Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

64. Operations Coordinating Board Report⁰

Washington, February 11, 1959.

REPORT ON POLAND (NSC 5808/1)¹

(Approved by the President April 16, 1958)

(Period Covered: April 16, 1958 through February 11, 1959)

A. Summary Evaluation

1. In the period under review the Gomulka regime has stabilized its position both externally and internally. Probably as a result of a combination of the Polish regime’s independent initiative and Soviet pressure, Gomulka has placed his relations with the Soviet Union on firmer footing and has rendered less effective the influence of Stalinists at home and abroad who have been a threat to his policies. In the early summer of 1958, the Polish party was isolated from the bloc, particularly on the Yugoslav issue and the Nagy execution in Hungary, but, in his June 28 speech, Gomulka adhered in large measure to the Soviet position in the Yugoslav dispute and made certain accommodations regarding Nagy. He further identified himself with the Soviet view of Yugoslav revisionism during his recent visit to the Soviet Union and came out as well in favor of all major Soviet foreign policy lines. Polish support of Soviet positions on important international issues is not a recent development but rather a continuation of previous Gomulka policies.

2. Despite such efforts on behalf of bloc unity, however, the Polish Government has continued its efforts to expand contacts with the West. The maintenance of cordial state relations with Yugoslavia, and the pursuit of closer contacts with Western countries and institutions are illustrative of limited Polish initiatives in foreign policy which set Poland apart. Fear of Germany, and particularly the rearming of the German Federal Republic with atomic-capable weapons, continue, however, to promote a close alliance with the Soviet Union, as the Polish Government professes to believe this to be the only guarantee of their western territories and their security as a nation. This alliance is further strengthened by economic dependence on the Soviet Union.

3. U.S.-Polish relations continue to be based on the improved conditions which arose at the time Gomulka reemerged, and there has been no indication that the Polish Government intends to restrict markedly presently available opportunities for the United States to exercise its influence in Poland. Frank exchanges of views with Polish officials are possible both in Warsaw and Washington. Polish officials have expressed interest in opening a third round of economic negotiations with the United States and a willingness to enter into negotiations for the settlement of American nationalization claims. A U.S. consulate will open in Poznan early in 1959. Western radio broadcasts continue unjammed by Poland, and distribution of printed material, both government and private, has increased. USIA has begun distribution of the Polish language Ameryka magazine in 32,000 copies monthly. The exchange of persons program is proceeding satisfactorily, and tourist travel has increased. (For further indications of improved U.S.-Polish relations, see paragraphs 17 through 20.)²

4. On the whole, NATO countries have established closer relations with Poland during the report period. No progress has been made, however, in promoting closer relations between Poland and the German Federal Republic; on the contrary, prospects for the resumption of diplomatic relations appear less favorable today than when NSC 5808/1 was adopted in April, 1958. The Polish Government has launched a propaganda campaign to the effect that the German remilitarization threatens the Oder-Neisse territories and Polish security.

5. The Polish people appear to be reconciled to the conclusion that the Gomulka regime is preferable to any presently feasible alternative. However, the population remains persistently anti-Communist and discontented. Popular support of the regime has diminished. The government has moved toward tougher internal policies, including the tightening of control over press and publishing, the broadening campaign against liberal intellectuals, a weakening of the workers councils, and the continued organizational strengthening of the secret police. Despite these unfavorable developments, the Gomulka regime has continued to reassert its belief in certain aspects of its program which represent significant deviations from Bloc internal policies: the voluntary and gradual collectivization of agriculture, abstention from the use of the secret police as a political weapon, coexistence with the Roman Catholic Church, relative academic freedom and freedom of speech, and in general, determination to follow a peculiarly Polish road to socialism. These deviations find their roots in the strong wishes of the Polish people and are not likely to be easily swept aside; they serve as a limit beyond which Gomulka could hardly go in a return to Bloc conformity without inviting serious trouble.

6. No review of NSC 5808/1 is recommended.

B. Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States

7. Popular Misunderstanding of U.S. Policy Toward Poland. There is a tendency on the part of the public and the Congress to expect that closer U.S.-Polish economic relations will produce basic changes in Polish foreign policy. A basic assumption in the formulation of our policy toward Poland has been that the Gomulka regime would not, indeed could not, both for political and economic reasons, deviate from the Soviet foreign policy line to any important degree. Our economic programs do, however, tend to create a favorable climate for other programs we are undertaking and enable the United States to bring influence to bear in Poland which benefits the Polish people and reminds them of our continuing interest in their welfare, serves to orient Poland toward the West, and weakens the internal cohesiveness of the Soviet Bloc. These political motivations cannot be explained publicly without embarrassing Poland and interfering with U.S.-Polish relations.

Status of U.S. Action. Efforts will be continued through personal contacts with correspondents and in closed hearings of Congressional Committees to obtain greater understanding of U.S. policy toward Poland and the rationale behind it.

8. Economic Assistance. In 1957 and 1958 the United States and Poland entered into credit and sales arrangements providing for the shipment to Poland of agricultural commodities, other raw materials, and various types of machinery and equipment. Under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480), Poland has been sold a total of $138 million worth of commodities. Under a line of credit allocated under Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act, Poland received a loan of $30 million in 1957 and $25 million in 1958.³

A major question in granting further economic assistance to Poland (both credits and PL 480 sales) is whether this should be conditional upon substantial progress in the settlement of United States nationalization claims against Poland. A very real problem would arise if settlement of the nationalization claims were indefinitely delayed.

Status of U.S. Action. It is anticipated that the United States will begin claims negotiations in Warsaw early in 1959. The third round of economic talks will begin in Washington following the opening of the claims negotiations. In order to achieve maximum leverage and coordination between the two negotiations, it is planned that the negotiation of claims will be transferred to Washington and signature of aid agreements will be made contingent upon substantial progress toward settlement of nationalization claims. If agreement on claims is not speedily reached, difficulties may arise both in the implementation of FY 1959 aid programs and in the execution of national policy covering economic assistance to Poland.

9. Battle Act Restrictions. Although it has been determined that it is in our national interest on political grounds to provide economic assistance to Poland, the Battle Act now limits the form in which such aid can be given. As Poland is a member of the Warsaw Pact, it has been necessary to assume that it ships arms, ammunition, and implements of war to Soviet Bloc countries. Under the terms of the Battle Act, the President has no discretionary authority to furnish financial or economic assistance to Poland in these circumstances. However, under the provisions of Section 451(a)⁴ of the Mutual Security Act, the President may and has determined that it is in the security interest of the United States to provide assistance to Poland from funds appropriated under the MSA, notwithstanding the Battle Act. There is, however, a ceiling of $30 million on the funds which may be provided to any one country under Section 451 (a) and, in fact, the requirements for such mutual security funds have far exceeded the availabilities.

Status of U.S. Action. The Department of State is preparing an amendment to the Battle Act for possible submission to Congress which would give the Executive greater flexibility worldwide in the granting of economic assistance and would, in the case of Poland, make it legally possible to extend loans to Poland under the Export-Import Bank Act, the Development Loan Fund, and the Mutual Security Act; to lend back to Poland U.S.-owned zlotys which are deposited by Poland against U.S. shipments under Public Law 480; and to furnish economic or technical assistance.

10. Strategically-Rated Goods. Present policy provides that strategically-rated goods, including embargo-type items, from Western countries may be made available to Poland on a case-by-case basis as such goods are shown to be reasonable and necessary to the Polish civilian economy (as determined in each case by reference to the stated civilian uses, and with due consideration to the strategic risk involved).

The Department of Defense has taken the following positions in the ACEP and EDAC:⁵

(a) In implementing the policy, too much emphasis has been placed on the criterion of stated civilian use and insufficient consideration given to the necessity of U.S. strategically-rated goods to the Polish civilian economy, or to the strategic risks involved, especially in view of the fact that the recent revision of the U.S. and international strategic lists has eliminated all items except those predominantly or exclusively usable for military purposes.

(b) There are no effective methods now being employed in the field to determine the actual end-uses of U.S. strategically-rated goods within the Polish economy.

(c) It has not been possible to determine if there have been any violations of Polish assurances with respect to specific shipments of strategically-rated goods.

Status of U.S. Action. The views of the Department of Defense have been considered in ACEP and EDAC, and the prevailing view has been that, since in some cases which have arisen under the case-by-case procedure the commodities in question are technically capable of being used either for civilian or military purposes, it has been necessary, if present policy is to be implemented, to rely upon the statements and assurances of the Polish Government that the commodities will in fact be used for civilian purposes and will not be trans-shipped or re-exported. To the extent possible, the proposed civilian use has been verified on the basis of technical and intelligence information available to the U.S. Government. While there have been reports of possible violations, and these are being investigated, the United States is thus far aware of no cases in which there has been an established violation of Polish assurances. It is recognized that this is a matter which will have to be kept under continuing surveillance. It has also been the prevailing view in ACEP and EDAC that the considerations raised by the Department of Defense relate to differing interpretations of the policy.

11. MFN and GATT. Active consideration is being given (by the Department of State) to recommending to the President at an appropriate time that Most-Favored-Nation treatment be restored to Poland. This action would end the tariff discrimination toward Poland which has existed since 1952, and would thus permit increased export opportunities for Poland in U.S. markets. Poland has for some time expressed interest in joining the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Last autumn, Yugoslavia formally applied for associate participation in the GATT, and Polish officials have indicated that their government would probably be satisfied with a similar arrangement. While the Poles have not yet filed a formal application, it is expected that, if the Yugoslav application is favorably acted on, the Poles will apply for a status similar to that of Yugoslavia.

12. Poland’s Relations with the German Federal Republic. Lack of progress in improving relations between Poland and the German Federal Republic is a serious problem because it tends to strengthen Poland’s ties with the Soviet Union and to complicate Poland’s relations with the NATO community in general; moreover, it directly affects U.S.-Polish relations since Polish officials frequently single out the United States as the country most responsible for remilitarization of the German Federal Republic.

Polish Government spokesmen frequently reiterate the theme that the remilitarization of the German Federal Republic threatens the peace of Europe and the world. In support of this thesis they state that former Nazi generals are in command positions in the present Bundeswehr; they refer to a spirit of revenge as the dominant philosophy of the Adenauer Government; they object to the implicit decision of the Bundestag to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons and explain that no other parliament in any country which does not possess nuclear weapons has passed such legislation; they describe the Bonn rejection of the Rapacki Plan as proof of aggressive intentions.

The proposed Polish solution to the German problem follows the Soviet line: reunification of Germany by the confederation of the two German states, neutralization of the reunified Germany, and creation of a “Free City” in West Berlin. Under these formulations Polish authorities assume that the “recovered territories” will remain part of Poland. The Federal Republic, on the other hand, has not been prepared to recognize the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s western border.

Status of U.S. Action. American officials take advantage of every opportunity in discussion with Polish officials to point out that it is to Poland’s interest to have the Federal Republic tied to NATO, which is an organization for defense in which Germany can act only in concert with its democratic European neighbors and the United States; and that the Federal Republic is now a democratic state of far different character than Hitler’s Third Reich. These arguments have made little impression on Polish officials, however, and there appears little likelihood of greatly improving German-Polish relations as long as the Oder-Neisse question remains unsettled and the rearming of the Federal Republic continues.

The Western Allies have taken the position that the Oder-Neisse line is temporary and that the final boundaries of Germany should be fixed in a peace settlement with the agreement of an all-German government. In view of the complexity of this problem, its implications for U.S. relations with the German Federal Republic and Poland, and the particularly fluid nature of those relations, the U.S. position on the German-Polish border should not be formulated until it appears that serious negotiations on a German peace settlement will take place or that other developments, not excluding U.S. initiative, indicate an impending international discussion of this issue. In that event, high-level U.S. consideration should be given to the problem immediately.

13. Rapacki Plan. The Rapacki Plan concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone covering East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia was recently modified to include the reduction of conventional forces and the introduction of control measures. Although it is U.S. policy to encourage independent foreign policy initiatives of the Polish Government, even the modified Rapacki Plan fails to meet certain fundamental objections and, therefore, cannot be supported. The modified Plan ignores Soviet capability to launch a major nuclear attack from its own territory, thus leaving the proposed limited denuclearized area dependent upon Soviet good intentions while offering no security against Soviet attacks launched over the zone. The modified Plan would also confirm the continuation of a divided Germany and would deprive the West of the nuclear shield to counteract the manpower superiority of Warsaw Pact forces in close proximity to the zone.

Status of U.S. Action. The modified Plan has not yet been formally presented so no official response has been made. It will, however, probably come up for discussion in connection with the larger issue of Berlin and German unity.

14. Batory. The Polish Government was informed in June that the U.S. Government would have no objection, subject to certain assurances and control procedures to the resumption of service to New York by the Polish passenger ship, Batory.⁶ The assurances requested caused no problem, but when the Polish authorities were informed that U.S. authorities would board and search the vessel at each arrival at New York with a resultant delay of probably 10–12 hours, the Poles decided not to resume the service. It is unlikely that the Batory will resume service to New York unless current regulations regarding search of the vessel are changed.

Status of U.S. Action. This problem is under study by the Department of State, which is considering whether to propose to the Secretary of the Treasury a modification in the present port security program relating to this matter.

15. Other Ships. Current U.S. port security policy prohibits the entry of Polish vessels to East Coast and Gulf ports if Polish or other vessels suspected of being under Sino-Soviet Bloc control are already in two other East Coast and Gulf ports. This may become a problem if Poland carries out an announced intention to assign additional merchant ships to service between the United States and Poland, or if other vessels suspected of being under Sino-Soviet Bloc control begin calling in greater numbers at U.S. ports.

Status of U.S. Action. On February 10, the Department of State transmitted a letter to the Treasury Department requesting a review of this problem and indicating State’s intent to submit the matter to the NSC Planning Board. Similar letters are being sent by State to Defense and CIA.⁷

16. Visa Difficulties. One factor which has complicated the travel of Poles to this country and has tended to irritate Polish authorities is the delay which has often occurred in the issuance of non-immigrant visas to Polish nationals. The required security procedures, including name checks and requests for waivers from the Attorney General, have resulted in delays which the Poles find difficult to understand. Further cooperation among the U.S. Government agencies involved is essential in order to assure a minimum of delay in the issuance of visas to persons whose travel to the United States is recognized to be in the interest of U.S. objectives in Poland.

Status of U.S. Action. The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security has informed the Department of State that, if the Department of State deems it necessary, consular officers at Warsaw may be accorded discretionary authority to waive the name check procedure on an individual basis on behalf of Polish nationals when urgency is a consideration in the granting of the visa and it is in the national interest. The Committee expressed the further view that when the requirement for a name check prior to the issuance of a visa is waived, the check should be undertaken concurrently with the issuance of the visa.

Note: The following National Intelligence Estimates are applicable to Poland:

• NIE 10–58, Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 4 March 1958.
• NIE 12–58, Outlook for Stability in the Eastern European Satellites, 4 February 1958 (Revised Estimate due in March).
• NIE 12.6–58, The Outlook in Poland, 16 September 1958.
• NIE 11–4–58, Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958–1963, 23 December 1958.⁸

0. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Poland Documents. Secret. A cover sheet; Annex A, “Additional Major Developments;” a financial annex and pipeline analysis; and an undated covering memorandum by OCB Executive Officer Bromley Smith in which Smith stated that the OCB concurred in the report for transmittal to the National Security Council, are not printed. A handwritten note on the cover sheet indicates this report was superseded by the report dated March 30, 1960, Document 99.
1. Document 46.
2. These paragraphs are in Annex A, not printed.
3. For text of the joint statement issued at Washington by the chairmen of the Polish and U.S. economic delegations, June 7, 1957, with annexed agreements subsequently negotiated on the basis of this statement under which the United States agreed to extend to Poland a line of credit of $30 million for the purchase of agricultural products and mining equipment, see Department of State Bulletin, June 24, 1957, pp. 1004–1009. Regarding the 1958 line of credit of $25 million, see Document 44.
4. Better known as Section 401(a) of the previous version of the MSA. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, enacted August 26, 1954; 68 Stat 832.]
5. ACEP is the Advisory Committee on Export Policy and has jurisdiction over exports from this country. Commerce, State, ICA, Defense, OCDM, Treasury, Agriculture, Interior, and AEC are represented.

   EDAC is the Economic Defense Advisory Committee and determines the U.S. stand to be taken in the international COCOM, which rules on exports from allied countries. Commerce, State, ICA, Defense, OCDM, Treasury, Agriculture, Interior, AEC, USIA, and the Export-Import Bank are represented. [Footnote in the source text.]

6. Beginning in May 1949, the Polish ship Stefan Batory had been one of the Soviet bloc merchant ships subject to restrictions and control measures applied by American authorities upon entry into the port of New York. In its April 18, 1951, note to the United States Government, the Polish Government protested what it termed discriminatory restrictions to which the ship had been subjected. Documentation on this topic is printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 295, 1036–1039, and 1261–1262.
7. Not found.
8. NIE 10–58 and 12–58 are printed in Part 1, Documents 3 and 2, respectively. NIE 12.6–58 is printed as Document 54. NIE 11-4-58 is scheduled for publication in volume III.