Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

51. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, December 17, 1959, 8 p.m.

1170. Paris for Secretary. I have now had opportunity for further talks with Brandt and Chancellor re Berlin and German question. Latter made obvious effort to avoid any discussion his specific views, and perhaps clearest indication his feelings re summit conference was to remind me that it had already receded from earlier suggested dates to April or May, and that were it to be postponed any further it would probably not be possible to hold it in 1960. From Krapf, who was here from German Embassy Washington for few days early in week, and from Carstens in Foreign Office, I gather there has been no particular change in Chancellor’s views on either Berlin or reunification (although they both indicate that he has not confided his views to anyone recently). I can only surmise, therefore, that Adenauer intends in effect to leave initiative to General De Gaulle before coming out with his own proposals. In any event, he seemed somewhat more relaxed than occasion my first call on him, and at end of long, hard day seemed extraordinarily fresh and alert.

On other hand, Brandt, with whom I lunched yesterday, has been most forthcoming. While in good spirits, he expressed apprehensions re possible Western moves at summit which could weaken West Berlin’s ties with FedRep. As in Berlin, Brandt made point of his agreement with Chancellor, and reiterated his insistence Western Powers should not revive Western proposal, tabled final stages Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting, as basis forthcoming East-West summit discussions. Instead, he suggested as minimum that we revert to indivisible package plan, preserving link between Berlin problem and reunification Germany. There was also some discussion whether, as tactical move, Western Powers might be well advised base their opening position on June 20, 1949 agreement,¹ which terminated blockade and dealt with questions German reunification as well as Berlin access.

Referring Khrushchev’s latest pronouncements on Soviet peace treaty proposal,²Brandt said he recognized Soviets would almost surely sign separate peace treaty with East German regime eventually. He appeared appreciate that in last analysis Western Powers could do nothing prevent such action. He seemed to feel, furthermore, that any new arrangement, no matter what nature, would not have result of mitigating pressure on Berlin for long, and that therefore present status was hardly likely to be improved upon.

Dowling

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12–1759. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, priority to Paris, Berlin, and Moscow.
1. For text of the final communiqué of the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers, June 20, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.
2. Presumably reference is to Khrushchev’s speech in Budapest on December 1 in which he again stated that a peace treaty with East Germany was the only solution to the Berlin problem. For text of his speech, see Pravda, December 2, 1959.