196. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Meeting of Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

  • Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant, Chairman
  • Mr. Gerard C. Smith, S/P
  • Mr. Edward T. Long, M
  • Mr. Herman Skofield, S/S–RO
  • Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GER
  • Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman, GER
  • Mr. James H. McFarland, Jr., GPA
  • Mr. Graham Martin, U
  • Mr. Robert P. Terrill, U/CEA
  • Mr. Edwin M.J. Kretzmann, P
  • Mr. Francis T. Williamson, REU
  • Mr. Stephen Palmer, UNP
  • General Fields, Dept. of Defense—JCS
  • Colonel Fawell, Dept. of Defense—JCS
  • Colonel Brannon, Dept. of Defense—JCS
  • Colonel Tyler, Dept. of Defense—OSD/ISA
  • Colonel Schofield, Dept. of Defense—OSD/ISA
  • Mr. Irwin, Dept. of Defense—OSD/ISA
  • Mr. James Lay, NSC
  • Mr. Critchfield, CIA

Mr. Merchant opened the meeting by stating that it was a good idea to get together at this time, as JCS and Defense had requested, in order to review Berlin contingency plans. He gave a brief summary of developments in Paris where the three Western Foreign Ministers had considered the plans and problems May 18 and had briefed the three Heads of Government later the same day.1 As a result, we had been given two new planning directives:

1.
To study further indirect measures, both economic and military, which might be useful or necessary.
2.
To study the problem of harassment of civil access which could become serious. The President himself had expressed concern and was [Page 528] anxious that the Western Powers consider what could be done to counter such harassment. The Heads of Government meeting gave authority to press ahead on these two problems and on other aspects of existing planning.

Mr. Merchant noted that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had made it plain that referral of the Berlin problem to the United Nations would depend on circumstances existing at the time such action might seem appropriate. Selwyn Lloyd added that the Governments would also have to decide whether they wanted to take the matter beyond the Security Council to the General Assembly. Secretary Herter emphasized that the existence of QBAL plans implied no commitment to their automatic implementation.

In connection with two new directives, the State Department considered it desirable to call a meeting of the Ambassadorial Group within the next week to secure tripartite agreement to bringing in Ambassador Grewe, since the bulk of the possible measures in response to harassment of civilian access would fall on the Federal Republic. After this meeting the work would be subcontracted to a Working Group in Bonn.

Mr. Merchant declared that we shouldn’t draw much comfort from the Khrushchev Berlin speech.2 We must keep our plans up to the minute. We should be prepared for another 180° turn by Khrushchev on Berlin at any time.

General Fields agreed with Mr. Merchant’s analysis and outlined the reasons why the JCS had asked for this meeting. He raised the problem of whether other U.S. agencies are aware of or can be quickly informed of what we plan to do on a world-wide basis to meet specific challenges.

He distributed copies of a list of possible measures, pointing out that the list was not to be considered complete but that it represented the best compilation JCS had.3 Individual items listed had been picked out of plans submitted. They were arranged loosely into logical groups, for example, “actions to demonstrate firmness.” It was felt the various sections of the list should now be arranged sequentially in order that all concerned might know how long it would take to bring off any particular exercise contemplated.

Mr. Merchant agreed with the necessity of notifying other governmental agencies which might have a role to play or which should be kept informed and asked if anyone had prepared such a list of agencies.

General Fields stated that at such time as the Soviets signed a separate peace treaty with the GDR it might be necessary to review our plans [Page 529] on industrial mobilization. Such a review would require the participation of the entire government. (After the close of the meeting Mr. Lay asked to be kept advised of any developments which might require or render advisable review of industrial mobilization plans.)

Mr. Merchant noted having seen General Palmer’s report (EC 9–10390)4 giving the current status of Live Oak planning.

General Fields was encouraged by the report from General Palmer. It contained two heartening statements. Both air and ground planning were now in such a state that they could, if necessary, be implemented at once. General Palmer has directed U.S. commanders to be prepared to implement the plans.

General Fields asked Mr. Merchant for his impressions of the amount of support we might expect from the U.K. and France, should it be necessary to implement the Berlin contingency plans.

Mr. Merchant replied that he had the definite feeling that there was absolute Allied solidarity on the point that to let Berlin fall would be damaging in the extreme to our world-wide positions. Lloyd had put it well by asking, “If Berlin goes, who goes next?” On the other hand, he did not believe it was possible to persuade any of our Allies to take in advance decisions to go to war on the basis of predetermined plans any more than we would be willing to do so.

At the NATO meeting (May 19)5 interest was expressed in the status of contingency planning. It might be useful to consider giving NAC a progress report. This should be on the check list of things to do. Mr. Merchant added a word of caution on the need to avoid all publicity on meetings of the kind presently taking place.

Mr. Irwin reported that U.S. Live Oak representatives had informed him that from the beginning the British had regarded Berlin contingency planning (more elaborate measures) as a planning exercise only and had no enthusiasm for implementation of these measures. The French seemed more inclined to support the plans as measures which might be implemented.

Mr. Smith asked whether it was not clear that the British did not like the issue of the stamping of documents as the point at which to implement the plans.

Mr. Merchant replied that we had eliminated the issue of stamping by the positive act of handing over sections of our travel orders at the checkpoints.

Mr. Merchant was called away temporarily.

[Page 530]

Mr. Hillenbrand stated that he thought the British might be willing to accept as a definitive cut-off point the maintenance of present procedures by the GDR. He doubted they would in the final analysis accept the “peel-off procedures. The reservation of their position on the final paragraph suggested by the French for inclusion in the statement to be made to the Soviets was revealing on this point.

[2 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Hillenbrand observed that the Paris report represented about as far as we could realistically expect to go. Mr. Irwin agreed.

Mr. Hillenbrand asked General Fields what actions he envisaged for the proposed Working Group.

General Fields stated that it should start with the check list he had just distributed and expand it if possible. The Group should also consider what other Government agencies should do. The Group should be convened as soon as possible. Colonel Fawell would represent JCS.

Mr. Irwin asked what action Western controllers in BASC were authorized to take in the event of the signing of a separate peace treaty between the USSR and GDR or the withdrawal of the Soviet Controller from BASC.

Colonel Brannon read the statement which the Western Controllers are to make.6 Colonel Schofield pointed out that the U.S. Controller is authorized to make the statement immediately. The British and French Controllers are not. They would need the specific authorization of their Governments.

There was a discussion of the need for practice and coordination exercises by the tripartite forces which would be participating in the various measures contemplated. The various units had already been designated by General Norstad. It was agreed that practice maneuvers could be conducted without being provocative if desired or could be conducted with the specific aim of showing determination to maintain access, should this be desirable.

Mr. Smith observed that before the training exercises were held a political decision would be required as to the timing.

Mr. Irwin conceded that this might be true but hoped there would be no decision not to hold the exercises.

Mr. Merchant, having returned, observed that it would be logical for General Norstad to put the matter of such exercises up to the Three Governments and noted that the Department of State as well as the British and French would want to consider the timing and situation prevailing at the time the exercises were scheduled to commence.

[Page 531]

There were no other points to be discussed. Mr. Merchant asked Mr. Hillenbrand to undertake to assemble the Working Group within the next few days. The first meeting is to take place May 25 at 3:00 p.m.7

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5–2360. Secret. Drafted by McFarland and approved in M on June 2. The source text bears Merchant’s initials.
  2. See Documents 181 and 185.
  3. See Document 192.
  4. A copy of this 24-page paper, JCS 1907/267, is in Department of State, JCS Files.
  5. Not found.
  6. Detailed reports on the Council meeting on May 19 were transmitted in Polios 2306, 2307, and 2319 from Paris, May 20 and 23. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1666)
  7. Not further identified.
  8. No record of a meeting of the Working Group on May 25 has been found.