Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

112. Paper Circulated in the Department of State⁰

FMW REF–3/102

Washington, April 7, 1960.

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

AGREED FIVE-POWER REPORT OF APRIL 5 ON DISARMAMENT

Summary of Discussions of the Conference

1. The conference began its discussions in a good atmosphere and entered directly into examination of the Western and Soviet general disarmament plans¹ without wasting time on procedural wrangles. There have been few recriminations within the conference itself although the Soviet group have used press conferences as an occasion for criticism and propaganda. The Western delegations for their part have consequently found it convenient to brief the press fully.

2. Both sides adopted a similar approach during the general debate which has been taking place. Neither side was anxious to allow the plan of the opposition to occupy the center of discussion. Accordingly both plans have been examined concurrently, and specific measures in each plan have been compared. Both sides have sought clarification by an extensive use of questions.

3. The Western questions have been primarily aimed at bringing out the unreality and lack of precision in the Soviet plan and, in particular, the lack of balance between measures of conventional and nuclear disarmament, the lack of clarity on the question of control and the rigidity of the timetable. They also noted the absence in the Soviet plan of provisions for arrangements to preserve world peace in a disarmed world. The Soviet bloc have naturally responded by pointing to the absence of timetable in the Western plan, the absence of any reference to the elimination of foreign bases and the alleged emphasis placed by the West on studies as opposed to concrete disarmament measures in the first stage. They have further aimed at demonstrating that the Western plan is a partial plan and consequently, in contrast with the Soviet plan, does not satisfy the requirements of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 1378.² They have also tried to expose the lack of connection between the various stages of the Western plan without at any time, however, directly commenting on the language linking the second and third stages.

4. The Soviet bloc have tried to demonstrate that the General Assembly Resolution No. 1378 and, in particular, the paragraph referring to general and complete disarmament, constituted the only terms of reference for the conference. The Western delegations for their part agreed that the General Assembly Resolution taken as a whole and with all its qualifying clauses (particularly those calling for agreement on measures leading towards this goal and stipulating that such measures should be under effective international control) was part of the documentation of the conference, and reaffirmed their support for that resolution in its entirety, but pointed out that the Ten-power Committee was set up by a directive of four foreign ministers in September 1959.³

5. The tactics of the Soviet bloc within the conference have given a negative and critical role to the satellites, who have demonstrated with extreme rigidity their attachment to the Soviet plan and their inability to accept that the Western plan is directed towards general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Delegate has attempted to reserve for himself the role of unofficial chairman of the conference and has tried to give an appearance of reasonable flexibility and willingness to listen to, if not to accept, the arguments of the West. The tactics of the West (in addition to the programme of questioning described above) have been to try to exploit this difference of approach between the Soviet delegation and the satellites and to show the Soviet bloc that the Western delegations are united in their serious desire to achieve progress in disarmament. In conformity with these tactics Western delegates have given a careful picture of the Western plan, of the way in which it provides for balanced disarmament and national security and the flexibility of its timing. A good deal of attention has been paid to showing the reasonableness of the Western attitude towards control, and the functions and constitution of an international disarmament organization have been sketched out.

6. So far both sides have been drawn by the course of the discussion to concentrate mainly on conventional disarmament; and the Western position on nuclear disarmament including the means of delivery has not been fully exposed. The Soviet plan has been criticized by the West, however, for its failure to deal with this subject except in the third stage.

7. On April 1 the US Delegate made a statement⁴ in which he indicated that, while the West were prepared to work patiently on measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the Soviet plan would not meet that objective. The representative of the USSR replied on April 4⁵ with a parallel rejection of the Western plan and challenged the bona fides of the US Government in the present conference.

8. In the course of discussions on control it appeared that the Soviet Union agreed on a certain number of general principles.

(I) The principle of the creation of an international disarmament organization.

(II) The control of each measure of disarmament from its beginning until its end.

(III) The maintenance of control after the completion of measures, in order to prevent back-sliding.

(IV) The principle of declarations on force levels and conventional armaments.

(V) The control of the amounts of conventional armaments or of forces to be reduced i.e., the difference between the amounts existing before the reduction and those existing after the reduction.

(VI) International inspectors.

9. In fact these statements of principles, of which the majority are not new, do little to alter the fundamental Soviet position on control. Thus according to Mr. Zorin’s declarations:

(I) Control will in principle affect only the amounts of forces or armaments subjected to measures of reduction but not the amounts existing before or after the reduction. He has moreover so far avoided any precise statement on the more important armaments.

(II) Although the link between measures of disarmament and of control has been affirmed there are signs that the principle is not fully accepted by the Russians. Thus Mr. Zorin has continually insisted on the need to avoid abstract discussions on control. According to him everything depends on the measures subjected to control. It is only “when we are in agreement on disarmament measures that we shall touch on the corresponding measures of control”.

10. He has also insisted on timing, in particular on the timetable of four years for the application of the plan as a whole. Disarmament measures are thus liable to be applied without measures of control having been properly worked out.

11. In addition Mr. Zorin has declared that if aerial photography is to be carried out over the whole of the territories of states, this cannot be attempted until after the completion of the disarmament process. The only exceptions would be the control of discontinuance of nuclear tests and the prevention or surprise attacks in limited zones on the lines of previous Russian proposals.

12. Finally his remarks have been focused primarily on measures in the field of conventional disarmament. His intention is clearly to direct negotiations toward a study of the first stage of the Khrushchev plan,⁶ i.e., towards reduction of conventional forces, while giving the impression of certain concessions in the field of control, but only after agreement on the entire framework.

13. Force levels: there appears to be agreement in principle on the maintenance of a balance on force levels during the process of force reductions, both among the ten powers and the other states which would attend a world conference on disarmament.

14. Conventional disarmament: The Soviet bloc appear to consider that a measure of conventional disarmament should start the disarmament process. This needs to be tested further and if it should mean no more than a willingness to accept as a starting point a force ceiling at or about 2.5 for the United States and USSR (with corresponding arrangements for armament deposits) it would not in the framework of the Western plan be far away from the Western position. However, so far there has been no indication that the Soviet bloc have such willingness.

15. Disarmament conference: There is a measure of agreement on the proposition that a world disarmament conference must take place before any far-reaching disarmament by the great powers.

There are difference of view on timing and scope, however. The Western delegations believe that some measure of disarmament by the great powers can safely precede the world conference; they further emphasize the need for agreement among “militarily significant states”. The Soviet bloc on the other hand believe that a complete disarmament treaty should be signed and ratified by the 90 odd states of the world before any significant disarmament measure is undertaken.

16. Nuclear disarmament: The Soviet bloc object to the measures of nuclear disarmament proposed in stages I and II of the Western plan. They have expressed their willingness to advance their own stage III proposal for an (uncontrollable) ban on the use of nuclear weapons to stage I. They have also re-introduced previous proposals for an undertaking not to be the first to use the bomb and for the discontinuance of nuclear tests. But they have refused to be drawn on any practical programme for the controlled prohibition of production or for the reduction of existing stockpiles.

17. Foreign bases: The Soviet bloc have harped on the need to eliminate foreign bases and have not been moved by Western arguments that:

(I) No real strategic distinction can be drawn between foreign and home bases, and

(II) In any case, on the completion of demobilization and reduction of armaments, no forces or equipment would remain to maintain any kind of base.

18. Peacekeeping machinery: There has been disagreement on measures to enforce the peace after the achievement of disarmament. The Soviet bloc reject both the concept of an international peace-enforcement authority retaining the only armed forces in the world and less clearly the concept of the retention of national forces sufficient to fulfill obligations under the UN Charter. They argue that in a disarmed world aggression will be impossible and in any case the provisions of the Charter are adequate.

19. Studies: The Soviet bloc object in principle to the initiation of joint studies without prior commitments on disarmament although the Soviet position is not clear or consistent. They have recognized in some field the need for preparation in advance of a disarmament treaty. They have also recognized that technical planning may be needed before a treaty can be put into force. This confusion appears partly to arise from their rigidity on the question of a timetable.

20. Timetable: Although the Soviet bloc have indicated some readiness to be flexible about the four year timetable included in the Khrushchev plan, they have insisted on the need not only for a fixed time limit for the whole process of disarmament in accordance with a single treaty, but also fixed time limits for each stage within the whole. This timetable is in any case only effective after the completion of the world disarmament conference.

21. Armaments: The Soviet position on the link between force reductions and armament reductions is not altogether clear, probably because they are unwilling to accept such a link which would entail more far-reaching control. The Soviet delegation have also criticized the Western proposal for storing surplus armaments in internationally supervised depots on national soil on the grounds that they could too easily be recovered if an act of aggression were contemplated—they maintain that destruction is the only true safeguard.

22. Collection of information: The Soviet bloc have been hostile to all Western proposals for collection of information prior to the introduction of measures of disarmament, even though it has been pointed out to them that this position is not consistent with earlier Soviet proposals. The Soviet bloc have maintained, in the face of careful Western explanations, the thesis that any verification beyond immediate verification of a measure of reduction could only serve the purpose of espionage.

23. Ratio of forces: The Soviet plan speaks of maintenance of a ratio between the different services during the process of force reductions. No effort has been made to show how this could be practicable or how it should be controlled.

24. Space vehicles and missiles: The Soviet bloc have not in the conference itself developed any position on space vehicles or missiles. In a press conference, however, the Soviet spokesman made some comments suggesting that because of the Soviet advantage in these techniques this was not considered a subject for negotiation.

Possible Soviet Tactics before the Summit

25. The conference has so far not advanced beyond the general debate stage and it is early to predict its further course. At some date fairly soon, however, either or both sides may decide to switch from general discussion of the two rival plans to more concrete discussion of specific topics. In the case of the Soviet bloc an attempt is already developing to lure the West into:

(I) A definition, in Soviet terms, of the terms of reference of the conference and the task it has to fulfill; and

(II) An agreement on the principles, taken direct from the Soviet plan, on which a disarmament treaty must ultimately be based.

It is possible that they may also, as it becomes plain to them that the Khrushchev plan as it stands is not negotiable with the West, revert to earlier Soviet partial proposals.

26. The immediate aims of the Soviet bloc appear to be:

(I) To maintain their public posture as champions of general and complete disarmament as described in the General Assembly Resolution No. 1378.

(II) To get the West to agree to certain “disarmament principles” which would form the basis of a treaty, such principles would then be presented for endorsement at the Summit and later represented as being equivalent to the Khrushchev plan and consequently available to blackmail the West in the later course of the negotiations.

(III) To make the Western delegations responsible for rejecting the concept of a general and comprehensive disarmament plan and for moving towards discussion of what they would call partial disarmament measures.

27. Western tactics between now and the end of April, when the conference will go into recess, must depend upon the objectives which the Western heads of governments decide to aim at the Summit meeting. No Western delegation has at present any precise instructions on these objectives.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1628. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. For text of the Western disarmament plan submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 16, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 68–71; for text of the Soviet plan, submitted to the United Nations on September 19, 1959, see ibid, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 1460-1474.
2. For text of this resolution, November 20, 1959, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, p. 1281.
3. For text of the September 7, 1959, directive, see ibid., pp. 1259–1260.
4. Made at the 14th session of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. A report on this session was transmitted in Deldi 53 from Geneva, April 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.12–GE/4–260)
5. Made at the 15th session of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. A report on this session was transmitted in Deldi 58 from Geneva, April 5. (Ibid., 396.12–GE/4–560)
6. The Soviet plan referred to in footnote 1 above.