Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

204. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (White) to Secretary of State Herter ⁰

Washington, August 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Bundestag Meeting in Berlin

1. The French have now joined in supporting the new British formula regarding the Bundestag meeting in Berlin. This formula is as follows:

“It seems important that the three Powers, if and when their opinion is asked by the Federal Government about a Bundestag meeting in Berlin this autumn, should give similar replies.

“Could we say something to the effect that the matter is of course for the Germans to decide but that a possible way out of the dilemma might be for the Bundestag, after the summer recess, to decide in principle on a meeting in Berlin during the present session but to leave the date undecided?”¹

2. Our initial reaction, as given to both the British and the French, was that it did not seem that such a formula faced-up to the basic issue involved and would not avoid giving the impression that the Western Powers were retreating before Soviet threats. The more considered views of the Department were promised, and it is accordingly now necessary that we formulate our position for official transmission to the British and French.

3. Although the British formula is ingenious, it does not seem to meet the basic requirements of the situation as set forth in the Department’s Airgram G–30 of July 15, 1960 (copy attached at Tab A).² Nothing has happened in the past two weeks which would indicate that the reasoning in this airgram does not remain the only realistic basis for a firm attitude in relation to Khrushchev’s threats on the subject. Our response to the British and French should accordingly be to urge that instead of the formula proposed, an appropriate tripartite position would be as follows:

a. The question of whether or not a Bundestag meeting is to be held this fall in Berlin is one for decision by the appropriate German authorities, i.e., presumably the Bundestag itself after such consultation as it may wish with the Federal Government.

b. Should the Federal authorities decide to hold the meeting in Berlin, we would not consider that this would be incompatible with the special status of Berlin as an area under Allied occupation or endanger the security of Berlin in such a way as to warrant negative Allied intervention.

c. If the meeting is held in Berlin, the Occupying Powers would ensure that public security in the city would be maintained in such a way as to permit the orderly holding of the meeting.

4. There have been press reports that Adenauer and De Gaulle discussed the subject during their recent meeting Rambouillet, coming to the conclusion that the meeting should not be held in Berlin. However, the French Embassy here has been unable to provide us with any information on this point.³

5. A further factor which tends to confuse the situation as well as to lead to a certain disingenuousness in statements of motives is the strong probability that the Germans and the French, as well as the British, have a highly exaggerated impression of the incapacity of the American Government, due to electoral campaign and impending change-over of administrations, to deal effectively with any crisis over Berlin. We have, of course, tried to give assurances on this subject at our level but, as you know, when people like the Chancellor and De Gaulle get a fixed idea in their heads, remonstrances to the contrary have little effect.

6. It seems probable, therefore, that early British and French acceptance of our position is unlikely and that we will be subjected to a continuing series of approaches in order to obtain our agreement to something like the British formula. Although tripartite unity in matters of this kind is something eminently to be desired, it may well be that, in the last analysis, more good than harm would result from the giving of differing advice to the Germans when they ask. If it were to become generally known that the United States had not opposed a German decision to hold the Bundestag meeting in Berlin, but that the decision had been taken on other grounds, this would probably at the very least be psychologically useful vis-à-vis the Soviets during a period when it will be important to convince Khrushchev that our intentions remain firm. One difficulty with this, however, could be that Adenauer is disposed not to have the meeting in Berlin, whereas the Berlin contingent headed by Brandt will push to have the meeting held this fall. While it is always possible that the question might become a public issue, we doubt that Adenauer would risk an open dispute with Brandt unless he could convincingly state that a decision had already been taken by the Western occupying powers.

7. In the likely event that the British and French find they cannot accept points (a), (b) and (c) in Paragraph 3, we might suggest that agreement merely to stop with point (a) would be preferable to their proposed formula. We would indicate, however, that if the Germans continue to press for some further expression of Allied views, or try to give the impression that opposition on their part to holding the Bundestag meeting in Berlin is based on advice received from the Western Allies, it might be necessary to bring all three points to the attention of the Federal Government.

8. In the event that the British and the French continue to give their views to the Germans on this subject without reference to tripartite agreement to stop with point (a), we would presumably be free to communicate such views unilaterally as we might consider desirable.

9. It is accordingly recommended that you approve the position outlined in Paragraph 3 above for initial transmission to the British and French; and the fall-back position in Paragraph 7 above for use in the eventuality indicated.⁴

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/8–260. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand; concurred in by Davis, Armitage, McKiernan, and Boster; and sent through Calhoun and Merchant who initialed.
1. The British made this proposal on July 27 and on August 1 Lebel told White of the French support for the proposal. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid., 762A.00/7–2760 and 762.00/8–160.
2. Document 202.
3. For Chancellor Adenauer’s recollections of the visit to France July 29–30, see Erinnerungen, 1959–1963, pp. 59–67. In the conversation referred to in footnote 1 above, Lebel stated that he had no information on whether De Gaulle and Adenauer had discussed this question. For the Department of State’s analysis of this meeting and that between Adenauer and Macmillan August 10–11, see vol. VII, Part 1, Documents 120 and 121.
4. Herter initialed approval of the recommendation. According to telegram 297 to Bonn, August 11, the Department of State informed the British and French Embassies that the British formula did not face up to the basic issue. The Embassy in Bonn was instructed to inform the British and French there. (Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/8–1160)