54. National Intelligence Estimate0

NIE 12.6–58

THE OUTLOOK IN POLAND

The Problem

To assess the current situation and probable trends in Poland, with special emphasis on regime stability, economic prospects and relations with the USSR.

Summary

1.
Since October 1956, the Gomulka regime in Poland has occupied a unique position within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is considerably more independent of Soviet control than any other satellite regime. [Page 140] Many of its policies—e.g., in agriculture, church-state affairs, and relations with the West—depart in important ways from the pattern imposed elsewhere by the Soviets.
2.
In general, however, departures from the Bloc norm have gradually become less pronounced during the past year or so, partly as a result of the Polish regime’s efforts to stabilize its internal position and partly in response to Soviet pressures for greater conformity. We expect this trend toward a more orthodox position to continue in the foreseeable future, but we believe the present leadership is determined not to return to Stalinism or to full satellite status.
3.
We believe that the Soviet Union will almost certainly maintain or increase its efforts to reduce or eliminate the distinctive features of the Polish experiment. But, since Gomulka would almost certainly combat extreme pressures and would have the support of the Polish people in doing so, we think that the Soviet approach will be cautious. If moderate pressure proves ineffective, however, the USSR might work for Gomulka’s ouster. Even in this case, we think that the USSR would resort to military intervention only if developments in Poland were likely to jeopardize the political or military security of the Bloc.
4.
Internally, the Gomulka regime has been steadily improving its position. Gomulka’s control of the Party—though not completely assured—has increased and the Party’s control of the people has improved. Nevertheless, threats to the stability of the regime continue and are clearly apparent in such fields as church-state relations. However, despite the persistent anti-communism of the population, we think that a popular insurrection is unlikely; underlying all considerations in the public mind is the feeling that the Gomulka regime is preferable to any feasible alternatives.
5.
Economically, the regime has made perceptible—though uneven—progress and we do not believe a crisis is imminent. Nevertheless, major economic problems, including a low standard of living, an unbalanced industrial structure, and a deficit in foreign trade accounts, will continue to threaten stability for the foreseeable future. The regime will probably continue to look for realistic rather than strictly doctrinaire answers to these problems.
6.
We believe that, as a result of both Soviet and internal pressures, Poland will find it more difficult to diverge from the Bloc line in its relations with the West. Nevertheless, within the limits imposed by its Communist convictions and its membership in the Bloc, the Polish regime will probably attempt to foster an improvement in East-West relations, to expand its economic contacts with the West, and to maintain some freedom of action in the conduct of its foreign affairs generally.

[Here follows the “Discussion” section.]

  1. Source: Department of State, INRNIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, this estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) on September 16. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director of the FBI abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.

    A 32-page Intelligence Report, No. 7822, prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, dated October 1 and entitled “Policies and Prospects of the Gomulka Regime in Poland,” contains similar conclusions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSSINR Reports)