Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

419. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, June 25, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Resumption of the Geneva Conference

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
• The Secretary
• Mr. R.W. Jackling, Counselor, British Embassy
• Mr. Foy D. Kohler—EUR
• Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

The Secretary handed a letter to Caccia for Selwyn Lloyd¹ in reply to a message received from the British Foreign Minister on June 24 through the Ambassador.² The Secretary said that his letter would give the British some idea of how far along we were in preparing for resumption of the Geneva Conference. He then read to Caccia excerpts from the preliminary report received from our Ambassador in Moscow of the Harriman conversation with Khrushchev to supplement the summary of this conversation attached to the Secretary’s letter.³ In response to the Secretary’s query as to whether the Harriman report would be published, Mr. Kohler indicated that, since Harriman was seeing Khrushchev as a former ambassador to the Soviet Union and not in his capacity as journalist, it would presumably not be published.

After Caccia had stressed the urgency of moving ahead with the Western preparations for resumption of the Geneva Conference, the Secretary said he had gone over at considerable length with the President certain ideas similar to those expressed by Lloyd in his message. While there might be some possibilities in the moratorium concept, the Secretary indicated, we must have assurance that Western rights would not be diminished at the end of the given time period.

Caccia noted that the difficulty was in determining the basic Soviet position in view of the different statements made by Gromyko to Lloyd, to the press and to individual journalists. The Soviets should be smoked out in the conference room, so that the West would know where it stood. If a satisfactory agreement could be reached on a moratorium period, the question would arise as to just what might be accomplished during the interval. The Secretary said that Von Brentano had shown a certain receptivity to the idea of German advisers putting their heads together under cover of a Four Power commission. He noted that, in the Khrushchev statement to Harriman, the campaign of invective against Adenauer continued. Caccia commented that the question about this most recent Khrushchev effusion was whether it represented genuine conviction or was merely a case of play-acting. The Secretary added that, when Gromyko presented the Soviet “ultimatum” proposals at Geneva, this was interpreted by some as an effort by Khrushchev to frighten the West into the Summit and thus to enter it on his part in a strong tactical position.

In response to Caccia’s query as to what he might say about United States thinking on the possibility of a moratorium, the Secretary said that we were trying to reduce the concept to a more precise form in order to see its full implications. The President had a draft in front of him,⁴ but no decision had been made and we could not be sure what would finally emerge. If agreement were reached on some formula, we might be in a more advantageous position than the British to take it up with the French and the Germans. We would try to have something more precise by Tuesday or Wednesday of next week. Caccia agreed that United States support of any proposal would carry more weight with the French and Germans than primary advocacy by the British.

Caccia noted that, despite exaggerated press accounts, Prime Minister Macmillan had tried to be careful yesterday in the Commons relative to a Summit meeting.⁵ He had expressed the hope that the resumed Geneva Conference would permit a Summit meeting to take place. Obviously the British Government still wanted such a Summit meeting, Caccia continued, but it also wanted to avoid any open break between the Western Powers on this subject. On the assumption that the optimistic interpretation of Gromyko’s press statement of June 19⁶ was warranted and would be reflected in the Soviet position when the Geneva Conference resumed, the British were wondering how tactically the subject of a Summit could best be handled. Caccia suggested that it would be desirable if the United States could take the initiative and not leave it to the Soviets to propose a Summit meeting. Perhaps the questions of a precise time period and of the level of troops might be left for decision at the Summit. The Secretary commented that all this depended on the actual progress made by the Foreign Ministers.

Both the Secretary and Caccia agreed that it would be better if the Italian proposal for a NATO ministerial meeting prior to the resumption of the Geneva Conference were dropped. The Secretary made the point that the NATO ministers always seemed to want to know what the Western fall-back position is. As soon as this is discussed it tends to become public property. He believed that a factor at Geneva was that the Soviets had heard so much about Western fall-back positions that they could not believe we had none. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Caccia again stressed the urgency of preparing a Western position for Germany. It was desirable, he said, to get something to Couve before he left for Madagascar in order to avoid any feeling that the United Kingdom and the United States were “plotting behind his back” while he was away on a trip. The Secretary noted that one problem was how much Couve could agree to which the Germans would not accept. It was possible that some tight arrangement existed between the French and Germans to support each others’ views in all respects. The Secretary added that we must make clear that a decision on a moratorium, which would be a big decision to take, must involve a careful evaluation of Western interests in terms of possible alternatives.

Caccia expressed the opinion that, if agreement on the Summit could not be reached as a result of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Khrushchev would then put on pressure and demand a Summit under crisis conditions. Under such circumstances, the British would be strongly impelled to accept.

Caccia said that he was taking the line with the Press that his call on the Secretary was to have a general tour d’horizon since it was their first meeting after the Secretary’s return from Geneva. In order to make this line an honest one, he wished to raise briefly a number of other subjects (covered in separate memoranda of conversation).⁷

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/6–2559. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Herter on July 7.
1. Not printed. It stated that Herter had discussed post-Geneva policy with the President and would reply the following week on the U.S. position. A summary of Harriman’s conversation with Khrushchev (see Document 417) was attached to the letter. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Dulles/Herter with UK Officials)
2. See footnote 1, Document 415
3. Not further identified.
4. See attachment B to Document 418.
5. For text of Macmillan’s statement to the House of Commons, June 24, see 607 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, cols. 1027–1028.
6. For text of this statement, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 332–334 or Cmd. 868, pp. 238–239.
7. The only other memorandum of conversation between Caccia and Herter on June 25 that has been found is a five-line memorandum on Laos. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)