Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

495. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, July 30, 1959.

Secto 433. Private Session. In two and one-half hour private discussion following Couve’s luncheon today, Foreign Ministers went over much the same ground covered by Secretary and Gromyko at their bilateral talk yesterday¹ except that today’s discussion was focused on Western paper.² Western Ministers deliberately avoided mentioning link on assumption that Secretary had elicited from Gromyko as much clarification of Soviet position as can be expected at this stage. Possibly for similar reasons, Gromyko refrained from pressing Western Foreign Ministers on troop level question. Despite persistent questioning, particularly by Couve, Gromyko refused to clarify what the situation would be at the end of interim agreement, resorting as in past to bare statement that during life of agreement and ensuing negotiations, Soviets would take no unilateral action. He continued to insist that Western commitments on troop levels, arms, and activities must be supervised but that West should rely on Soviet pledge alone with regard to access. He again rejected Western five year duration proposal and insisted that formula for duration must represent compromise between Western two and one-half year period (which Couve said was totally irrelevant to Berlin problem since it prescribed time within which all German free elections must take place) and Soviet one year proposal.

Thus, Gromyko’s position on all fundamental points remained unaltered except possibly for slight movement toward West requirement for reciprocity re activities ban reported below. Virtually only change in situation as result of today’s discussion was agreement with Gromyko’s suggestion to appoint quadripartite working party for purpose attempting work out agreed language on various aspects of Berlin solution for subsequent consideration by Ministers. All Ministers, however, including Gromyko, doubted whether working party could profitably discuss anything but weapons and access formulas since differences on all other points remain deep and fundamental.

Following points in addition to those brought out in yesterday’s bilateral meeting emerged from today’s discussion:

1. Troop levels: Gromyko saw no justification for including statement of Soviet intention no longer to maintain forces in Berlin in view of West’s refusal to withdraw their troops.

2. Armaments: While there was general agreement that no misunderstanding existed on this point, Gromyko expressed his position in somewhat different terms from yesterday when he said Soviets had in mind missiles requiring ground installation for launching. He now says that while Soviet formula referring to “rockets” covers weapons only, it is not confined to ballistic weapons.

3. Activities: Gromyko conceded that Soviet-proposed Supervisory Committee could hear complaints on activities in both East and West Berlin. He made clear that Soviet preference for specific language and objection to Western formula was based on Soviet suspicion that latter would allow such broad latitude of interpretation to West Berlin authorities that all activities could be encompassed in fundamental liberty reservation and there would be no change in situation. When Secretary suggested that best solution might be for each side to declare intention reduce activities in both parts of Berlin without requirement for supervision, Gromyko replied Soviets could not commit GDR whereas West, as occupation bosses in West Berlin, could order Brandt to comply.

4. Supervisory Committee: In re-stating Western refusal to permit supervision of Western obligations on troop, levels and armaments, Couve pointed out that Governments would be directly responsible for implementation of these obligations whereas this would not be true of obligation to effect reduction propaganda and subversive activities. Any complaint, therefore, of failure to carry out such obligations would be a matter for discussion between Govts and not by any commission.

5. Duration: In discussion of this point, Western Powers attempted to pin Gromyko down on what would be situation at end of agreement. Couve saw only two possibilities: either status quo ante with lapse of obligations undertaken by parties to interim agreement—that is, present situation; or prolongation of agreement—that is, present situation as modified by agreement. Gromyko gave stock evasive reply that in negotiations to follow expiry of agreement any party could raise any question relating to Berlin.

It was agreed that Quadripartite Working Party would meet tomorrow at 11:30 and Ministers would meet at Gromyko’s for “Working Tea” at 4:00 p.m. Gromyko again made no mention of desirability of holding early plenary session.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1316. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Moscow, London, and Bonn eyes only Ambassadors and to Paris eyes only Houghton and Burgess and to Berlin eyes only Gufler.
1. See Document 491.
2. See Document 488.