260. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 0

789. Re Embtel 788.1 Prime Minister has just handed me following message for President from King with request it be transmitted urgently. He accompanied this by another appeal for our intervention to effect postponement of UK plan on Cyprus:

“I have already had the opportunity of stating to you, Mr. President, Greece’s position on the question of Cyprus.

For four years the people of Greece, in spite of its bitter feelings created by the lack of understanding from its allies has shown moderation and has remained faithful to its alliances.

For the sake of these alliances Greece has also made concessions which could have led to a friendly and prompt solution of the Cyprus problem.

However, the British Government insists upon the application of their plan, which complicates instead of solving the question and which my government has rejected for precisely this reason.

The impending unilateral application of this plan will aggravate the situation in Cyprus and will have dangerous repercussions not only on the internal conditions but also on the international relations of Greece.

[Page 704]

Having these dangers in mind, I wish to request of you, Mr. President, that you exercise all your influence in view of averting them.”2

[Here follows the remainder of the telegram.]

Riddleberger

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–2058. Confidential; Niact; Presidential Handling.
  2. Not printed.
  3. At 10:50 a.m. on September 22, Eisenhower (Eisenhower was in Newport) called Dulles to discuss King PAUL’s letter: “He feels we should let the British Amb know he has appealed and also in urging another reason for postponement by the British one might say the old saying—don’t make any mistakes in a hurry. Once it’s done, it’s done.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

    Dulles met with Caccia at 3:45 that afternoon and relayed the President’s suggestions as follows: “I told Sir Harold of the President’s reaction to his letter from the King of Greece; namely, that a postponement might be wise. I said that this was in no sense a final or firm position, being a reaction taken by the President at Newport without any general briefing on the situation. However, I said that it was our opinion in the State Department that if the plan went forward, the probability was that the Greeks would terminate their cooperation under the NATO treaty. Also I mentioned the danger that the Turkish representative on Cyprus might well be assassinated and that this could start up a chain of trouble.” Dulles requested that Eisenhower’s views be reported to Macmillan. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)