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  4. Document 265

265. Memorandum of Conversation0

MC–16
Boston, September 27, 1958, 5:30 p.m.

SECRETARY’S TRIP TO BOSTON1

PARTICIPANTS

  • United States
    • The Secretary
    • Ambassador Burgess
    • Mr. Compton
    • Mr. Greene
  • NATO
    • Secretary-General Paul Henri Spaak
    • M. St. M’leux

SUBJECT

  • Cyprus

M. Spaak was not sure whether the present Greek adamancy on the British plan for Cyprus, scheduled to be put into effect on October 1, was a bluff or not. In Athens he had found Karamanlis discouraged and, he thought, sincere in his view that appointment of a Turkish Government representative as adviser to the Governor [was] a personal defeat for himself. While the Greeks will accept the principle of minority rights on Cyprus they would not, Spaak thought, accept the idea of a Turkish Government representative from Ankara, with its implication that Turkish administration is on the way back. He was inclined to think there may be something in the Greek point that, in its provision for the return to Cyprus of a Turkish Government representative, the British plan is a violation of the Treaty of Lausanne.2

M. Spaak said that he thought his plan for a conference is an important new element in the situation. He understood from Karamanlis that Makarios is prepared to accept the idea, but it may be too late and Karamanlis may be overtaken by events. M. Spaak wondered too why Greece should contemplate walking out on NATO, or at least on the North Atlantic Council; what is going on, he said, is not the fault of NATO. And now, according to a message from his Deputy in Paris (copy attached),3 the Greek representative wants to publish the Spaak [Page 711] plan. While it may eventually become public, M. Spaak doubted the utility of letting it out now.4

The Secretary said he did not think the Greeks were bluffing and that if the British plan goes into effect they will probably take it out on NATO, at least by discontinuing cooperation in the military field and adopting a neutralist line in policy. The Turkish situation is not good either; we agree with the British that if they do not go ahead with their plan the Turks will turn out in mobs against the Greeks. With the stakes so high for both sides, and the substantive differences that remain so slight, the Secretary had not abandoned hope that a bridge could be found. Perhaps the British might agree to going ahead with the conference Spaak has proposed even though putting their plan into effect on October 1; to try to get agreement from the Greeks, the British might make it clear in advance that any agreed results of the conference could be put into effect as modifications of the British plan even after the latter is underway. Spaak agreed that it is worth trying this on the British and the Secretary said he would speak to Ambassador Caccia in this sense later in the evening.5 The Secretary and Spaak noted too that someone, probably the United States, would have to urge on the Turks’ acceptance of this formula, if the British agree.

The Secretary and Spaak agreed that in view of the critical situation, which will probably come to a head at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in the afternoon of September 29, M. Spaak should postpone his visit to Washington and return directly to Paris.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Greene. The meeting was held at the Sheraton Plaza Hotel.↩
  2. Dulles and Spaak were in Boston to address the meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association. For texts of their speeches, see Department of State Bulletin, October 13, 1958, pp. 571–574, and October 20, 1958, pp. 607–611.↩
  3. Under the 1923 treaty, both Greece and Turkey renounced their claims to Cyprus in favor of the United Kingdom.↩
  4. An undated message from Casardi to Spaak, not printed.↩
  5. The Greek Foreign Office subsequently published this record.↩
  6. Dulles met with Caccia at 10:30 p.m. that day. After recounting his discussion with Spaak, he expressed the hope the British Government would agree to the conference proposal and urged that the October 1 implementation of the plan for Cyprus be suspended. Dulles also assured the British Government of U.S. support if it decided to go forward with the plan. A memorandum of the conversation is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.↩