Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2

286. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State⁰

Athens, March 12, 1960, 9 p.m.

2506. Reference: Embassy despatch 743, March 4.¹

1. I had two–hour talk with Prime Minister this morning at his house. Foreign Minister and Berger also present.

2. In view Prime Minister’s pathological suspicions and rumors that US considering Averoff or Rodopoulos as possible successors, I opened by saying I wished convey confidence US Government has in him and his government. I then thanked him and Foreign Minister for clearing up several minor causes of irritation in economic field (tax size-restrictions, Limperg payment, etc.) saying these had taken up altogether too much of our attention, to detriment of larger and more important issues.

3. Went on to say Department had been immediately responsive to his request that we appeal to common market countries to facilitate Greece’s entry and had made representations in the various capitals. Insofar as we had seen replies we were pleased by favorable reaction and believed Prime Minister should be too.

4. Prime Minister thanked me, then launched into lengthy, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] tirade about [1 line of source text not declassified] treating the Greek application for affiliation, saying:

A. Greek exports to Europe were in the insignificant ratio of 1 to 400. A fractional increase would solve Greece’s problem, yet Greece was being told nothing could be done to facilitate her exports.

B. Europe imports $600 million in fruits and vegetables, but can make room for only $11 million from Greece.

C. Italy has just planted another 10,000 acres of oranges in anticipation of expanding demand which common market will create, opposes Greece’s admission on grounds Italy will be hurt.

D. Greece buys $183 millions from Europe, sells $83 millions, yet no one will lift a finger to correct the balance.

5. Prime Minister said he was pro-West and would remain that way, and the disposition of Greece was also overwhelmingly pro-West. But the Greek people were becoming increasingly puzzled and concerned by the absence of positive and friendly overtures from the West to help them in their economic difficulties.

6. Meanwhile, the Soviets were making trade overtures and offers. He would resist these, but we should not underestimate their effect on the country. He was not worried about the Greek Communists; but opportunist nationalist politicians, using demagoguery, and taking advantage of country’s economic difficulties, were whipping up sentiment against the government’s pro-West policy, playing into Communist hands and confusing the people. Political situation in Greece was precarious and would continue so. Unless the West gave more positive evidence of its interest in Greece and showed a better understanding of its special difficulties, he could not predict outcome of next election.

7. All this was prelude to the following demands

A. Greece’s admission to common market on favorable terms was “absolute necessity.”

B. Greece must have larger defense support next year to tide her over her difficulties.

C. Rising military strength of Bulgaria and Albania was worrying his military chiefs, and he will be compelled to increase his defense expenditures next year even at expense of his investment program. He hoped the US would be able to supply more tanks, heavy guns and other equipment, and gave me a memorandum on his needs. (Text will be sent by Embassy despatch.)²

8. Comment: Department will note that paragraph 6 confirms Embassy despatch 743. With respect paragraph 7 above, point (A) is identical with our recommendations in paragraph 29 A (I) of referenced despatch,³ and point (B) more or less conforms with paragraph 29 A (IV).⁴ In regard to point (C), we doubt if government will increase its expenditures above present limits. I am asking JUSMAGG to study military equipment recommendations and we shall send comments later.⁵

Briggs

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 881.00/3–1260. Secret.
1. Despatch 743 reported that mounting economic difficulties in Greece threatened both the stability of the Karamanlis government and the achievement of U.S. objectives in Greece. (Ibid., 881.00/3–460)
2. The text of the Karamanlis memorandum was sent to the Department of State in despatch 779 from Athens, March 15. (Ibid., 781.561/3–1560)
3. It reads: “Greece must be brought into the Common Market and on favorable terms.”
4. It reads: “Cash grant-aid must continue at approximately present levels at least until after the next general election and probably longer. Other NATO partners should be approached and urged to share in this.”
5. JUSMAGG’s comments were sent to the Department of State in telegram 2571 from Athens, March 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 781.56/3–1960)