496. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State0
Cahto 183. For the President from the Secretary.
“Dear Mr. President:
Western Foreign Ministers talk with Gromyko today1 made clearer that three major unresolved points will make agreement very difficult. The first deals with the continuation of Allied rights in Berlin on which we feel it essential to get some language which in light of past Russian statements and threats will give us strength in any renewed negotiations after possible moratorium for few years. The second is the Soviet increasing insistence on some reduction in troop levels in Berlin which to them appears to be almost a sine qua non in order to show: a) that they have made tangible progress in changing status quo Berlin; b) this beginning of liquidation of occupation rights; c) such a shock to morale Berliners as to begin a psychological deterioration of real importance. Third, the linkage of direct all-German talks with the time limit to be put on any temporary moratorium agreement on Berlin.
We consider the first point a practical necessity. Couve agrees but Selwyn very wobbly. On second point, all my advisers here as well as Ambassador Bruce and military, including commanding officer Berlin, Norstad, and Pentagon, strongly opposed any reduction beyond present levels but willing to place ceiling at that point.2 Von Brentano and Mayor Willy Brandt bitterly opposed any reduction not so much for military reasons as for psychological reasons. I am personally terribly reluctant to make any concessions this point. Couve feels we could get agreement at level somewhere between 8,000 to 10,000 and would favor this if it were last sticking point towards agreement. Selwyn takes same position as Couve but insistent this be kept as very final concession. On third point, impossible accept all-German committee in form proposed by Soviets since impossible to get West German concurrence and hence pledge by us no value. All three of us feel we cannot go beyond substitute four-power committee with German advisers which we have offered and believe Soviets would as last resort accept this rather than nothing. Also feel Soviets likely to drop linkage if they can get concession on point 2.
[Page 1097]Remembering Foster Dulles’ own feeling which as I recall you shared that troop numbers in Berlin were negotiable point, I would deeply appreciate your personal reaction on this and the other two points mentioned.
It is just possible of course that we could not reach agreement because of rights issue and that troop levels might not come to decision. However, we must be prepared on this point, since it might even become quid pro quo for acceptance wording assuring our rights.3
Faithfully, signed: Chris.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–3059; Top Secret.↩
- See Document 495.↩
- These conclusions were made in a July 29 paper that included the comments of Hamlett, Norstad, the JCS, CIA, and the Department of State. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1282)↩
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On July 31 the President replied:
“I agree with you that it is essential to obtain agreements satisfactory to us on points one and three. … Provided we have obtained firm agreement on these two items, I would be prepared to accept a unilateral statement by Western powers that they would limit their forces in Berlin to a figure such as that mentioned by Couve. In my opinion this is clearly a political and psychological matter and has no military importance. A modest reduction of this order should not cause lasting discouragement in Berlin. If such a modest reduction in forces becomes necessary we should make every effort to put it in its true light to the Berliners and the West Germans and be willing to accept some temporary discouragement as the price for a sound agreement on the issues of basic importance to us.” (Tocah 219 to Geneva; July 31; ibid., Central Files, 110.11–HE/7–3159)
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