Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

50. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, December 15, 1959, 1 p.m.

1653. Following comments are inspired by receipt today of record dated December 7 of Washington consultations for use at Heads of Govt meeting Paris.¹ US position papers on problems raised have not been received.

It seems almost certain that at summit meeting question of German reunification cannot be resolved and that there is very little likelihood that problem of Berlin can be settled. (French Amb informs me that at his recent meeting with De Gaulle, Adenauer indicated he thought Western Allies had already gone too far in their Geneva proposals and that their offer should be withdrawn.) In my opinion two chief motives Sovs had in raising Berlin question were to clear way for separate peace treaty with East Germany and for gradual neutralization and eventual takeover of West Berlin.

In these circumstances maximum we can probably hope for at summit meeting is to obtain tacit agreement for an indeterminate period to leave Berlin situation basically as it now is with an understanding that both sides would endeavor to undertake unilaterally to reduce friction there. This would only be possible if Sovs could also be brought to agree to refrain for time being from concluding a separate peace treaty. This in my opinion unlikely unless we have an agreed policy and make a determined effort to prevent this. In any event believe it would be helpful in inducing West Germans to adopt a more flexible attitude for Western powers to discuss realistically situation that will exist if Khrushchev carries out his present threat to conclude separate treaty.

In first place once such treaty is concluded Sovs and East Germans will have means of pressuring neutral and other non-NATO govts to adhere to such treaty and mere passage of time will result in a growing acceptance of East German regime. Sov position is that such treaty would end our occupation rights in Berlin. It is probable that Sovs would give instructions to East German regime at least at first to avoid incidents and allow relatively free passage for troops and supplies of occupying powers. Nevertheless probability of serious incidents, possibly caused by local East German initiative, is very great. Moreover Sovs would undoubtedly decline any responsibility in connection with incidents which would arise and we would be obliged to deal with East German authorities which again over period of time would go far toward tacit recognition. It is of course also clear that separate treaty would greatly hamper eventual efforts to bring about reunification Germany, which although clearly not now in the cards could in time become possible. Without attempting an exhaustive examination in this message of disadvantages of separate treaty, seems clear to me that one of our major tactics at summit meeting should be to reduce possibility this development. It should be noted that a settlement of Berlin problem might enhance possibility of separate treaty in event (a) that such settlement involved our giving up our occupation rights or (b) was sufficiently satisfactory to Sovs that they would feel impelled to make separate treaty with a clause reorganizing a special regime in Berlin although in latter event some of disadvantages of separate treaty would be diminished or disappear.

If a summit meeting or President Eisenhower’s visit to Soviet Union do not result in any developments advantageous to Sov Union I think it unlikely that steps for separate treaty would be taken by Sovs immediately but I am inclined to believe that Khrushchev will not defer such action for any considerable time unless we can devise proposals which will induce him to forego his obvious determination to carry out his declared policy in this respect. The foil are not considered policy proposals but merely suggestions which might be explored or might stimulate other proposals, their primary purpose being in the first place to prevent recurrence of a Berlin crisis and in the second to keep German question from becoming even more frozen than it now is. In his desire to maintain improved atmosphere and to explore possibility of disarmament, Khrushchev may be induced to give us further time if West can come up with some imaginative proposals even though these may not be very practical.

1. On assumption that one of primary Sov considerations is their concern over frontier situation in Eastern Europe, we might consider negotiating for adequate compensation including an undertaking for a given period of time not to conclude a separate peace treaty. The establishment by West Germany of relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia and unilateral declarations by France, Britain and the US that in an eventual peace treaty with a reunited Germany they would not advocate any change in the existing German frontiers.

2. If the West Germans could be brought to accept some kind of all-German committee for purpose of examining problem of reunfication we might propose such a step be combined with an undertaking in part of Sov Union to agree to free elections at end of given period of time, say seven years. If in meantime Germans themselves had not been able to resolve problem of reunification. Such package might include drafting terms of peace treaty which would be concluded at end of period with Germany reunited either by all-German negotiations or by elections upon their failure to agree.

3. Sovs might be deterred from separate treaty and/or from action affecting status of West Berlin by some indication as to what Western reaction might be. For example, Sovs have indicated great concern that we might turn over authority in West Berlin to West Germany. Although it is dangerous to make threats there are other possible actions we could take which might at least be mentioned in passing in discussing this problem.

Also wish to suggest that at summit conf we should be prepared to have thorough discussion of problems raised in international field by conflict of ideologies. Believe such discussion should go far beyond suggestions contained in French paper on problem of non-interference.

Thompson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1559. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Paris.
1. See footnote 2, Document 48.