Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

168. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/26

Paris, May 16, 1960, 11 a.m.–2:10 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT

• Pre-Summit Problems Among the Four Powers

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • President Eisenhower
  • Secretary Herter
  • Secretary Gates
  • Mr. Bohlen
  • Colonel Walters
  • Mr. Akalovsky
• United Kingdom
  • Prime Minister Macmillan
  • Secretary Lloyd
  • Sir Frederick coyer-Millar
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Mr. Zulueta
  • Two Interpreters
• France
  • President de Gaulle
  • M. Debre
  • M. Couve de Murville
  • M. Maillard
  • M. Andronikov
  • M. Laurie
• Soviet Union
  • Mr. Khrushchev
  • Mr. Gromyko
  • Marshal Malinovsky
  • Two Interpreters
  • One Note Taker

President de Gaulle: We are gathered here for the Summit Conference. Yesterday I received a statement from one of the participants, Mr. Khrushchev, which I conveyed verbally to the other participants, President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan. Does anyone therefore wish to say anything?

Khrushchev: I would like the floor.

President Eisenhower: I would also like to make a short statement.

President de Gaulle: Perhaps we should hear President Eisenhower first.

Khrushchev: I was the first to ask for the floor and I would like my request to be granted. Permit me to address you with the following statement.

A provocative act is known to have been committed recently with regard to the Soviet Union by the American air force. It consisted in the fact that on May 1 a United States military reconnaissance aircraft invaded the Soviet Union while executing a specific espionage mission to obtain information on military and industrial installations on the territory of the USSR. After the aggressive purpose of its flight became known the aircraft was shot down by units of the Soviet rocket troops. Unfortunately, this was not the only case of aggressive and espionage actions by the United States air force against the Soviet Union.

Naturally, the Soviet Government was compelled to give appropriate qualification to these acts and show up their treacherous nature which is incompatible with the elementary requirements of the maintenance of normal relations between states in time of peace, not to speak of it being in gross contradiction with the task of lessening international tension and creating the necessary conditions for the fruitful work of the Summit Conference. This was done both in my speeches at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and in a special note of protest sent to the United States Government.¹

At first the U.S. State Department launched the ridiculous version that the American plane had violated the borders of the USSR by accident and had no espionage or sabotage assignments.² When irrefutable facts clearly proved the falsity of this version the U.S. State Department on May 7 and then the Secretary of State on May 9³ stated on behalf of the United States Government that American aircraft made incursions into the Soviet Union with military espionage aims in accordance with a programme endorsed by the United States Government and by the President personally. Two days later President Eisenhower himself confirmed that execution of flights of American aircraft over the territory of the Soviet Union had been and remained the calculated policy of the United States.⁴ The same was declared by the United States Government in a note to the Soviet Government on May 12.⁵ Thereby the United States Government is crudely flouting the universally accepted standards of international law and the lofty principles of the United Nations Charter under which stands the signature of the United States of America also.

The Soviet Government and the entire people of the Soviet Union met these declarations of leading statesmen of the USA with indignation as did every honest man and woman in the world who displays concern for the destinies of peace.

Now, at a time when the leaders of the governments of the Four Powers are arriving in Paris to take part in the Conference, the question arises of how is it possible to productively negotiate and examine the questions confronting the Conference when the United States Government and the President himself have not only failed to condemn this provocative act—the intrusion of the American military aircraft into the Soviet Union—but, on the contrary, have declared that such actions will continue to be state policy of the USA with regard to the Soviet Union. How can agreement be sought on the various issues which require a settlement with the purpose of easing tension and removing suspicion and mistrust among states, when the Government of one of the great powers declares bluntly that its policy is intrusion into the territory of another great power with espionage and sabotage purposes and, consequently, the heightening of tension in relations among states?

It is clear that the declaration of such a policy which can be pursued only when states are in a state of war dooms the Summit Conference to complete failure in advance.

We, naturally, take note of the declaration by the United States Government of such a policy and state that in the event of a repeated intrusion by American aircraft into the Soviet Union we shall shoot these planes down.

The Soviet Government reserves the right in all such cases to take the appropriate retaliatory measures against those who violate the state sovereignty of the USSR and engage in such espionage and sabotage regarding the Soviet Union. The USSR Government reiterates that with regard to those states that by making their territory available for American military bases become accomplices in aggressive actions against the USSR, the appropriate measures will also be taken, not excluding a blow against these bases.

In this connection it is impossible to ignore the statement by President Eisenhower to the effect that under the threat of a peace treaty with the GDR he could not take part in the Summit Conference, though what he called a threat was merely the declaration by the Soviet Government of its firm resolve to do away with the vestiges of war in Europe and conclude a peace, and thus to bring the situation—particularly in West Berlin—in line with the requirements of life and the interests of ensuring the peace and security of the European nations. How then can the Soviet Government take part in negotiations under conditions of an actual threat emanating from the United States Government which declared that it would continue to violate the USSR borders and that American aircraft had flown and would continue to fly over the Soviet Union’s territory? The United States Government has thereby declared its intention to continue unheard of and unprecedented actions directed against the sovereignty of the Soviet state which constitutes a sacred and immutable principle in international relations.

From all this it follows that for the success of the Conference it is necessary that the governments of all the powers represented at it pursue an overt and honest policy and solemnly declare that they will not undertake any actions against one another which amount to violation of the state sovereignty of the powers. This means that if the United States Government is really ready to cooperate with the governments of the other powers in the interests of maintaining peace and strengthening confidence between states it must, firstly, condemn the inadmissible provocative actions of the United States air force with regard to the Soviet Union and, secondly, refrain from continuing such actions and such a policy against the USSR in the future. It goes without saying that in this case the United States Government cannot fail to call to strict account those who are directly guilty of the deliberate violation by American aircraft of the state borders of the USSR.

Until this is done by the United States Government the Soviet Government sees no possibility for productive negotiations with the United States Government at the Summit Conference. It cannot be among the participants in negotiations where one of them has made treachery the basis of his policy with regard to the Soviet Union.

If under the obtaining conditions the Soviet Government were to participate in negotiations clearly doomed to failure, it would thereby become a party to the deception of the nations, which it has no intention of becoming.

It stands to reason that if the U.S. Government were to declare that in future the United States will not violate the state borders of the USSR with its aircraft, that it deplores the provocative actions undertaken in the past, and will punish those directly guilty of such actions, which would assure the Soviet Union equal conditions with other powers, I, as Head of the Soviet Government, would be ready to participate in the Conference and exert all efforts to contribute to its success.

As a result of the provocative flights of American military aircraft and above all as a result of such provocative flights being declared national policy of the United States of America for the future with regard to the socialist countries, new conditions have appeared in international relationships.

Naturally, under such conditions we cannot work at the Conference, we cannot because we see the positions from which it is intended to talk with us: under the threat of aggressive reconnaissance flights. Espionage flights are known to be undertaken with reconnaissance purposes with the object of starting a war. We therefore reject the conditions which the United States of America are creating for us. We cannot participate in any negotiations and in the solution of even those questions which have already matured, we cannot because we see that the United States have no desire to reach a settlement.

It is considered to be a leader in the Western countries. Therefore the Conference would at present be a useless waste of time and a deception of the public opinion of all countries. I repeat, we cannot under the obtaining situation take part in the negotiations.

We want to participate in the talks only on an equal footing, with equal opportunities for both one and the other side.

We consider it necessary for the peoples of all the countries of the world to understand us correctly. The Soviet Union is not renouncing efforts to achieve agreement. And we are sure that reasonable agreements are possible, but, evidently, not at this but at another time.

For this, however, it is necessary first of all that the United States admits that the provocative policy it declared to be by a policy of “unrestricted” flights over our country, is condemned, that it rejects it and admits that it has committed aggression, admits that it regrets it.

The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that if not this Government of the United States then another, if not another then the next one would understand that there is no other way out but peaceful co-existence of two systems, capitalist and socialist. Either peaceful co-existence or war which will result in a disaster for those who are pursuing aggressive policy.

Therefore, we think that some time should be allowed to elapse so that the questions that have arisen should settle and so that those responsible for the determining of the policies of a country would analyze what kind of responsibility they placed upon themselves having declared an aggressive course in their relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Therefore we would think that there is no better way out than to postpone the conference of the Heads of Government for approximately six–eight months.

The Soviet Union on its part will not lessen its efforts to reach an agreement. I think that the public opinion will correctly understand our position, will understand that we were deprived of the possibility to participate in these negotiations.

However, we firmly believe in the necessity of peaceful co-existence because to lose faith in peaceful co-existence would mean to doom mankind to war, would mean to agree with the inevitability of wars, and under the circumstances it is known what disasters would be brought by a war to all nations on our planet.

I wish to address the people of the United States of America. I was in the USA and met there with various sections of the American people and I am deeply convinced that all the strata of the American people do not want war. An exception constitutes but a small frantic group in Pentagon and supporting it militarist quarters which benefit from the armaments race gaining huge profits, which disregard the interests of the American people and in general the interests of the peoples of all countries, and which pursue an adventurous policy.

We express gratitude to President de Gaulle for the hospitality and rendering us the possibility to meet in Paris, the capital of France. We also appreciate the efforts of the Government of Great Britain and of Prime Minister Macmillan personally.

We regret that this meeting has been torpedoed by the reactionary circles of the United States of America by provocative flights of American military planes over the Soviet Union.

We regret that this meeting has not brought about the results expected by all nations of the world.

Let the disgrace and responsibility for this rest with those who have proclaimed a bandit policy towards the Soviet Union.

As is known President Eisenhower and I have agreed to exchange visits. Last September I made such visit to the USA. We were greatly gratified by that visit, the meetings and talks we had in the United States, and for all this we expressed our appreciation.

The President of the USA was to make a return visit to our country. Our agreement was that he would come to us on June 10. And we were being prepared to accord a good welcome to the high guest.

Unfortunately, as a result of provocative and aggressive actions against the USSR there have been created now such conditions when we have been deprived of a possibility to receive the President with proper cordiality with which the Soviet people receive welcome guests. At present we cannot express such cordiality to the President of the USA since as the result of provocative flights of American military planes with the reconnaissance purposes there are created conditions clearly unfavourable for this visit. The Soviet people cannot and do not want to be sly.

That is why we believe that at present the visit of the President of the USA to the Soviet Union should be postponed and agreement should be reached as to the time of the visit when the conditions for the visit would mature. Then the Soviet people will be able to express proper cordiality and hospitality towards the high guest representing the great power with which we sincerely want to live in peace and friendship.

I believe that both President Eisenhower and the American people will understand me correctly.

The Soviet Government states that on its part it will continue to do its utmost to facilitate the relaxation of international tension, to facilitate the solution of problems that still divide us today; in that we shall be guided by the interests of strengthening the great cause of peace on the basis of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems.

President Eisenhower: I have a short statement to make.

I had previously been informed of the sense of the statement just read by Premier Khrushchev.

In my statement of May 11th and in the statement of Secretary Herter of May 9th, the position of the United States was made clear with respect to the distasteful necessity of espionage activities in a world where nations distrust each other’s intentions. We pointed out that these activities had no aggressive intent but rather were to assure the safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack by a power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic warheads. As is well known, not only the United States but most other countries are constantly the targets of elaborate and persistent espionage of the Soviet Union.

There is in the Soviet statement an evident misapprehension on one key point. It alleges that the United States has, through official statements, threatened continued overflights. The importance of this alleged threat was emphasized and repeated by Mr. Khrushchev. The United States has made no such threat. Neither I nor my government has intended any. The actual statements go no further than to say that the United States will not shirk its responsibility to safeguard against surprise attack.

In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue.

I have come to Paris to seek agreements with the Soviet Union which would eliminate the necessity for all forms of espionage, including overflights. I see no reason to use this incident to disrupt the conference.

Should it prove impossible, because of the Soviet attitude, to come to grips here in Paris with this problem and the other vital issues threatening world peace, I am planning in the near future to submit to the United Nations a proposal for the creation of a United Nations aerial surveillance to detect preparations for attack. This plan I had intended to place before this conference. This surveillance system would operate in the territories of all nations prepared to accept such inspection. For its part, the United States is prepared not only to accept United Nations aerial surveillance, but to do everything in its power to contribute to the rapid organization and successful operation of such international surveillance.

We of the United States are here to consider in good faith the important problems before this conference. We are prepared either to carry this point no further, or to undertake bilateral conversations between the United States and the USSR while the main conference proceeds.

Macmillan: I naturally deplore that after the long and painful ascent to the Summit we now find this dark cloud upon us. I quite understand the feelings that have been aroused by this incident, but I would like to appeal to you and make two points. 1) What has happened, has happened; 2) We all know that espionage in one form or another is a disagreeable fact of life and also that most forms of espionage involve violation of national sovereignty.

The weight of Mr. Khrushchev’s argument and his unwillingness to take part in the Conference were based on his statement that these overflights have been and will be in the future the calculated policy of the United States. If this were the case I would understand his feelings and sympathize with his arguments. But the President has clearly stated that these overflights have been suspended and will not be resumed. If the Conference is to continue, as I hope it will, it will not be under, as Mr. Khrushchev puts it, any threat of continuance of these flights. I am glad Mr. Khrushchev did not propose abandonment but postponement only. However, I would suggest to him, as the French proverb goes, that “What is postponed is lost.” (Macmillan quoted this proverb in French.) A long delay after all our efforts would dim the great hopes that have been placed, in our country and throughout the world, on this Conference. Could we not make note of these statements and put them aside for study in their written form and in the meantime get on with the Conference after a short recess rather than to make a hasty decision now without opportunity to study these statements? The President’s statement was as carefully thought out as was Mr. Khrushchev’s. If we do not do this I feel postponement will itself bring great harm to the cause for which we have worked so hard.

De Gaulle: A few words in regard to the problem raised by the incident, with reference to the statements of the President, Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Macmillan, before turning to the substance of the problem.

I would make one observation. The Conference was called for the 16th of May and it is indeed the 16th of May. The overflight occurred on May 1. In between would it not have been possible to raise this question in the manner it has just been raised? In this case the questions would have been settled, or possibly not, but at any rate we would have known where we stood and that would be better than the present uncertainty.

Now as to substance, this incident arose from the state of international tension and the sharp differences which exist between the two camps, both possessing terrible means of destruction and guided by differing ideologies. This in fact was the chief reason for this Conference. It still exists and even more than ever the plane incident underlines the need for this Conference. It would be unfortunate if after all our efforts to come together we parted without considering those at all. Overflights, whether by aircraft, missile or satellite, are of course a serious matter and they increase tensions. But the concept of these overflights is bound to change and they are bound to become a natural phenomenon. There is now a Soviet satellite which is going through the skies around the world and it crosses through French skies 18 times a day, of course higher than a plane. But this development will become second nature to us and I wonder if this should not be taken into consideration and discussed. In reality these satellites can take photographs and tomorrow they may be in a position to launch terrible destruction. We should examine this question in its proper framework, that of disarmament and international tension. We should consider these two questions here at the Summit and France will be prepared at an opportune moment to make a proposal on this subject. It would not be a service to humanity to separate on the basis of a local incident. Especially after the President has made his declaration that flights will be suspended, there is no reason for taking a decision to suspend the meeting. Let a day go by while we consider the statements made here and then I shall reassemble the Conference or not, depending upon the views of the delegations. I am in Paris and you have done me the honor to be here. I will stay in contact with the delegations.

Khrushchev: Gentlemen, I have listened attentively to the statement of President Eisenhower and I note with some satisfaction that there will be no more flights. However, I do not understand if this means only for the duration of the Conference or in general. The President said there was some misunderstanding on our part but here I have a note from the United States which states that this was done and would continue. The question is, does President Eisenhower’s statement mean that the United States has revised its former policy and admitted that the previous policy was wrong? This should be stated out loud for world public opinion to hear so that the world would know that the basic policy announced by the Department of State and later by President Eisenhower would not be carried on. It is not satisfactory if this is said only in a small room since the threat was made before the whole world. President Eisenhower expressed no regrets for this aggressive act. On the contrary, he spoke of its necessity and thus attempted to justify if not condone it. Naturally, we cannot agree to this. The President referred to free countries or skies, I do not exactly remember which. This is not the first time that we have heard of open skies. I heard it in Geneva in 1955. At that time we declared categorically that we were opposed to it, and I can repeat it now. We will permit no one, but no one, to violate our sovereignty. A government should be master in its own country and this applies equally to the Soviet Government. If we should reach disarmament and it is real, then we would stand for open skies, open lands, open waters both for tourists and intelligence gatherers. Then there would be no weapons and no need for espionage, but as long as arms exist our skies will remain closed and we will shoot down everything that is there without our consent.

De Gaulle: Does this include satellites?

Khrushchev: As for sputniks, the United States has put up one that is photographing our country. We did not protest; let them take as many pictures as they want. But our latest sputnik has no photographic equipment. It contains a space cabin designed to test the condition for manned flights, and at the next or one of the next stages of this program we will put a man in space.

De Gaulle: France has nothing to fear from photography.

Khrushchev: France has nothing to fear from the United States, which is its ally, any more than Poland has anything to fear in this respect from the Soviet Union, nor has China anything to fear from the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union anything to fear from China. If the United States was an ally of ours we would not be afraid of it. Let the United States come into the socialist camp and join the Warsaw Pact and we would welcome her flying over our territory.

De Gaulle: We have no fear of any photographs whatsoever.

Secretary Herter: There has been no English translation of this exchange.

Khrushchev: All right, since there was no English translation we better have it now because my friend, Mr. Macmillan, might consider there had been discrimination.

The President had mentioned bilateral talks. This idea is always good. We bear too great a responsibility and we are, at least the Soviet Government and I, for reducing international tension and ensuring peace. I am ready to meet, but frankly I am skeptical of reaching agreement on the basis announced by President Eisenhower. We are grateful to President de Gaulle for the efforts he proposed to make to create conditions which would permit the Conference to continue. We also are in favor of this but on condition that the suspension of flights would not be temporary but for always, and this should be announced publicly so that the world would know because of its previous knowledge of the threat. If this is the case we are ready to attempt to reach such a solution. The recess is all right but how long—for how many hours or days? It is hard to say. We could exchange views, give time for reflection and we might cool off. Paris has many wonderful shady chestnut groves where we can sit and think and perhaps something good would come out.

In regard to President de Gaulle’s remark that it would have been better to have settled this question before coming here, between the first and the sixteenth, we handed a note of protest to the United States Government for this purpose. The answer was that this was and will continue to be United States policy (Gromyko interjected to say that the note said it was deliberate policy). We decided to come to Paris nevertheless to present our position so that it would be understood. We want to find a solution and the best solution of this incident would be—I don’t know whether I should use this expression—but we don’t understand what devil pushed you into doing this provocative act to us just before the Conference. If there had been no incident we would have come here in friendship and in the best possible atmosphere. I recall that at Camp David both the President and I said to each other “my friend”, and now these two friends have collided in the skies. Our rocket shot the thing down. Is this good friendship? (Raising his hands above his head): God is my witness that I come with clean hands and a pure soul.

De Gaulle: Mr. Khrushchev referred to a devil giving advice to the United States unfavorable to the Soviet Union. There are many devils in the world and it is the job of this Conference to exorcise them. Mr. Khrushchev thinks bilateral contacts are good. That had always been part of our program. We have come here not only to meet in plenary sessions but also to talk among ourselves. We need time and should not take any definitive decisions, at least until we have had a chance for reflection. We might recess until tomorrow and in the meantime we could exchange views and make contacts. I am at your disposal. We may be able to agree to meet tomorrow morning or postpone the meeting until later. In the meantime, I urge that there be no unilateral declarations to the press if we want to proceed with our work. These would serve no good purpose but would merely complicate our tasks.

President Eisenhower: I agree, Mr. Chairman. I want, however, to answer one specific question raised by Mr. Khrushchev. He asked what is the sense of my statement that these flights were not to be resumed. He also referred to the fact that there will be another government and the next one. He is correct in this. (Khrushchev interjected “And another government after that” and “Nor am I eternal.”) My words regarding the suspension of flights meant not merely for the duration of the Conference but for the entire duration of my office. I cannot speak for my successor and I do not know what decision the next President will make. However, the flights will not be resumed not only for the duration of the Conference but for the entire duration of my office.

De Gaulle: I take note of the President’s statement.

Khrushchev: This is all right for you as an ally of the United States but for us it is not enough. There is no reference to the condemnation or regret for the insult publicly made to us. In regard to President de Gaulle’s remarks on publication, we want to publish the statement. This is not a Heads of Government meeting as agreed but a preliminary meeting to determine if conditions exist for a Conference. The United States has stated its policy publicly and we wish to inform public opinion of our position. We may change the form and make it a governmental declaration rather than a declaration to the Summit Conference, but we will publish. Otherwise the world will not know.

De Gaulle: Previously the Soviet position had been made clear before the Conference. It had been expressed by Mr. Khrushchev, Marshal Malinovsky and Mr. Gromyko, and now we have heard Mr. Khrushchev’s statement. If this statement is published little would be added to what is already known of the Soviet position and it would not contribute in any way to the work of this Conference, since it contains remarks unfavorable to participants here. So I don’t see what would be gained.

Macmillan: Mr. Khrushchev raised two points of importance regarding Mr. Eisenhower’s statement. The first is that the flights are not to be resumed, not only for the duration of the Conference but in general. President Eisenhower has made this quite clear. The second point justly advanced by Mr. Khrushchev was that since we all are here in private Mr. Khrushchev’s declaration should become public. Perhaps the best way to deal with this is to consider this matter during adjournment to see which is the best method to deal with this question.

Khrushchev: I want to be correctly understood. If we do not publish our declaration our Soviet public opinion will be confused. They will think that the United States has forced the Soviet Union to its knees by our coming to Paris and engaging in negotiations in the face of the threat. This is insulting to us. We don’t want to aggravate relations. They require a great deal of improvement anyhow. However, please understand that our internal policy requires this, which is very important to us. It is a matter of honor.

Secretary Herter: I would like to ask a question which the President might not like to ask himself. There are two matters. The first is the memorandum concerning the incident, and the second is the withdrawal of the invitation to the President to go to Russia. Is it the intention of Mr. Khrushchev to make both of these public after the meeting?

Khrushchev: I intend to publish my full statement as made here. Please understand this—how can I invite as a dear guest the leader of a country which has committed an aggressive act against us. No visit would be possible under present conditions. How could our people welcome him? Even my small grandson would ask his grandpa: “How could we welcome as an honored guest one who represents a country that sends planes to overfly and which we shot down with a rocket?” Both I and my guest would be in a false position. I don’t want to put myself or my guest in this equivocal position. Later on, when passions have calmed down, the visit could be possible.

Macmillan: What will be published and when?

Khrushchev: All I said in my original statement today; our subsequent exchanges could be released by mutual agreement.

Macmillan: I would ask Mr. Khrushchev to publish only the memorandum given to President de Gaulle and read to me. This would be in our common interest and would also satisfy the problem of public opinion in his own country. The President could then publish his statement. Both positions would be made clear without adding acrimony or the new controversial subject regarding the invitation. In such a case better arrangements could be made for agreed publication at the end of the Conference when the atmosphere was clearer. This would be an equitable way to proceed if we want to get on with our work.

Or perhaps I could suggest another solution. Since the second part of the declaration contains an additional point, namely that of adjournment, perhaps it could be possible to publish it leaving out the reference to the President’s visit while leaving in the reference to adjournment. The question of making public the statement regarding the invitation could be decided later.

De Gaulle: I took note of the two suggestions made by Mr. Macmillan. However, even if only the first part is published I ask myself what effect this would have, and whether the Conference would be able to go on, because the first part contains the categorical statement that the Soviet Union refuses to participate in the Summit Conference unless there was a great change in the climate, and Mr. Khrushchev himself does not believe that that change is probable. If all participants want the Conference to go on there should be no statement published at this stage. Now we should take note of the statements and decide the question of publication at the end. If the statements are published now this would do away with the possibility of another meeting. Mr. Khrushchev refers to public opinion. He should remember that other countries have public opinion also. We should allow ourselves time for reflection and clarification before making any decision. It would be improper to make decisions now. I have already suggested a 24-hour recess to which I understand we all agree. We could use this interval to establish contacts, reflection and then decide the question of publication.

Khrushchev: I must inform public opinion at home, and world opinion as well. I am sorry that there are differences among us. The insult to our country has been made public. It has not been made to your country. You are all members of NATO and the United States is the leader. We are alone and are obliged to express our opinion in regard to the conditions which would permit the Conference to work. I intend to publish my statement and I have no objection to others doing likewise; they all have the same right. The United States as leader of NATO has made its threat public and we have been insulted, but we are not prepared to come as poor relatives among NATO members to ask for mercy and to beg your leader not to violate our frontiers flying over our territory. We will defend ourselves and our honor with force if necessary and we have the necessary force. Our policy is based on respect for your sovereignty and we want you to respect ours. I am very sorry about the situation. We would like to do everything possible to contribute to the success of this Conference, but we cannot do anything because no prejudice should be done to any of the parties. As to bilateral talks, we would agree if any other party would want them.

In regard to the second part of my statement, it does not refer only to the invitation. However, I have on my desk thousands of letters and telegrams from workers and citizens requesting me to postpone the invitation to the leader of a nation that has not only violated our sovereignty but has even insulted us by stating that it would continue such acts. Our people cannot indulge in hypocrisy and receive as a distinguished guest the representative of a country that has declared such policy and its intention to continue it.

De Gaulle: There would seem to be nothing more at the present time than to take note of what has occurred and to draw the necessary conclusions. I am always at your disposal for as long as necessary. In these conditions the only thing we can do is adjourn.

Macmillan: It would be desirable to fix a time for the meeting tomorrow because the press might think that the Conference has broken down, which it may. We may reach agreement by tomorrow so we should leave the door open.

Khrushchev: As I have said, this is not the beginning of the Summit Conference as agreed. That has not started yet. We regard this meeting as a preliminary one, dealing with procedural matters and I also said that I would not participate in the Summit Conference until the United States has publicly removed the threat it has imposed.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5–1660. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bohlen and Akalovsky and approved by the White House on May 18 and in S on May 20. The meeting took place at the Elysée Palace. A summary of the discussion at the meeting was transmitted in Cahto 7 from Paris, May 18 at noon. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1665) For other descriptions of the meeting, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 555–556; Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp. 205–207; De Gaulle, Mémoires, pp. 263–265; Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, pp. 454–455; Walters, Silent Missions, pp. 342–346; and Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 467–468.
1. See footnote 3, Document 146. The may 10 note is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 30, 1960, pp. 852–854.
2. For text of the May 5 Department of State statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 412–413.
3. For texts of the May 7 and 9 statements, see ibid., pp. 417–420.
4. For a transcript of the President’s May 11 press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61 pp. 403–414.
5. For text of this note, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 425.