Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

406. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State at Geneva⁰

Washington, June 18, 1959, 7 p.m.

Tocah 129. For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary. Following confirms your telecons with Murphy and me today¹ and supplements Tocah 127.² We appreciate force of your argument that discussion has reached such an impasse that indefinite prolongation risks result of chipping away of our position. However, it seems to us that there are real vulnerabilities in Khrushchev’s artful letter of June 17 which it might be useful to probe further with Gromyko in the next few days thus avoiding necessity of a substantive reply from here. I am listing below series of questions which we think might be put to him, in private meeting such as suggested Tocah 124,³ and you will think of many others. Gromyko’s postponement of session today also leads us to think he might be expecting new instructions conceivably going beyond blandly unyielding position of Khrushchev’s letter.

We would not expect this exercise to go on for any length of time though we could envisage it might extend into next week. If Couve has to be absent wouldn’t it be possible for him to leave a deputy behind if this proved necessary?

Following are suggested questions:

1. How can Khrushchev’s statement that a Summit meeting becomes more necessary if the Foreign Ministers do not reach meaningful understanding square with the understanding concerning the terms of reference of the Foreign Ministers conference reached in the exchange of letters dated March 26 and March 30?⁴

2. What does Khrushchev mean when he stated that the “main obstacle to attainment of agreement” is merely a question of the time period? Has he not been informed that the question of recognition of Western rights to be in Berlin pending German reunification is the central point of contention?

3. Khrushchev states that it is “possible to agree on another period” than one year. Does this mean that the Soviets are prepared to recognize Western rights in Berlin for the period prior to German reunification? Why should any period be fixed in terms of time when clearly should be in terms of goal on which we all agree?

4. What is the “certain positive significance” in the work of the Foreign Ministers which Khrushchev sees?

5. The letter equates the time period in the Western Peace Plan with the Soviet ultimatum for the surrender of Western rights in Berlin in the course of one year: has the Soviet Prime Minister not been informed that, unlike the Soviet proposal, the Western plan would involve no unilateral action against Soviet rights as in case Soviet proposals?

6. The letter states that the Soviet proposal would entail no “harm to anyone’s interests.” Is it the Soviet position that the surrender of Western rights in Berlin would not damage Western interests? Or the security and well-being of the West Berliners?

7. If, as the letter states, the question of the duration of Western rights in Berlin is “neither the main one nor one of principle” can the Soviet Union not agree to the maintenance of those rights until German reunification?

8. What does Khrushchev mean by stating that the Soviet proposal would “concentrate attention on what can reasonably be decided now”?

9. Khrushchev states that the Soviet Government has instructed the Foreign Minister to bend his “efforts in direction of drawing together points of view.” Does this signify Soviet willingness to negotiate on Western proposals on Berlin or on Western “Peace Plan”?

10. Does not the four powers “responsibility before the peoples” to use all means for easing tensions obligate the USSR to negotiate seriously at the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting as well as at a summit meeting?

11. Does Khrushchev’s statement that the solution of important international problems is “beyond the powers of the ministers” not contradict Soviet note of March 30 which said the four powers have “reached agreement to start solving urgent international questions at a Foreign Ministers conference and a summit meeting”?

12. What “measures for obtaining the success of the conference” does the Soviet Foreign Minister consider he has taken when the latest Soviet proposals only reiterate Soviet positions advanced and rejected as a basis for negotiation prior to the conference?

13. As the letter refers to better clarification of a number of questions, could the Soviet Foreign Minister clarify what worries the USSR in the existing situation in Berlin?

14. Does Soviet Government advance seriously proposals the “essence” of which consists in “gradually liquidating abnormal situation”, i.e., Western position in West Berlin?

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1332. Secret; Priority.
1. Herter called the Department at 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. Washington time on June 18. In the first call he told Murphy that he found nothing helpful in Khrushchev’s reply (see Document 403), and that the four Western Ministers were in agreement to seek a recess of the meeting. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, June 18; ibid., Central Files, 600.0012/6–1859) No record of the second conversation has been found.
2. Tocah 127, June 18 at noon, informed Herter that the President would not accept a Berlin solution that carried a time limit, but that a troop reduction in Berlin was acceptable if the other elements of the solution were satisfactory. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF1332)
3. Tocah 124, June 17, reported that the President was impressed with the conciliatory tone of Khrushchev’s message and suggested that Herter meet privately with Gromyko to see if he had received new instructions. (Ibid.)
4. See Document 244.