Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, April 6, 1960, 8 p.m.

1919. 1. Mayor Brandt has informed me privately of his 5 April meeting with Chancellor Adenauer concerning latter’s proposal for West Berlin plebiscite before summit conference. Meeting began with one hour private conversation between Brandt and Adenauer which was conducted in friendly atmosphere but did not change viewpoints either party. Brandt disagreed especially with Adenauer’s thesis that it was Germany’s duty to bind Allies by means of plebiscite to their original occupation rights. Brandt maintained that Berliners could only be asked to express their views on political freedom and ties to West. Using arguments already reported, Brandt tried in vain convince Adenauer drop plebiscite plan. Adenauer argued that only France could be considered completely reliable on Berlin question while US, and especially UK, positions subject to change under Soviet pressure.

2. Brandt and Adenauer were then joined by Brentano, Lemmer, Globke, Vockel, Amrehn and Berlin officials Albertz and Berning. Enlarged meeting covered similar ground. Adenauer delivered lecture on world affairs reminding his listeners that in United States during second half of previous year, there had been tendency to give up original legal status and replace it by new treaty with Soviets. Chancellor said he was facing summit conference with concern since not all participants have same nerves as Khrushchev. Cabinet had discussed plebiscite question earlier that day but no decision reached because plebiscite is regarded as Berlin matter. Relationship of Berlin to Federal Republic is not question but, rather, whether the occupation rights should be given up or not. It was not necessary to place plebiscite question before Allies for decision. In any case, Herter was not opposed to it. Goal must be that Berlin disappears from negotiations at forthcoming summit conference. Chancellor said he could and would only advise Berlin to carry out the plebiscite as soon as possible.

3. Minister Lemmer spoke against suggestion that political parties serve as initiators of plebiscite. He maintained that Berlin was in principle ready to carry out plebiscite, but one must still determine proper time. Brentano reported that position United States Government was clear and unmistakable but no one could predict exactly course of summit conference.

Because Khrushchev had better nerves, Germany could not know in advance how others would conduct themselves. De Gaulle’s standpoint was clear, but when talks became tough, it was possible that one of Allies would make a compromise proposal which could be extremely dangerous for Berlin.

4. After further discussion, Brandt stated agreement reached on three points:

(1) Federal Government advice is that a plebiscite should be held. It is, however, responsibility of Berlin Senat to decide whether this recommendation should be followed.

(2) Plebiscite by political parties is undesirable, and this possibility no longer considered.

(3) Principle of self-determination should be applied to Berlin, although parties disagree re timing or question to be posed to Berlin electorate.

5. Brandt went on to say in meeting he was not as optimistic as Chancellor about value of plebiscite. Brandt pointed out that Commandants apparently have certain reservations about plebiscite and are concerned that it in part at least is directed against Western Powers. Moreover, if plebiscite is confined to West Berlin alone, one must reckon with the possibility that on same day, as has already been announced, a plebiscite will be carried out in East sector Berlin and in Soviet zone.

6. Adenauer repeated his arguments favoring plebiscite, saying since Eisenhower had acknowledged Berliners have right of self-determination, they should make use of this privilege.

7. Amrehn said that Berlin had been in danger since the Khrushchev note of 1958,¹ but it was necessary to have strong allies. No decisive step should be taken without agreement or toleration of United States. Berlin would, according to Amrehn, only irritate the Allies by carrying out plebiscite at this time. Amrehn also expressed doubts that plebiscite as presently conceived would have an important impact on world public opinion. It was important to maintain not only occupation rights in city but also status quo and ties to Federal Republic. Chancellor repeated his concern about unpredictable atmosphere at forthcoming summit conference and warned again about possible weaknesses in allied position. In any event, it was up to Berlin Senat to decide whether or not to carry out this plebiscite, but he, the Chancellor, was not as optimistic as representatives from Berlin.

8. Brandt also advised me that he intends at special Senat session evening 6 April to recommend Senat issue declaration referring to assurances President Eisenhower and Allied spokesmen that any future agreements affecting Berlin will be based on principle of self-determination. Will quote from 15 March Eisenhower–Adenauer communiqué² and state that Senat has confidence in word of its allies. Senat prepared carry out plebiscite if so requested by allied authorities in accordance with stipulated timing, method and formulation question to be submitted to electorate. In any case, if plebiscite to be held, it must be in consultation and in full agreement with Allies.³

Dowling

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–660. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Berlin.
1. See vol. VIII, Document 72.
2. For text of the joint statement issued by the President and the Chancellor on March 15, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 363.
3. On April 7, Brandt briefed the three Western Political Advisers in Berlin along these same lines and told them that the Berlin Senat had discussed the plebiscite question at length on April 6 and issued a 10-point report which stated that it was ready to hold the plebiscite prior to a summit meeting if the Federal Government, in accordance with the three Western Powers, should desire it. (Telegram 795 from Berlin, April 7; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–760)