Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

288. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State⁰

Athens, March 12, 1960, 11 p.m.

2508. Reference: Embassy telegrams 2506 and 2507.¹

1. Following conversation with Prime Minister described reference telegrams, I called on King Paul as pre-departure courtesy.² I told him I had just spent two hours with Caramanlis during which latter discussed politico-economic situation, and I had urged importance early settlement foreign debt. King smiled and said Caramanlis is emotional over that issue. King believes settlement should be made and I believe we can count on his support toward that end.

2. Far as I could determine, King views political situation about as Embassy does; anything which can be done to meet Communist activity (specifically including Greek association with common market on favorable terms) should be undertaken, but he apparently unsold on new political movement and sees little prospect meeting Communist threat through mechanism of establishment “loyal opposition.”

3. I said we have confidence in Caramanlis and his motivation, believe in importance of strengthening economy but are handicapped by Prime Minister’s unwillingness to get debt matter out of the way. Moreover, Prime Minister is wearing himself out without delegating sufficient authority to sufficiently competent subordinates (reference to desirability of strengthening Cabinet).

4. King expressed warm appreciation American Government support for Greece, which I assured him would continue be forthcoming. He anticipates immediate world situation difficult (summit meeting)³ but that if Western allies can close ranks and preserve unity, local problems such as those of Greece can work themselves out.

5. Foregoing adds up to little new. The King is aware Caramanlis’ difficulties and I think sympathizes with them. At present he has no alternative solution and lacks confidence new group may succeed rallying non-Communist opposition to Caramanlis. He apparently shares Prime Minister’s belief that best bet is to strengthen economic situation in hopes that Prime Minister can become sufficiently strong politically to move against local Communism and pressure resulting from Soviet overtures.

Briggs

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.00/3–1260. Secret; Limited Distribution.
1. Documents 286 and 287.
2. Briggs flew to the United States for consultations on March 14. He returned to Greece on April 6.
3. Reference is to the four-power summit meeting scheduled to begin in Paris on May 16.