Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

322. Operations Coordinating Board Report⁰

Washington, November 19, 1958.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR TURKEY

I. Introduction

A. Special Operating Guidance

1. Objectives.

a. Continuance of Turkey’s independence, territorial integrity, identification with the Free World, and will and ability to resist Communist invasion or subversion.

b. Continued Turkish cooperation in NATO and in strengthening other Free World regional security arrangements.

c. Continued maintenance of Turkish armed forces capable of resisting direct Soviet attack as part of a concerted allied defense, withstanding an assault by satellite forces, protecting the vitally important Straits, protecting Turkey’s southern flank, and maintaining internal security; thereby also assisting Baghdad Pact defense.

d. Continued access by the United States and its allies to Turkish resources and military facilities necessary for the preservation and further strengthening of the Free World.

e. Improved Turkish relations with Greece, the Arab States and Israel.

f. Achievement of a stable Turkish economy which can support an increasingly greater share of its defense expenditures, while maintaining investment outlays at realistic levels.

2. Economic Reform and U.S. Program

a. On July 31, 1958, the Turkish Government reached agreement with the IMF and OEEC on the elements of a stabilization program. In support of this program $359 million was promised Turkey. Of this amount, the United States was to provide $234 million. The reform program involved the establishment of an exchange rate system which would bring into balance Turkey’s import and export prices; the establishment of firm credit ceilings on both central and commercial bank financing; a reexamination of State Enterprise practices; and the establishment of a global import system on the basis of highest priority requirements and available resources, as well as machinery for the coordination of investment planning for public enterprise. A de facto devaluation was carried out on August 3, bringing the official effective import rate to TL 9 to $1, and establishing three effective export rates of 4.90, 5.60 and 9.00 to $1. There are indications that progress is being made in the other areas.

b. The primary problem which faces the U.S. over the next few months is to find a way to influence or persuade Turkish officials to vigorous and continuing application of stabilization measures. U.S. representatives in Turkey should develop continuing consultations with Turkish officials in all those offices which have stabilization responsibility and continually encourage those officials to vigorous support of their economic reform program. They should report back periodically on the progress of stabilization and relate particular elements in U.S. aid activities constantly to stabilization support. U.S. representatives should be constantly attentive to progress in the Turkish import quota system, and to the availability of non-U.S. credit, reporting back to Washington sufficiently in advance of suspected developments to enable the U.S. to exercise what influence it can on other external authorities in making assistance available.

3. Turkish Requests for Assistance. Of the $100 million Defense Support portion of the July 31 commitment, $75 million had been obligated by October 3. The remaining $25 million is expected to be provided after January 1, 1959. In view of the magnitude of the Turkish 12-month post-stabilization import quota, U.S. representatives in Ankara should be alert to the degree to which non-U.S. sources of promised credits are made available. It is possible that in the event Turkey’s earnings fall below expectations, or that non-U.S. sources of promised credit fail to eventuate, requests for additional assistance may be made by the Turkish Government. While any such request would have to be considered on its merits, U.S. representatives should bear in mind that MSP funds for such additional assistance are not presently available.

4. Turkish Political Development. As internal stability is essential to Turkey’s continuing its present role in NATO and Free World affairs, governmental restrictions on parliamentary discussions, freedom of assembly and press¹ should be carefully watched, particularly should further restrictions occur which might lead to covert opposition activity. Despite the sensitivity of leading Turkish officials, opportunities should be taken as suitable by Embassy officers to reaffirm to those officials U.S. feeling that a strong democratic process should be permitted to develop in Turkey.

5. Cyprus. The question of the future political status of Cyprus has seriously strained relations between Greece and Turkey, and thus weakened the strength of NATO in the eastern Mediterranean. The United States has attempted to act as a moderating influence among the three interested countries and should continue to exert its influence on the Turkish Government to reach an accord with the U.K. and Greece for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The U.S. must continue to recognize the depth of Turkish feeling on the Cyprus question and the fact that any action taken by the U.S. which can be construed by the Turkish Government as U.S. support of the Greek position will have an adverse effect on U.S.-Turkish relations. The importance which the U.S. attaches to making progress toward a solution should, however, be stressed to the Turkish Government and the point made that greater flexibility and further compromise on the part of all parties, including Turkey, are essential.

6. Turkish-Arab Relations. Turkish relations with the Arab states remain varied. Special efforts are being made by the Turks for improved relations with the North African countries. Turkish leaders are distrustful of the new Iraqi regime and are concerned over the possibility of Egyptian-Iraqi collaboration in encouraging foment among the Kurds resident in Turkey and Iran. Developments in Syria² have further exacerbated the already troubled relations between Turkey and Syria. The United States shares Turkey’s concern over the implications of these developments and should continue to consult with Turkey regarding possible courses of action which might be taken to prevent a further deterioration of the Western position in the Middle East. At the same time, the United States should discourage Turkey from taking any unilateral or precipitate action with regard to Syria.

7. Military Commitments. In discussions with the Prime Minister, leading officials of the Foreign Office, cabinet ministers and defense authorities concerned with military aid, the Ambassador and other U.S. representatives designated by him should make efforts to discourage the Turks from initiating military programs beyond the country’s capacity to absorb, or in the long run support. Emphasis should be placed on the need for reviewing at all times the question of balancing the increased costs and additional strength derived from more modern weapons against the maintenance of a large military establishment. In this connection, the heavy costs of maintaining and operating modern weapons in terms of foreign exchange and personnel should be painstakingly explained to Turkish officials. Operating personnel should keep in mind at all times the fact that the U.S. currently is reviewing the possibility of achieving a reduction of NATO-approved force levels for Turkey, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces. Specific commitments to the Turks should be made only on an annual basis.

8. Technical Training Needs. a. One of the principal factors inhibiting Turkey’s ability to strengthen its defense posture by the use of modern weapons is the Turkish soldier’s general lack of technical knowledge. Basis education is at a low level. Priority should be given to those U.S. programs designed to improve the educational base of the country and raise the educational level of the military forces, but in the meantime the Turkish authorities should be made to recognize that the consequent lack of ability to use and maintain modern weapons will place severe limitations on the number and type of modern weapons which the U.S. will be prepared to include in its military aid program.

b. Special note is taken of the inquiry, made on the occasion of their visit by the members of the Turkish financial mission, on technical assistance in the management and operation of State Enterprises. U.S. representatives in Ankara should develop in the shortest possible time specific proposals in this regard. U.S. representatives in Ankara should explore the possibilities of providing technical assistance to Turkey in the development of institutions for the mobilization of domestic capital, such as savings, insurance, etc. The formation of local private capital over the next few years will be essential to a successful investment program.

9. Turkish Labor. The Turkish Government has recently evidenced some softening of its “hard” attitude toward organized labor in Turkey. For example, it has not yet objected to the recent first international affiliation of a Turkish labor union, that of the Turkish Petroleum Workers Union, with the International Federation of Petroleum Workers, whose headquarters are in Denver, Colorado; similarly, the Turkish Government has recently sent its General Director of Labor, accompanied by two professors from the University of Ankara, to the U.S. to study American labor-management relations. While keeping U.S. activities in the field of Turkish labor within the scope acceptable to the Turkish Government, these initial Turkish moves toward modern labor-management relationships should be discreetly encouraged. Ties between Turkish labor and anti-communist international labor federations such as the ICFTU and International Trade Secretariats (ITS’s) should also be encouraged because these organizations can provide the young inexperienced Turkish trade unions with guidance as to their true goals, which should be economic rather than political, and with help in combatting any internal infiltration by communist elements.

10. Attitudes Toward U.S. Personnel Overseas. a. The Operations Coordinating Board has given particular attention over the past several years to ways and means of improving foreign attitudes toward U.S. personnel overseas. This involves both the positive actions which can be taken to improve these relationships as well as the removal of sources of friction and difficulties. The special report prepared by the Board, “United States Employees Overseas: An Inter-Agency Report,” dated April 1958,³ is an effort to provide on an over-all governmental basis a common approach and guidance in this field. All supervisory employees in the field should familiarize themselves with the substance of this report and all U.S. personnel should know the substance of the Conclusions and Recommendations set forth in Section V, Volume 1. Attention is directed to the President’s remarks in the Foreword of the report.

b. The present and planned community relations program in Turkey, including orientation of U.S. personnel, traffic safety campaign, bi-national committee on community relations, visits by U.S. military bands, athletic teams and other special event attractions, information and cultural programs supporting the community relations theme and participation in the semi-annual European Working Group meetings on Community Relations; should be given continued emphasis and support. In addition, it should be noted that the number of U.S. official personnel and dependents now approaches 13,000 of whom 12,000 are military personnel and dependents. All agencies will continually review their programs in Turkey, with a view to ensuring that the number of U.S. employees does not exceed the minimum required to achieve U.S. objectives.

11. Information and Cultural Programs. U.S. information and cultural programs should seek to convince the Turkish people that the U.S. appreciates the staunch Turkish support of U.S. policies, that it favors a Turkey which is strong militarily, politically and economically, and that the U.S. is doing all it can, in the light of many obligations, to assist Turkey to attain its goals. Recognition should be given to the staunch anti-communist stand of the Turkish Government, but the public should be reminded, through USIS output, of communist successes in subverting nations through Soviet cultural presentations and economic assistance. As the Turks resent their being taken for granted, cultural programs should demonstrate that the U.S. does not by-pass Turkey because it is a reliable ally, and such programs should assist Turkey in achieving the goal of increased westernization of its culture. Although “grass roots” appeal is desired, the principal effort should be directed to Turkish media officials and Turkish leaders in the political, professional and educational fields, who are in turn capable of reaching large segments of the population. Information and cultural programs also should be to the extent possible increase popular understanding of the NATO and Baghdad Pact alliances.

12. Internal Security Program Guidance. The progress of the U.S.-financed public safety program in Turkey over the past 3 years is gratifying. When this program was begun it was anticipated that it would terminate at the end of 3 years. U.S. representatives in Ankara have been advised that if the Turkish Government requires certain communication or transportation equipment in connection with public security, it should consider those commodities for financing under the Defense Support program. Substantial justification will be required if it is intended to continue the services of technicians in connection with this program beyond FY 1959.

B. Selected U.S. Arrangements⁴ With or Pertaining to Turkey

13. U.S. Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees.

a. NATO. In accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States is committed to regard an armed attack against Turkey as an attack against itself and to take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security” of Turkey.

b. Baghdad Pact. The United States indicated its support for the area Baghdad Pact countries by State Department press release 604 dated November 29, 1956,⁵ which stated in part:

“… The United States reaffirms its support for the collective efforts of those nations to maintain their independence. A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.”

c. Middle East Resolution.⁶ The United States by a Joint Resolution on the Middle East, signed by the President on March 9, 1957, announced its determination to assist Middle Eastern nations to maintain their independence. The Resolution declared that the U.S. is prepared to commit its military force, on the determination of the President, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism whenever a victim requests such aid.

d. At the Ministerial Council meeting in London in July 1958, the Secretary of State joined with the Prime Ministers of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom in signing a declaration⁷ accepting the obligation of cooperating with those states in their security and defense, and expressing U.S. willingness to enter into bilateral agreements with those states to effect this undertaking. Appropriate bilateral agreements are now being discussed.

14. U.S. Commitments for Funds, Goods or Services, a. The U.S. has offered and the Turks have accepted a total of four Honest John battalions, two Nike battalions, two additional F–100 squadrons and two additional submarines under the recently passed Ship Loan Act.

b. The Richards Mission⁸ informed the Turkish Government that the U.S. is prepared, in principle, to furnish assistance to regional economic activities, including grant aid towards completion of the Turkish portion of regional communications system, the Turkish-Iranian rail link and the Turkish-Iraqi highway link.

c. In support of the Turkish stabilization program, the U.S. on July 31, 1958, agreed to extend to Turkey certain financial facilities amounting to $234 million, as follows: (a) For FY 1959, $100 million Defense Support; (b) $75 million development assistance from the DLF and the EXIM Bank; (c) postponement of payments under previous ECA–MSA loans amounting to $44 million, and (d) sale of agricultural products for payment in lira amounting to $15 million.⁹

15. Other Arrangements.

a. Mutual Security. Agreement relating to the assurances required by the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Bilateral agreement signed January 7, 1952.¹⁰

b. Status of Forces. In accordance with the agreement signed between the U.S. and Turkey on June 23, 1954,¹¹ the NATO Status-of-Forces agreement is in effect between the U.S. and Turkey.

c. Economic Cooperation. Agreement signed July 4, 1948.¹²

d. Atomic energy. Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy signed May 6, 1955, effective June 10, 1955.¹³

II. Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action

Individual action items when extracted from this Plan may be downgraded to the appropriate security classification. All actions are continuing unless otherwise noted.

A. Political

16. Continue to encourage development of the Baghdad Pact. While recognizing that Iraq has not participated in Pact deliberations since the coup d’etat of July 14, 1958, we have agreed that the determination to remain or withdraw from the Pact should be left to the Iraq Government without pressure of any kind.

Assigned to: State, Defense

Support:ICA, USIA

17. Consult with the Turkish Government, whenever feasible and appropriate, on matters of mutual interest in the Middle East, with particular reference to the Arab countries.

Assigned to: State, Defense

18. Utilize, as appropriate, visits of Turkish officials to other Middle Eastern countries as a means of advancing U.S. objectives in those countries.

Assigned to: State, Defense

19. Continue to exercise influence on Turkey to reach an accord with Greece and the U.K. on the Cyprus problem.

Assigned to: State

20. Limit the number of American personnel to the minimum required to achieve U.S. objectives, and ensure that newly assigned U.S. personnel receive orientation, with dependents receiving appropriate indoctrination in the field.

Assigned to: All agencies

B. Economic

21. Carry out continuing consultation with Turkish Government officials to encourage vigorous support by the Turkish Government of its decision to pursue a comprehensive financial program designed to eliminate inflation and restore financial stability.

Assigned to: State, ICA, Treasury

22. Take whatever steps appear feasible to ensure that non-U.S. credit sources provide the assistance promised Turkey under the stabilization plan.

Assigned to: State

Support:ICA

23. Continue to carry out the defense support program consisting primarily of raw materials, basic commodities and spare parts to keep agricultural and industrial sections of the economy operating during critical period of foreign exchange shortage. (See Pipeline Analysis Annex for financial data.)

Assigned to: State, ICA

24. Continue to carry out the technical cooperation program which endeavors to improve Turkish capacity in the fields of operations, management and administration. The program will be kept under constant surveillance to make it responsive to current needs with special reference to stabilization support. In this regard, consideration will be given to new activities in the fields of capital formation and help to State Enterprises management. (See Pipeline Analysis Annex for financial data.)

Assigned to:ICA

25. Review Turkey’s current situation in connection with the internal security program, taking into account that (1) the internal security program for Turkey was started with the expectation that it would be a three year program; and that (2) any further assistance in response to Turkish requests will be based on a review of the program and justification for its continuance.

Assigned to:ICA

26. Negotiate sales agreements for a Title I, PL 480¹⁴ program under the July 31 agreement.

Assigned to: State, ICA, Agriculture, Treasury

27. Encourage Turkey to create the climate which will encourage the movement of private domestic and foreign capital into productive enterprise.

Assigned to:ICA, State

Support: Commerce

28. Consider qualified American capital investments in Turkey under the Investment Guarantee Program in the context of a coordinated use of foreign resources.

Assigned to:ICA

29. In publicity efforts stress the achievements which Turkey has made unilaterally and establish the principle that Turkey must seek to achieve a self-sustaining economy.

Assigned to:USIA

Support:ICA

30. Encourage the development of appropriate Turkish national programs in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, including as appropriate support for suitable research and training programs in the application of atomic energy to agriculture, medicine, industry and science.

Assigned to:AEC

Support:ICA, USIA

C. Military

31. Continue to review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements, bearing in mind the importance of adequate military support of the Baghdad Pact organization.

Assigned to: Defense

Support: State

32. Implement Military Assistance Programs for maintenance and improvement of forces, taking into account Turkish absorption and support capabilities in the rate of any military build-up.

Assigned to: Defense Support: ICA

33. Implement the delivery to Turkey of the commitments listed in paragraph 14 above.

Assigned to: Defense

Target Date: As soon as feasible

34. Exert maximum influence with Turkish Armed Forces to obtain best utilization of personnel in view of the lack of personnel available for induction and a definite shortage of qualified personnel for advance technical training. Continue efforts toward specialized training as well as training to improve the literary and general schooling of armed forces personnel.

Assigned to: Defense

35. Continue training on a carefully screened basis in U.S. installations both in U.S. and overseas of qualified Turkish military personnel selected to further self-sufficiency in Turkish training programs.

Assigned to: Defense

36. Continue emphasis on maximum maintenance and upkeep of matériel by Turkish armed forces, with encouragement of maximum local use of existing facilities and resources to meet their own requirements, particularly with respect to POL and ammunition storage facilities.

Assigned to: Defense

Support:ICA

37. Encourage cooperation between Turkey and Afghanistan in the military training field and, in particular, encourage the Turkish Government to continue its Military Mission in Afghanistan.

Assigned to: Defense

Support: State

38. Encourage Turkey to take full advantage of information on subversive personalities, techniques and activities which is available through the Countersubversive Committee and other activities of the Baghdad Pact.

Assigned to: State, ICA, Defense

39. Strengthen the present troop-community relations program.

Assigned to: Defense

Support:USIA

D. Information and Cultural

40. Provide appropriate information and other public relations support for political, economic, and military policies and programs set forth elsewhere in this Operations Plan.

Assigned to:USIA

41. Strengthen information activities aimed at maintaining Turkish public acceptance of U.S. military personnel and installations in Turkey.

Assigned to:USIA

42. Continue information programs which include (1) operation of libraries and library programs; (2) distribution of books, periodicals and wireless file material; (3) production of periodicals, pamphlets and unattributed newsreel footage; (4) support of Voice of America and production of radio programs for VOA and local use; and (5) publication of selected American books by Turkish publishers with emphasis on the “ideological shelf.”

Assigned to:USIA

43. Develop extensive personal contacts with Turkish media representatives at all levels to facilitate placement of material favorable to U.S. objectives.

Assigned to:USIA

Support: State

44. Publicize the mutual benefits accruing from Turkey’s adherence to NATO and the Baghdad Pact.

Assigned to:USIA

Support: Defense

45. Continue the Informational Media Guaranty Program.

Assigned to:USIA

46. Through binational centers and modest cash grants assist and encourage Turkish groups seeking to organize or sponsor local Turkish-American organizations capable of contributing to understanding of U.S. objectives and development of a more widespread English-teaching program. Provide more adequate facilities for the Binational Center in Ankara, by new construction, utilizing PL 480 funds when available.

Assigned to:USIA

47. Provide advice to Ankara and Istanbul Universities in establishing curricula on U.S. history, literature, etc.

Assigned to:USIA

48. To strengthen existing cultural ties arrange for and support visits of American musicians, writers, artists and others under the President’s Special International Program.

Assigned to:USIA

49. Continue the Exchange of Persons program under PL 402 emphasizing educators, members of Parliament, journalists and lawyers.

Assigned to: State, USIA

50. Support U.S. educational institutions in Turkey, utilizing funds as available under Section 104 of PL 480.

Assigned to: State, USIA

Note: See National Intelligence Estimate 33–56, Turkey As An Ally, February 21, 1956.¹⁵

0. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Turkey. Secret. A title page, covering memorandum, statement of purpose and use of the operations plan, a financial annex, and an MSP pipeline analysis are not printed. In the undated covering memorandum, Roy Melbourne, Acting Executive Officer of the OCB, noted that the Board had revised and concurred in the Operations Plan for Turkey at its November 12 meeting, and that this plan superseded the November 6, 1957, Operations Plan for Turkey. Minutes of the OCB meeting are Ibid., Minutes.

1. Reference is to libel and press laws enacted on June 7, 1956, and to restrictions on political assemblies enacted on June 27, 1956.

2. Reference is to the federation of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic.
3. A copy of this report, which outlined legal, personal, and community relations problems facing U.S. personnel overseas, is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Overseas Personnel.
4. See State Department publication Treaties in Force for additional arrangements. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. For text of this statement, see Department of State Bulletin, December 10, 1956, p. 918. The ellipsis in the quotation that follows is in the source text.
6. See footnote 8, Document 239.
7. For text of the declaration, released July 29, see Department of State Bulletin, August 18, 1958, pp. 272–273.
8. In March 1957, Ambassador James P. Richards, former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, visited 15 Middle Eastern nations. Richards was in Turkey March 20–23, 1957. Regarding his visit to Turkey, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 710–712.
9. In addition, through OEEC, other governments agreed to extend to Turkey credits equivalent to $100 million and the IMF made available to Turkey the equivalent of $25 million. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. For text, see 3 UST 4660.
11. For text, see 5 UST 1465.
12. For text, see 62 Stat. 2566.
13. For text, see 6 UST 2703.
14. For text of P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, see 68 Stat. 454.
15. Not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)