Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece⁰

Washington, August 27, 1958, 7:53 p.m.

679. Following is current Department estimate of remaining gap between positions GOG and HMG on Cyprus and proposed steps which might be taken to help bridge this gap. Before discussing these with HMG Dept would welcome views all addressee posts but desires particularly Embassy Athens judgment as to whether attitude of GOG and Makarios would warrant such approach at this time.

1. It appears UK statement of Aug 15¹ may have appreciably narrowed margin of disagreement between GOG and HMG on essential elements of provisional arrangement for Cyprus. Relatively moderate tone of Karamanlis reply to Macmillan,² reported mixed feelings of Greek Cypriot leaders about modified UK plan (see Nicosia 102 rptd London as 73),³ and conciliatory views informally expressed by members Greek Embassy here (not including Ambassador),⁴ have encouraged us to hope gap might be bridged by treating problem as one of interpretation.

2. We continue to doubt feasibility of carrying out plan without cooperation of overwhelming majority of Cypriot people. We believe Greek Cypriot cooperation might be obtained and necessary delicate equilibrium between Greeks and Turks achieved if additional minor concessions are made to Greeks.

3. We see Makarios more than GOG as key to Greek cooperation in carrying out plan. Assuming self-interest of Cypriots now lies in direction of holding their own through provisional arrangement, there may be chance Makarios may cooperate in plan if he is offered graceful way out. Certainly we believe chance is worth taking.

4. It seems desirable to have single assembly established and role of Greek and Turkish Governments minimized as far as possible. Our support of modified plan has been given on understanding that institutions of self-government will be established in such a way as not to prejudice any particular final solution and that there will be opportunity for these institutions to become truly representative of desires of Cypriot people.

5. Given this estimate of gap, Dept has in mind proposing that Embassy London discuss with Fonoff next steps re Cyprus in above context and offer to Fonoff following specific suggestions:

(a) If UK thinks it worthwhile, US Ambassador Athens would be instructed ask GOG if it would be willing go along with UK plan provided UK (1) clarified role of GOG and GOT representatives, pointing out that they would be advisors to Governor, principally with regard protection and welfare of two ethnic communities, and would not participate in administration of island, and (2) promised that single assembly would be established as soon as both communal assemblies were functioning. Such UK interpretive statement could be made in various ways; one might be form of another letter from Foot to Makarios. We note in Nicosia 114⁵ that Foot is thinking along somewhat similar lines re timing of establishing single assembly.

(b) If GOG is receptive, Ambassador Riddleberger would then with knowledge GOG talk with Makarios along same lines. If Makarios is willing to give assurances that he would cooperate in implementation of modified plan, Ambassador would offer to relay suggestion of such interpretive statement to UK.

6. In approaching GOG and Makarios we would couple suggestion to reaffirmation of US support for modified UK plan. We would of course be careful to disabuse Greeks of notion that our offer to be of help on specified course of action above constitutes general offer of mediation.

FYI. If British did not accept suggestion of interpretive statement, they may at least come up with some alternative proposals for bending their plan slightly more in direction of Greeks and thus facilitate chances of Greek acquiescence. British may be unwilling make any clarifying statement regarding plan without first checking with Turks. We would of course await British reaction before taking any action. End FYI.⁶

For USRO: You would be authorized later to inform Spaak of above at time we initiate approaches suggested.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–1658. Secret. Drafted by Blood. Repeated to London, Ankara, Paris for USRO, and Nicosia.
1. See footnote 4, Document 255.
2. For text of Karamanlis’ August 19 letter to Macmillan, see RIIA, Documents on International Affairs, 1958, pp. 385–387.
3. Telegram 102 from Nicosia, August 16, reported that Cypriots generally opposed outright rejection of the August 15 British proposals. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–1658)
4. On August 18, Ambassador George V. Melas announced he had resigned in protest over U.S. efforts to promote a Cyprus settlement based on British proposals.
5. See footnote 4, Document 257.
6. In telegram 1209 from London, August 28, Whitney replied that he felt the British Government would generally welcome U.S. suggestions as long as Great Britain’s leading role in a Cyprus settlement was recognized. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–2858)