Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

70. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 10, 1959.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Polish Relations and the Situation in Poland

PARTICIPANTS

• The Polish Ambassador, Romuald Spasowski
• G—Mr. Robert Murphy
• EE—Valdemar N. L. Johnson

Ambassador Spasowski called at his request to inform the Department about his discussion of U.S.-Polish relations with high Polish officials and other items of interest in connection with his recent sojourn in Warsaw to attend the Third Party Congress.¹ He explained that he wanted the Department to have this information before his planned departure from Washington on April 13 for a month’s auto tour of the western United States with his family.

After dwelling briefly on the satisfaction of his Government over improved U.S.-Polish relations in general, he stated that there was a reservation concerning economic relations, specifically the current economic talks in Washington. He characterized overall economic relations as developing smoothly but he observed that the economic talks were not moving forward as much as expected. He said he had a feeling that, in the U.S. view, the talks were linked with nationalization claims negotiations in Warsaw. If so, he wanted to point out on the basis of Poland’s nationalization claim negotiations with other countries that agreement would take a long time, even though the Foreign Office and other interested Polish ministries earnestly desired an early settlement. A strict link between the claims negotiations and the economic talks did not seem justified, in the Polish view.

The Ambassador stressed the importance of reaching an economic agreement at an early time. He pointed out that there were shortages in cotton and fats in Poland and that a decision on Polish grain policy must be made soon. In fact, he said, the advent of the growing season necessitated completion of the overall agricultural plan by May. A decision already taken to abolish all compulsory agricultural deliveries also entered into the picture. If a U.S.-Polish economic agreement could not be reached by May, it would cause great difficulties. Moreover, May would be a difficult time for negotiation since there would be “other conferences” and Deputy Assistant Secretary Beale would have gone abroad for the GATT meeting.²

Turning to his impressions of Warsaw and the Party Congress, Ambassador Spasowski said he had been struck by the considerably improved availability of consumer goods, particularly from Polish production. As to the Congress, he believed it had stabilized Gomulka’s position to the point where “one cannot talk about opposition to him.” If there were any opposition, he said, its adherents were convinced it was hopeless. In response to a question from Mr. Murphy about Mr. Gomulka’s health, with reference to his illness in Moscow,³ the Ambassador stated that he believed Gomulka’s health was satisfactory.

Mr. Murphy noted that Gomulka never sees any of our people, which leads us to speculate about his knowledge and understanding of the United States and the West. Spasowski replied that Gomulka rarely sees even Poles outside of the top leaders, but that he has a keen interest in the United States and Western countries and reads many reports about them. Spasowski said that he, nevertheless, believed it important for Gomulka to have more contact with Western representatives and had so recommended to the Foreign Office. He observed in this connection how useful it was to have exchanges involving high Polish leaders, such as Jaszczuk who headed the Polish delegation to the United States in October 1958,⁴ whose reports were carefully considered by Gomulka. The Ambassador assured Mr. Murphy that he strongly supports the visit of such high Polish representatives to the United States. Mr. Murphy agreed that such visits were useful.

In apparent anticipation that Mr. Murphy might make some remarks about anti-United States and anti-West statements emanating from the Third Party Congress, Ambassador Spasowski stated his supposition that Mr. Murphy might have noted in reports about the Congress that a strong stand had been taken vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Germany. The Ambassador said that the Polish Government was very worried about the rearmament of West Germany, especially with nuclear weapons, and about German intentions to change the Oder-Neisse frontier in their favor. He observed that none of the Western European countries had declared themselves officially in favor of the Oder-Neisse border and stated that such declaration would do a great deal to ease Polish anxieties. Ambassador Spasowski noted in this connection the desire of his Government to participate in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting⁵ on grounds of Poland’s wartime experiences with Germany.

Recalling that Khrushchev had reopened the question of Berlin at a time when Gomulka was in Moscow, Mr. Murphy inquired if Gomulka had been involved in this development. Spasowski replied that, as far as he understood, Gomulka was not involved but this did not mean that he disagreed with Khrushchev’s position.

Mr. Murphy said that we all recognize Poland’s interest in the German question and stated his belief that the Germans also recognize Poland’s anxiety in this connection. Spasowski asked if German appreciation of Polish anxiety might extend to a recognition of the Oder-Neisse border by the Federal Republic of Germany. Mr. Murphy replied that he would not exclude this possibility. He pointed out that the Germans are also interested in a relaxation of tension, that they learned a lot from World War II and that they want to take a constructive approach to their problems. Referring to unfriendly statements such as the one by Defense Minister Strauss of the Federal Republic saying that advocates of the Rapacki Plan should be considered potential war criminals,⁶ Spasowski speculated that not all Germans had learned appropriate lessons from World War II. Observing that Strauss’ statement apparently referred only to Germans, Mr. Murphy asked if Rapacki was still fervent in support of the Rapacki Plan. The Ambassador replied affirmatively, stating that the Polish Government thought the Plan would prove important both at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers’ meeting and otherwise. He realized the United States had reservations about the Plan but emphasized that Poland believed it to be sound. Mr. Murphy said that, although we did have reservations, we respected Polish opinion.

Ambassador Spasowski reverted to the frontier question, asking if the United States could officially approve the Oder-Neisse border. Mr. Murphy replied that he could not answer that at this time but he assured the Ambassador that the question was receiving most careful attention in the Department. Spasowski said that he was pleased to hear this.

Turning again to the Party Congress, Mr. Murphy asked for an explanation of the term “imperialism,” as used in some of the speeches and resolutions emanating therefrom. He said that we found it inexplicable and even laughable in relation to the way in which it had been used at the Congress with reference to the United States and the West. In response to Spasowski’s reply, that this term had different meanings for different people, Mr. Murphy retorted that there was an apparent opprobrium attached to its use at the Congress. Mr. Murphy then read passages from Defense Minister Spychalski’s speech at the Congress and from the political resolution adopted at the Congress in approval of Gomulka’s political line, in which the United States and Western countries were spoken of derogatorily as an imperialist bloc following aggressive and warlike policies, inciting survivors of German fascism, drawing strength from “the entire Dulles diplomacy from the position of strength and of balancing on the brink of war,” etc.⁷

Mr. Murphy raised again the question of whether the Polish leaders had an adequate knowledge and understanding of the United States and the West. If so, how could they endorse such statements, which were clearly not in accord with the facts? The facts were that, following World War II, the United States had disarmed whereas the Soviet Union had expanded its military strength, building up a situation where we could not sit idly by. We tried to cooperate with the U.S.S.R. in these matters and our cooperation was interpreted as weakness or fear. If the Polish leaders understood the United States and its people, they would know that statements such as they have made about us are not true. We are puzzled by the Polish attitude. Are we expected to believe that the Polish leaders don’t mean these statements? Are these statements being made essentially for other purposes? What is the relationship of Poland to the U.S.S.R.’s “diplomacy from a position of strength” and Khrushchev’s “brinksmanship”? How much freedom of action does Poland have?

Mr. Murphy said that he did not expect Ambassador Spasowski to answer these questions but he wanted him to realize that statements like these have an impact here on the executive branch of the Government, the Congress, and the people. He said that the situation in Poland was followed closely in the United States and that these objectionable statements did not help in our sincere efforts and desire to improve our relations with Poland.

In response to a question from Ambassador Spasowski as to whether the statements had a bearing on the economic talks, Mr. Murphy replied that statements of this nature had an effect on our economic talks. He said that one could not segregate these objectionable remarks from other aspects of our relations, including those of an economic nature. Ambassador Spasowski observed that Poland had offered evidence of its cooperative attitude to the United States by taking a number of steps to improve relations and that admitted disagreement on some issues should not be an obstacle to good relations in other fields. Mr. Murphy agreed but said that the objectionable statements went beyond disagreement per se. He suggested that Spasowski think of this situation in reverse and imagine his reaction if the United States were coming to Poland for cooperation and similar statements were made by United States leaders.

Ambassador Spasowski recalled that this was not the first time this subject had been discussed between our two Governments since 1956 and that he thought the cited statements had by no means been sharper this time than previously. Mr. Murphy expressed the wish that they would have been much less sharp.

It was agreed that press inquiries about the purpose of the meeting should be answered by stating that it consisted of a “tour d’horizon,” following Ambassador Spasowski’s return from Warsaw.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.48/4–1059. Confidential. Drafted by Johnson and initialed by Murphy and Johnson. Spasowski also saw Kohler that day and reiterated the same points expressed here to Murphy. A copy of that memorandum of conversation, April 10, is ibid.
1. See Document 68.
2. The 14th session of the Contracting Parties to GATT met at Geneva May 11–30.
3. Presumably reference is to Gomulka’s attendance at the special Twenty-First Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in Moscow January 27–February 5, but no mention of his illness while attending this meeting has been found in Department of State files.
4. See Document 56.
5. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union met at Geneva May 11–August 5. See volume VIII.
6. Reference is to a speech given by Strauss on November 9, 1958, at Regensburg.
7. In telegram 1182 from Warsaw, March 13, Beam reported that remarks made in a speech on March 12 at the Congress by Spychalski about NATO, imperialists, and the arms race fostered by the United States were sharper than those of other speakers. In telegram 1223 from Warsaw, March 20, Beam reported that Gomulka, in his final address on March 19, referred to the “war-strivings of imperialists, particularly aggressive imperialist American circles and West German militarists.” In telegram 1230 from Warsaw, March 23, Beam wrote that the text of the first resolution of the Congress declared that the “main obstacle to victory principles peaceful coexistence is aggressive direction policy reactionary circles of USA whose main ally in Europe is Federal Republic” These three telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, 748.00/3–859.