Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus

244. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State ⁰

Athens, July 5, 1958, 7 p.m.

50. 1. Only opportunity I had take action yesterday on instructions Department telegram 51¹ was during Fourth July reception when I conveyed Averoff substance para 2.² He was obviously bitterly disappointed particularly at our refusal of meeting with Secretary in Paris although I did my best to assuage his resentment. He remarked it was “obviously very thin excuse”. As it was impossible to have extended conversation at reception and as I had not yet received report of Hood-Rountree interview,³ we agreed to meet today as Foreign Minister wanted to consult Karamanlis to consider our reply.

2. Today with fuller information I reviewed our positions with Foreign Minister leading off with our hope that his proposals may give impetus for constructive suggestions and explaining our views on procedure. Averoff replied he could now give GOG reaction, after consultation with Prime Minister and Greek Ambassadors recalled to Athens. Spaak invitation⁴ is not rejected by GOG but it is not in favor of inviting three interested governments to discussion. Spaak had told Melas in Paris that discussions could be informal and GOG would permit Melas to participate without instructions. But if this invitation implied tripartite conference at another level, it was rejected and Foreign Minister said he must be altogether clear on this point. He envisaged this informal meeting without instructions to Greek Ambassador as something that is “tolerable” to see if further program can be made. Simultaneously, he must point out that advisory committee could be very dangerous to NATO if something disagreeable to Greece were to emerge from it. Unhappily, Greek suspicions of NATO continue to increase as Greek people regard NATO as supporting colonial positions. This is regrettable but true and in Averoff’s opinion even establishment of advisory committee would provoke strong reaction here. GOG is convinced this reaction would immediately be exploited by all elements of opposition and would burst forth in press in manner that could not be controlled. Result would be a priori failure of advisory committee in what concerns Greece and feeling amongst majority of Greek people that GOG has given way to heavy pressure by some of its allies, meaning US. GOG is seriously concerned that reaction against NATO might turn into increased anti-American sentiments and wishes to avoid this. Furthermore, establishment of advisory committee could lead to increased pressure for convocation of Parliament and if government refused even ERE deputies would waiver.

3. At this point, I interrupted to ask if composition of advisory committee could not prevent this reaction, pointing out that NATO was by no means composed entirely of colonial powers. Averoff replied that unfortunately NATO was regarded by Greeks as predominantly colonial-minded.

4. Averoff then commenced to back-water on his own proposals.⁵ He said he must tell me that while he considers they bind him personally, this not the same as binding GOG. He remains hopeful they can eventually be accepted but recalled he had Makarios to deal with. He furthermore thought that if his suggestions are to have eventual success they should not be advanced as Greek ideas. If they are, the Turks will certainly object. He still thinks ideas can work because they avoid enosis and can be fitted into UK plan. At this point I said advisory committee would offer just the kind of forum where this might be accomplished. Again Averoff objected for same reasons, but insisted that exclusion of enosis should go far to meet Turkish desires and referred to a declaration attributed to Inonu just published in The Economist.⁶

5. I attempted again to get his agreement to advisory committee but was not successful. Finally, he said that GOG would agree to informal first contacts which would permit a preliminary exchange of views. This would be in effect without commitments. If this exchange shows any promise it could then be pursued quickly through diplomatic channels, and if any of the Greek ideas can be applied the results could then go to NATO. After the grand outline is decided, a special meeting of NAC could be convoked to approve the decision, leaving to Permanent Council the working out of small details. In this way NATO would have a success and not be faced with a possible failure.

6. Foreign Minister then said that he had received reports on the Spaak “Frigidaire” Theory. He remarked that in one sense this is what GOG has already proposed and under it a definitive solution could be postponed indefinitely. He realizes this implies formulation of some liberal constitution for Cyprus but assumes it could be done. I assume this Spaak Frigidaire Theory refers to Spaak’s ideas as set forth in first paragraph of Paris Polto 67 to Department.⁷

7. Averoff concluded in somber tones that GOG increasingly feels it is being mistreated by US which in fact if not in words adopts Turkish viewpoint. With some bitterness he said that substance of Greek proposals was being ignored and that my only reply to him is merely to go to NATO which GOG distrusts. I interjected remark that we had just expressed hope his suggestions might lead to constructive discussions and reminded him that all NATO was inevitably concerned in view of recent actions of GOG including aide-memoire threatening withdrawal.⁸ Averoff answered this by stating great concern of GOG is now to keep Greece in NATO and that is why it is prepared even to accept Spaak Frigidaire Theory. He reiterated his urgent need for an answer to his proposals as time is running out and situation in Cyprus is threatening, both from Turks and EOKA. If he cannot get answers on substance he will be compelled to go to UN which he had hoped to avoid.

8. I could have made some sharper replies to Averoff particularly in view of press attacks on US here and Greek tendency to blame US for its own shortcomings, but I decided in present atmosphere of bruised feelings and wounded amour-propre there was nothing to be gained. Averoff did not refer again to Washington trip and I did not mention it. I think he felt sure Secretary would receive him in Paris and he probably caused story to be leaked to press.⁹ It is clear that our lack of response on substance of suggestions and refusal of Paris visit have bitten deeply. We have expatiated at some length in earlier cables on political risks GOG is taking and shall not repeat them here. There is no doubt an element of bluff, but with this unstable and egocentric people also a hard core of reality. Noting what Spaak said yesterday to Burgess about our influence,¹⁰ I doubt if I can do much more here until we can give some reaction on substance of Greek suggestions. If we cannot, and I realize there may be good reasons for this, perhaps the best policy is to push Spaak’s Frigidaire Theory.

Riddleberger

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–558. Secret; Limited Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Nicosia.
1. Telegram 51 to Athens, July 3, provided instructions for the Embassy and the Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for responding to Greek approaches “within the context” of Spaak’s initiative. (Ibid., 747C.00/6–2958)
2. Paragraph 2 reads: “For Athens: In response Averoff approach reported Embtel 11, suggest you welcome his seeing UK Ambassador and express hope that Averoff’s suggestions may provide impetus for constructive discussions. We do not however believe it appropriate for US to mediate with UK and GOT along lines suggested by Averoff. If Spaak and others so wish, US prepared participate in advisory committee along lines outlined Topol 4693 as amended by Topol 4701. You should encourage Averoff to see Spaak and emphasize impossibility Secretary being able see him at Paris in view of latter’s full schedule during one day visit and necessity leaving Paris promptly midnight July 5 because of Ottawa trip. If Averoff presses you for response to his offer to come to Washington to discuss Cyprus suggest you discreetly discourage him by pointing out that talks between immediately interested parties appear to us to be more logical starting point for constructive discussions.” Telegram 11 is printed as Document 242.
3. Hood and Rountree discussed Cyprus on July 2, with particular emphasis on Greek objections to British proposals to give Turkey a legal status on the island. The conversation was reported to Athens in telegram 49, July 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–358)
4. In discussions with Melas, Sarper, and Roberts during the first week of July, Spaak renewed his proposals for tripartite discussions on Cyprus to take place in Paris under NATO auspices. (Polto 67 from Paris, July 4; ibid., 747C.00/7–458)
5. See footnote 2, Document 242.
6. Inonu said that if the Greek Government pressed for enosis, then the island must be partitioned since enosis implied a partition. These remarks were reported in The Economist (London), July 5, 1958.
7. The relevant portions of this paragraph read: “Elaborating his ideas, he said he had two principles in mind: (A) That a provisional solution was only kind on which agreement is possible at this time; (B) that such a provisional solution should not prejudice in any way the final solution, neither towards partition, nor enosis, nor independence. If these principles could be agreed, then the United Kingdom plan could be looked at in the light thereof, and perhaps modified so as to make it entirely consistent with principle (B).”
8. Transmitted in Document 219.
9. In telegram 11 from Athens, July 3, Riddleberger reported that the Athens newspaper Eleftheria had published a report that Averoff would meet with Dulles in Paris, and that Averoff had telephoned the Embassy to blame the United States for the leakage of this information. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–358)
10. In Polto 67, Burgess reported that Spaak had told him that the United States was the only NATO nation which could keep Cyprus discussions on the right course.