Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

418. Memorandum of Conversation With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, June 25, 1959.

I met with the President this morning at 8:30 to discuss the communication which he had received from Harold Macmillan¹ and the one that I had received from Selwyn Lloyd² dealing with the negotiations on Germany at Geneva.

At the outset the President showed me a telegram from Moscow³ outlining Averell Harriman’s conversation with Khrushchev. The President was really concerned by the state of mind that Khrushchev was apparently indicating, although he was not certain whether this was an additional effort to threaten us into a Summit Conference or whether it represented genuine views.

I then showed him the draft of a letter⁴ we had prepared as an answer to Macmillan. I asked the President not to pass on this until he had had a chance to think over the draft of a proposed communiqué in which we had outlined some positions which might be taken at the forthcoming meeting in Geneva (copy attached herewith). The President read through the paper with great care. He said that he felt that if we reached such agreement as appeared in the paper, even though the number of troops to be stationed in Berlin and the number of years that the arrangement should last were not specified, it would warrant going to a Summit meeting and that perhaps those two matters might be settled there. I said the paper had originally been drafted with that very thing in mind and actually specified that the blanks should be resolved at a meeting of the Heads of State but that I had then asked for a redraft so that it would come to the President, in the first instance, as a Foreign Ministers’ agreement. I told the President that the paper was not an agreed paper of the Department in that several of our senior advisers, including Mr. Murphy and Mr. Kohler, had serious doubts as to whether the mention of any deadline would be considered an excessive weakening on our part. I explained to the President that whether deadlines were mentioned or not, we were actually under the threat of a deadline all the time and that part of our draft represented a moratorium for X period of time. I said I felt that the President should consider alternatives, the last one of which would, of course, be allied unity on the question of going to war, a unity it would be hard to achieve in the light of Mr. Macmillan’s last letter unless a Summit Conference had been held and all remedies exhausted. I also told him that the draft we had prepared followed very closely Selwyn Lloyd’s thinking, although we had reached our points of view somewhat separately. The President said he would give the matter further thought and that we would discuss it again. In the meanwhile he was going to try to redraft the answer to Macmillan and try to be a little more forthcoming than we had been in our suggested draft.

C.A.H.

Attachment A⁵

Draft Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan

Dear Harold: I was glad to have your letter assessing the situation at the close of the present phase of the Foreign Ministers Conference and suggesting a line which we might take when the Conference resumes on July 13.

We too have been considering where we go from here. We are working very hard on the issues which the Conference has developed. Chris will be touch with Selwyn on the thoughts which the latter has conveyed to him. I hope that we may be able to work out a concerted position in time to consult with the French and Germans before July 13th. The issues are so large and the time so short that this may not be possible. However, we shall do our best.⁶

Attachment B⁷

Draft Communiqué Containing Agreed Recommendations of Foreign Ministers

The Foreign Ministers of the French Republic, UK, USSR and the United States of America met in Geneva from May 11 to June, 19, 1959 [and] from July 13 to ————, 1959.

The meeting was convened to consider questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany, and Berlin. The discussions which were carried on in the course of the meeting regarding Germany established that the Foreign Ministers all agreed that Germany should be reunified, that there should be free elections held for this purpose, and that there should be a final German peace settlement at the earliest practicable time. The Foreign Ministers were unable to agree upon procedures for achieving these ends.

In order to further the solution of these questions the Foreign Ministers have agreed to recommend to their respective Governments the following proposals:

(a) That a four-power commission be established to continue the discussion of the German problem and to examine questions connected with the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

(b) That the four-power commission make appropriate arrangement for the cooperation of German advisors, who would be requested to discuss and propose concrete measures for the reunification of Germany, with free elections at an appropriate stage in the process, and to propose agreed principles for a peace treaty with Germany. The advisors would also be requested to transmit proposals for the extension and development of technical contacts between the two parts of Germany and the free movement of persons, ideas and publications between the two parts of Germany.

(c) Unless agreement has been reached on plans for reunification and for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany at an earlier date, the Foreign Ministers will reconvene at the end of ———— years to continue their discussion of these subjects.

The Foreign Ministers will further recommend to their respective governments consideration be given to alleviation of tensions in Berlin by adoption of measures along the following lines in the light of the existing situation and agreements at present in force:

(a) The Western Powers would establish a ceiling upon the combined total of their armed forces in Berlin which would be in the neighborhood of ———— troops.

(b) The Four Powers would continue to arm their forces in Berlin only with conventional weapons.

(c) Access to Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the forces of the Western Powers stationed in Berlin, would be maintained in accordance with the procedures in effect in April 1959. All disputes which might arise with respect to access would be raised and settled between the four governments except that a resident four-power commission would be established in West Berlin which would in the first instance consider any difficulties arising in connection with access and would seek to settle such difficulties. This commission would make use of German advisors as necessary.

(d) Measures would be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties to avoid within or directed at Berlin activities which might either disrupt public order or seriously affect the rights and interests, or aim to interfere in the internal affairs, of others. A representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, supported by adequate staff, would be established in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the city for the purpose of monitoring propaganda activities in the light of the foregoing principles, and to report to the Secretary General any such activities in Berlin or directed at Berlin which appear to be in conflict with such principles. The four governments would consult with the Secretary General in order to determine the appropriate action to be taken in respect to any such report.

The Foreign Ministers will also recommend that the arrangements specified in sub-paragraphs (a) through (d) above will remain in effect until reunification of Germany provided that, in the absence of reunification, or agreed plans for reunification, the Foreign Ministers will meet at the end of ————— years to review these arrangements.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/6–2559. Secret. Drafted by Herter.
1. Document 416.
2. See footnote 1, Document 415.
3. Document 417.
4. Printed as attachment A.
5. Secret.

6. On June 27, the President replied to Macmillan with a note incorporating these two paragraphs and adding the following three:

   “I agree with you, of course, that our tactical position in Berlin is indeed weak in that the Russians have many physical and geographical advantages. Their opportunity to exert economic pressure against the Western part of the city is obvious.

   “Because Chris is, as I say, communicating to Selwyn our current thinking for an ad interim arrangement, I think it would be futile for me to try to get into details at this point. I can say only that I have studied his paper and agree generally with it.

   “Yesterday Mamie and I spent the day with the Queen and Prince Philip. The Prime Minister of Canada was of course present. I noted with some interest that he repeated what I believe has been an earlier suggestion of his—that Quebec might be a nice place to hold a summit meeting if one should ever become practical. I merely replied that the place would be most convenient from my viewpoint, but the location and time made very little difference to me.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

7. Secret.