Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

321. Operations Coordinating Board Report⁰

Washington, November 12, 1958.

OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT ON TURKEY (NSC 5708/2)¹

(Approved by President, June 29, 1957)

(Period Covered: From: January 29, 1958 Through: November 12, 1958)

A. Summary Evaluation

1. The U.S. gave substantial support to a comprehensive Turkish economic reform program, which was announced on July 31 following Turkish consultations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and member countries of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Despite the many difficulties to be expected in implementing an economic reform program and the necessity to follow the program closely, a major step finally has been taken toward the achievement of a stable Turkish economy.

2. During the Lebanese operation,² the Turkish Government gave permission for full use of the Adana air base as a staging area for U.S. airborne troops enroute to Beirut and for the storage of overflow supplies. This was a concrete demonstration of strong Turkish identification as an ally of the U.S. but at the same time there are indications that local attitudes toward U.S. service personnel are changing from acceptance to hostility. Although incidents involving U.S. service personnel provide the focal point for outbursts of popular resentment and bitter press comment, wide disparity in standards of living, sharply contrasting social mores, a formidable language barrier and alleged special privileges for American military personnel are continuing factors exacerbating community relations.

3. Even though the recently adopted reform program carries hope for better economic conditions in Turkey, widespread dissatisfaction due to the hardships endured by the populace for the past three years has brought internal political strains including some dissatisfaction within the party in power. A traditional sense of national unity has been disrupted as the opposition party headed by former President Ismet Inonu has replied to steamroller parliamentary tactics on the part of the party in power by openly splitting on major issues including foreign policy.

4. No progress was made on the Cyprus issue involving Greece, Turkey and the U.K. and Turkish-Greek relations have remained strained.

5. No review of policy is recommended.

Annex A

DEVELOPMENTS UNDER PARAGRAPH 28 OF NSC 5708/2

Policy Guidance

9. Paragraph 28 of “U.S. Policy Toward Turkey”, approved on 29 June 1957, states, in part, that “…³ the United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements.” U.S. civilian and military representatives, both at home and abroad were provided with this policy guidance in order that they might influence the action by NATO committees. Further, the matter was more emphatically brought to the attention of our high officials in Paris by other means. At the time the policy guidance was approved, the major combat units in the DOD-approved force objectives for Turkey were generally in accordance with NATO goals. They were 20 8/3 divisions, 65 naval vessels and 21 squadrons of combat and support aircraft.

Other Directives

10. Subsequently, actions were taken by the U.S. on directives from the highest level, at the time of Syrian union with Egypt, to accelerate U.S. aid to Turkey. The Iraqi coup resulted in even greater efforts to enhance Turkey’s military posture. The U.S., among other actions, delivered one of the four Honest John battalions programmed for Turkey at a much earlier date than originally contemplated. Training for the two Nike battalions for Turkey is continuing. It is yet to be established that Turkey can absorb by 1963 any modern weapons beyond these six battalions, despite the various recommendations from the NATO and others.

NATO Action

11. By 9 May 1958, the North Atlantic Council approved for planning purposes, a document entitled MC 70⁴ which concerns only NATO-committed forces and does not cover national requirements or the requirements of other pact organizations. The major Turkish combat units called for in MC 70 are 16 8/3 divisions, 65 combat vessels and 20 squadrons of combat and support aircraft. This indicates a reduction of four divisions and one squadron from the DOD, and previous NATO-approved, force goals listed in paragraph 9 above.

Turkish Army

12. The Turks recently deactivated two infantry divisions, and have plans to deactivate a cavalry and a mountain division in the near future. These divisions were below strength, poorly equipped and in a priority receiving no additional MAP build-up. Personnel were assigned to other duties in the Army. Actually, the Turkish army budget is not greatly changed whether their manpower is divided among 10, 20 or 50 divisions. From the U.S. point of view, since we program only for the 10 8/3 M-day divisions, plus certain essential training requirements for first echelon divisions, our contribution through MAP to the Turkish Army is relatively unaffected by additional units over and above those planned for early commitment in event of hostilities. There is indirectly some cost to us for the various national units maintained by the Turks over and above recognized force objectives. However, considerable progress has been made in reducing these forces by the deactivation of certain pill-box battalions, frontier regiments, etc.

Turkish Navy

13. Although MC 70 calls for an identical number (65) of combat vessels as does the DOD-approved force goals, the MC 70 Navy proposal is more attractive to Turkey. While MC 70 reduces by four each the number of patrol vessels and motor torpedo boats, it increases by eight the number of destroyer/escort types. The economic burden on both Turkey and the U.S. would be increased considerably if MC 70 goals were implemented for the Turkish Navy.

Turkish Air Force

14. The MC 70 proposal for the Turkish Air Force indicates a more apparent rather than real reduction. MC 70 calls for three transport squadrons of 16 aircraft each while the DOD-approved force levels include four transport squadrons of 12 aircraft each. MC 70 and the DOD-approved force goals are in agreement as to the eventual composition of the combat squadrons. This is to be accomplished by conversion of existing squadrons to more advanced high performance aircraft, and the economic burden on both the U.S. and Turkey will be considerable.

Turkish Government

15. The Turkish Government has reservations concerning the adequacy of forces proposed in MC 70. Specifically, they are concerned with the problem of defense on two fronts, one of which has been extended by events in Syria and Iraq. The Turkish Minister of Defense has expressed the view that this situation requires a mobile corps of two divisions and an armored brigade as well as two all-weather fighter squadrons and a fighter-bomber squadron. However, it is not clear as to whether these units are to be within or over and above the MC 70 goals. In addition, he considers that the Turkish Navy requires twenty-nine combat vessels more than listed in MC 70. Consideration of the Turkish attitude toward its armed forces must include the manner in which they have cooperated in the establishment of unilateral U.S. peripheral observation points in their country, their continued support of our UN objectives in Korea, as well as their wholehearted support of the Lebanon operation as indicated elsewhere in the Progress Report.

Summary

16. In summary:

a. The possibility of achieving a reduction of NATO-approved force levels for Turkey has been reviewed with some measure of apparent success with respect to ground forces;

b. This apparent success in the NATO review was more than offset from an economic point of view by the naval and air units listed in the resultant MC 70;

c. Despite the heavy costs of maintaining and operating the forces listed in MC 70, the Turkish Government proposes Navy and Air Force, if not Army, goals even higher; and,

d. Whereas the policy guidance was preceded by a discussion of the desirability of reducing economic burdens, MC 70 calls for expenditures above those previously contemplated in the U.S. policy paper on Turkey, and the SHAPE International Staff is urging a joint U.S.-Turk program to achieve the more costly MC 70 objectives by 1963.

0. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Turkey. Top Secret. A title page, covering memorandum, and three of the four annexes (Additional Major Developments, Sino-Soviet Activities, and a Financial Annex with Pipeline Analysis) are not printed. In the undated covering memorandum, Bromley Smith noted that the Board, at its November 12 meeting, noted remarks by Ambassador Warren on the situation in Turkey and revised and concurred in the report for transmittal to the NSC. Minutes of the OCB meeting are Ibid., Minutes. The NSC noted the OCB report on Turkey at its January 15 meeting. The memorandum of discussion at that meeting is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
1. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol XXIV, pp. 720–727.
2. On July 15, President Eisenhower sent U.S. military forces into Lebanon in response to the request of the Lebanese Government.
3. Ellipsis in the source text.
4. The MC–70 Program established a Minimal Essential Force Requirements Plan for the period 1958–1963 for all NATO member states. Documentation on the implementation of MC–70 is in volume VII, Part 1.