Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

86. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 6, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Call by Polish Foreign Minister on the Secretary

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki¹
• Others Present:
• Ambassador Spasowski, Polish Ambassador to the United States
• Mr. Z. Janczawski, Interpreter, Polish Foreign Office
• EE—Albert W. Sherer, Jr.
• LS—Edmund Glenn, Interpreter

Mr. Rapacki opened the conversation by thanking the Secretary for receiving him stating that he believed that it was a propitious moment for them to have a discussion. Mr. Rapacki added that he had enjoyed talking over several problems with the Vice President during the Vice President’s trip to Poland² and that he hoped during this meeting with the Secretary that they might also discuss several aspects of US-Polish relations.

Security Council Election

The Secretary stated that there was one point he wished to make immediately, namely to explain why we are supporting Turkey for election to the Security Council rather than Poland. The Secretary referred to his press conference earlier in the day at which a reporter had asked if US support of Turkey rather than Poland was not a manifestation of the “cold war”. The Secretary had replied that our choice in this matter had nothing to do with the “cold war”. He explained to Mr. Rapacki that the US has never supported any one country for election to two major Council seats in the same year and he reminded the Foreign Minister that we were supporting Poland for reelection to the Economic and Social Council. Another example of the same policy, the Secretary explained, is our refusal to support India for the ECOSOC, since we are supporting her for the Trusteeship Council.

Mr. Rapacki replied that he had also had a press conference³ in which he had discussed the Security Council question in terms of geographic representation and had noted his disappointment in the US attitude as he believed the principle of geographic representation was being violated. He added that without proper geographic representation the UN cannot be regarded as a forum for negotiation but simply one ruled by an automatic majority.

The Secretary replied that with regard to geographic representation it is our belief that the seat being vacated by Japan is a “floating seat”. Rapacki replied that it had been his hope that the US this year could maintain its view that the seat was not a permanent Eastern European seat but that at the same time it would support Poland’s election. Rapacki stated that it appeared to him that Turkey was put forward at the last moment which makes it appear that the US will never support an Eastern European country for the Security Council.

Mr. Herter replied that every year we have to choose between friends for many UN positions and that this is often an embarrassing choice which we do not enjoy making. Mr. Rapacki concluded this phase of the conversation by saying that he hoped that in the course of the election the US would act as though Poland were indeed a friend of the United States, and that, even though choosing between friends, the US would not use its influence against the Polish candidacy. The Secretary said that the US would always treat Poland as a friend.

Radio Free Europe

Mr. Rapacki then said that he wanted to raise another matter, namely the problem of Radio Free Europe. He said that his Government could not understand why in the present state of US-Polish relations it was necessary for a radio station under US Government control located in Western Germany to broadcast 18 hours a day in the Polish language. He stated that Radio Free Europe discusses Polish internal affairs in an “inadmissible manner” and in such a way as to contradict the better relations which presently exist between our two Governments. Mr. Rapacki continued that the Polish Government would have no objection if RFE criticism were based on the ideological differences between the socialist and capitalist systems, as such mutual criticism was to be expected; but that the type of critical comment on internal affairs now broadcast was entirely unacceptable. Secretary Herter replied that Radio Free Europe is run by private individuals most of whom are located in New York City. He told Mr. Rapacki, however, that we have had some concern about Radio Free Europe and that we were discussing certain matters with the private people who are responsible for its operation. Mr. Rapacki expressed the hope that the talks to which the Secretary referred would result in certain improvements. The Secretary replied that he hoped so too but that under our system of Government one could never be sure of the influence the Government could bring to bear upon private individuals. Mr. Rapacki remarked that when he had discussed this problem with John Foster Dulles⁴ and with Vice President Nixon the US Government control over RFE had not been questioned.

West German Rearmament

Mr. Rapacki then turned to a problem which he said was more complicated than the first two which had been discussed, namely the problem of West Germany. He said he hoped that the Secretary realized the concern felt by Poland as a result of the arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons. He said that this rearming coupled with West German revisionist propaganda was of deep concern to the Polish people. He said that Poles realized that revisionist tendencies are not deep rooted among the German people, as most refugees have been assimilated into West Germany and would be reluctant to return to their former homes. There is, however, a small and determined group of propagandists working under Government guidance who are attempting to convert the refugees from the border areas into a revisionist force. Mr. Rapacki said that statements by Government officials such as Mr. Lemmer, Minister for All German Affairs, reveal that the West German Government is in fact promoting this revanchist sentiment, and in particular that Mr. Lemmer said assimilation of refugees should be discouraged so that they would remain a force by the existence of which the recovery of the lost provinces would be facilitated.

The Secretary asked if Mr. Rapacki had any quotations from Mr. Lemmer’s speeches which would illustrate this point. Mr. Rapacki replied that he did not have such statements with him but that he would make them available to the Secretary.

Mr. Rapacki then said that another factor which supports revanchist sentiment in West Germany is the ambiguous attitude of the US and the UK toward the Oder-Neisse frontier but that before discussing the border question Mr. Rapacki desired to discuss further the rearmament of West Germany. He stated that in the Polish view such rearmament did not affect the balance of power at the present time but that its implications for the future were very important not only to Poland but also to the US. Mr. Rapacki said that it was his Government’s belief that should Germany once again become strong militarily it would play on the differences between East and West for its own purposes. Mr. Rapacki added that the Poles were not worried by the fact that West Germany was in NATO. What worried them was the possibility that Germany was fast becoming the leading force in Europe within NATO and the principal ally of the US in Europe. This would permit Germany to use NATO rather than to be controlled by it, and would determine the direction of German policy in accordance with the wishes of revisionist elements.

After a brief conversation in which a misunderstanding developed concerning Mr. Rapacki’s remarks about actions by the President while in Bonn on his recent trip⁵ the situation was clarified when Mr. Rapacki stated that he was gratified that the President had failed to provide the revanchists in Germany with any encouragement during his visit to Adenauer.

Rapacki Plan⁶

Rapacki then turned to the plan which bears his name stating that in answer to Western criticism of his first plan his Government had developed the two stage plan which they presently support. Under this plan there would be a freeze on the introduction of additional nuclear weapons into the limited zone to be followed in the second stage by full denuclearization as well as reduction and proper balancing of conventional forces.

The Secretary replied that we have grave reservations about proposals which are of limited scope and we feel that we must approach the subject on a broader basis. The Secretary said that today it is not a question of soldier fighting soldier but rather a struggle between scientists and therefore effective disarmament must be very broad in nature and be accompanied by the settlement of political problems. The Secretary pointed out that nuclear warfare can break out anywhere and that an attempt to make arrangements for only limited areas would not stop war. The Secretary reiterated the thought that we must solve our political problems first and then attempt to rid ourselves of the heavy burden of armaments. Rapacki replied a very practical political problem is created by the policy of equipping the West German army and other armies in this sensitive area of Central Europe with nuclear weapons. He agreed that from the military point of view such additional armaments were of no great importance but he hoped the Secretary would understand the political consequences caused by the rearmament of West Germany. An increase in the number of armies equipped with nuclear weapons would make the disarmament talks more difficult. That is why Poland raises at this time the more limited aspect of an atom-free zone; as for the broader problem, it would be indubitably discussed at the summit where Mr. Rapacki hoped to contribute to the discussion.

At this point the Secretary said that in his view an army equipped with nuclear weapons is less likely to start trouble than one that is not. He said that he believes that any army equipped with nuclear weapons realizes that the consequences of its actions are so serious that it would not undertake use of its weapons without the most serious consideration. Rapacki appeared to be impressed by this argumentation but then remarked that it would be most unfortunate, for example, if Egypt and Israel had nuclear weapons today.

The Secretary reminded Rapacki that at one time the US had had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and had offered to internationalize the methods of production but that its offer had been turned down⁷ and the world is now suffering from such short-sightedness.

Oder-Neisse Line

Mr. Rapacki then returned to the subject of the Oder-Neisse frontier and the discussion which the Vice President had had on this subject with Mr. Gomulka. Mr. Rapacki expressed the hope that the US would not regard the frontier problem in a legalistic manner but rather from a moral and political point of view. The Secretary replied that he could assure Mr. Rapacki that the US was giving careful consideration to this and to all of the other problems Mr. Rapacki had raised but that he regretted he had another appointment and would have to discontinue the conversation at this time. Mr. Rapacki replied he regretted the conversation had to terminate as he had discussed only unpleasant subjects and was about to turn to those aspects of US-Polish policy which were gratifying to his Government. Mr. Herter replied that there had been a great improvement in US-Polish relations and that he hoped very much this would continue.⁸

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 748.13/10–659. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Sherer and approved in S on October 13.
1. Rapacki was in the United States to attend the 14th Session of the U.N. General Assembly September 15–December 13.
2. See Document 73.
3. No record of this press conference has been found.
4. Dulles and Rapacki met in Washington on October 16, 1957; see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXV, pp. 671–677.
5. The President traveled to Bonn August 26–27 during his trip to Europe August 26–September 7 to consult with Western Allies prior to Khrushchev’s trip to the United States.
6. See footnote 5, Document 48.
7. When the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission began meeting on June 14, 1946, the United States proposed the creation of an international atomic development authority to control atomic energy production and to establish effective safeguards against atomic warfare. The proposal, known as the Baruch Plan, was vetoed by the Soviet Union on June 22, 1948.
8. On October 8, Sherer met with Bogdan Lewandowski of the Polish Foreign Ministry, who was a member of the Polish Delegation to the United Nations. Lewandowski had come to Washington with Rapacki and called on Sherer to discuss in more detail some of the problems raised by Rapacki in his conversation with Herter on October 6. Lewandowski urged the United States to take some initiatives as a result of the Nixon–Gomulka conversation which would be helpful in creating a “favorable climate” for the final stages of the nationalization claims negotiations. He suggested the U.S. Government make a general statement regarding the Oder-Neisse frontier such as De Gaulle’s press conference statement of March 25 and use its influence to control Radio Free Europe. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10–859)