205. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Herter0
Since, as you know, I will be leaving the Department to attend the Aspen Institute seminar, and will be gone somewhat over two weeks, I [Page 547] should like to set down the subjects with which I have been involved prior to my departure.
1. Powers Case1
I believe this is in good shape and the chief consideration I would think is not to rush out into any line of pre-trial propaganda which Powers’ statements at the trial might blow up. In other words, I think we should wait and see what develops at the trial and handle it from the propaganda point of view in the light thereof.
I think there should be a committee set up, possibly with Mr. Davis as its head, which would examine immediately material as it emerges from the trial and get out quickly the necessary proper propaganda guidance both at home and abroad.
2. Berlin
The subject which I think could be the most dangerous and serious is of course Berlin. We of course have no certainty that recent indications of Soviet intention possibly to bring on a Berlin crisis before the termination of the six to eight months period originally set by Khrushchev may merely be a continuance of pressure in the current war of nerves on general rather than specific grounds. It would, however, be extremely imprudent to assume that this is merely bluff. If it turned out the Soviets did intend some move in regard to Berlin, particularly during our Presidential campaign, we would be caught dangerously short.
I would, therefore, suggest that immediate attention by State and Defense should be given to our contingency plan for Berlin and, as soon as practicable, some form of discussion with the British, French and West Germans. In reviewing the contingency plan on Berlin, which as far as I can gather is still that drawn up in April 1959,2 I believe insufficient attention has been given to the desirability of having a military probe if necessary done by air. I understand that there is concern in the Pentagon that this might indicate our willingness to accept an airlift as against attempting to free, by military force if necessary, the land routes to Berlin. There is also some question I believe as to the feasibility of air cover within the confines of the corridor. The first of these objections I do not consider valid. There is no reason to believe that we will have to abandon our rights on the ground or intention to enforce them simply because in the initial phases of the Berlin crisis we choose the form of communications most advantageous to us for a military probe of Soviet and GDR intentions. Furthermore, an air probe should not in any way delay military preparations for ground action.
[Page 548]In the event of a Soviet turn-over to the GDR of all control functions or access to Berlin, in the air as well as on the ground, I think we would have every advantage of making a test in the air. It would offer by its very nature, and based on the precedent of the Berlin blockade, the easiest “out” for the Soviets if they so desired. We would also have the best chance of winning an air battle in the event real resistance was encountered. By their very nature air operations are easier to control than shooting engagements on the ground. It could therefore contain less danger of automatic progression to general war than any ground engagement. We could of course completely reserve our position in regard to land communications and would not in any sense be committed merely to a renewal of the air lift. However, since the problem is only that of supplying the Western garrisons and not, as I understand it, that of the civilian population in the opening phases of the crisis, we could gain time while other world-wide measures could be developed and put into effect. If blockades were extended to civilian traffic to Berlin, we could then on better basis initiate land probe.
As to the technical feasibility of jets in the corridor, I am not competent to judge how limiting this factor is, but it should not be impossible to fly air cover to a convoy of transports as a first move. In the event of armed resistance there would be no necessity or even desirability of scrupulously respecting the limitations of the corridor since we would have been subjected to an act of aggression.
In any event, I would suggest that you should appoint a committee at once to re-examine the various aspects of the contingency planning on Berlin. If the Soviet attitude turns out to be mere bluff, we have only lost a certain number of man hours in study, but we would be better prepared to deal with a possible crisis this autumn.
With further reference to Berlin, there have been some suggestions current in the Department as to the best way of conveying to Khrushchev a convincing demonstration of our determination in this matter, particularly in light of the doubts he expressed in Austria to Kreisky on this score. I doubt if a communication from the President to Khrushchev would be the best method of doing this. In the first place, it might be construed as a US initiative to open up the channel of personal communication broken off by the Summit events. Secondly, it might afford Khrushchev an opportunity while leaving the threat hanging to cast an element of uncertainty in regard to his intentions which would not help us very much. Thirdly, any written communication, particularly in the present circumstances, would be considered by the Soviets to have a propaganda angle which might reduce its effectiveness. On balance, if there is any continuing evidence of Soviet threats in regard to Berlin, I believe an instruction to Thompson to talk to Khrushchev following his return to Moscow would be the best. He could either be [Page 549] brought home on consultation and have an interview with the President, which might enhance the effectiveness, or I believe an instruction from the President would be an acceptable alternative. Any such move would have to be checked out with the British, French and West Germans.
Needless to say, if there is any urgent need for me to return to Washington I can be back from Aspen within a day.
- Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Germany. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and sent through S/S. attached to a memorandum from Calhoun to Merchant, dated August 4, which stated that the Secretary of State had approved the proposals put forth under numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 and had charged Merchant with establishing the committee to re-examine contingency plans. Calhoun suggested that the interdepartmental committee might be the appropriate vehicle for the re-examination↩
- Reference is to the trial of Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the U–2 plane.↩
- See vol. VIII, Document 255.↩