Arab countries.

Mr. Lucet reiterated that he was acting on instructions from Paris. He must, he said, insist on the first of the two points, i.e., that military intervention in Lebanon should be avoided if it were at all possible. He requested on behalf of the Ambassador that this information be passed to the Secretary.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/6–2358. Top Secret. Drafted by Dorman.↩
  2. According to a summary of the June 20 meeting, transmitted to Paris in telegram 4828, June 20, Dulles emphasized to Ambassador Alphand that French participation in a military intervention in Lebanon would prejudice the effort because of opposition to France in the Arab world arising out of the Algerian problem and because of close French ties with Israel. (Ibid., 783A.00/6–2058; included in the microfiche supplement)↩