403. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0
2570. Observe Presidential Handling. Geneva for Secretary. Kornienko, Acting Chief American Section MFA, summoned me at 1700 today and handed me Khrushchev’s reply dated June 17 to President’s letter of June 15. The following is text:
[Page 914]“Dear Mr. President: I received your kind message and highly esteem your concern to find a path for the liquidation of the tense situation between States and to introduce calmness into the world.
The Soviet Government on its part has never spared efforts in order to attain this goal and to create a situation of confidence and mutual understanding between States. When we received your message in February1 which touched on the question of convoking a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, we, as you remember, immediately gave a response2 and set forth our conceptions concerning what the Foreign Ministers should concern themselves with and what might be expected from this conference. In our messages agreement was expressed that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs should consider the problems which await decision. At the same time we emphasized that the current international situation is very complicated and has so many difficult problems that a decision on all questions appears beyond the powers of the Ministers and such a nut can be too hard for them. Therefore we did not hide our opinion that for the solution of ripe international problems, such forces should be included which have greater plenary powers and rights, that is, the Heads of Governments and of states.
I should like to remark that the question of a meeting of the Heads of Governments was also touched upon during the talks in Moscow with the Prime Minister of Great Britain, H. Macmillan. Mr. H. Macmillan expressed then the just opinion that one meeting of the Heads of Governments may prove to be insufficient, that the Heads of Governments will not decide immediately all problems in view of which a first meeting may mark only a beginning and several meetings of the Heads of Governments will be required for the achievement of the necessary success.
It is impossible not to take into account that the peoples expect from the leading state figures that there should be taken without delay measures for the lessening of international tension and the strengthening of peace, and governments are obliged to reckon with this.
Having agreed with the proposal for the convocation of a conference of the Foreign Ministers, the Soviet Government, of course, hoped that this Conference will bring its useful contribution to the matter of the preparation of mutually acceptable, positive agreements. Sending its Minister of Foreign Affairs to Geneva, it empowered him to take all possible measures for obtaining the success of the Conference. It seems to us that despite the divergencies and difficulties which have appeared in Geneva, that work, which has already been done by the Ministers, has a [Page 915] certain positive significance. The conference has permitted positions of the sides on a number of questions to be better clarified, to define the degree of the existing disagreements and to try in some measure to draw nearer the viewpoint of the sides on separate aspects of actual international problems.
The situation which has developed at the Geneva Conference of Ministers has impelled the Soviet Government to introduce recently new proposals taking into account the position of the Western powers and the real situation. At the same time we were anxious that the Conference of the Ministers would be as productive as possible and that it would take some step forward in the direction of the solution of such of the most acute contemporary questions as a peaceful settlement with Germany, the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, the rapprochement of the two German Governments with the aim of the achievement of the reestablishment of German unity. Of course, all this would clear the way and would create more favorable conditions also for the solution of other ripe international problems.
We consider that the Soviet proposals which were introduced in Geneva provide a good basis for agreement of the sides because they take into consideration the position of the Western powers and proceed from the necessity to concentrate attention on what can reasonably be decided already now. We consider that once an agreement in principle exists between our governments in relation to the necessity for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and a solution of the question of West Berlin, then the way can and must be found to work out a concrete formula of agreement on each of these questions.
Unfortunately, the US Secretary of State, supported by the Ministers of England and France, refused to discuss the substance of the proposals which give a basis for the gradual liquidation of the abnormal situation in West Berlin and Germany, and for the sides coming to an understanding without harm to anyone’s interests or prestige. At the same time they persistently seek to foist on the Soviet Union an agreement by which the preservation of the occupation regime in West Berlin would be confirmed for an indefinite time and which would also put off further the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.
As the main argument against the Soviet proposals, the US Secretary of State advances the question about the period of operation of a temporary agreement on West Berlin and about the all-German committee. I should like to think that such an evaluation of the Soviet proposals is based on a misunderstanding or incorrect understanding.
What is the essence of our proposals? Since the Western powers at present are not ready to come to an immediate and complete abolition of the occupation regime in West Berlin, the Soviet Government gave instructions to its Minister not to oppose the preservation in the course of a [Page 916] definite period of the occupation rights of the three powers in West Berlin. We proposed to work out an agreement on a temporary settlement of the question of West Berlin which would operate in the course of this period. During that time the all-German committee should work out concrete measures for the preparation and conclusion of a German Peace Treaty and the unification of Germany. Thus the essence of the proposals of the Soviet Government consists in gradually liquidating the abnormal situation in West Berlin and in preparing a peace treaty and measures for the unification of Germany.
The question about the period for us is neither the main one nor one of principle. It surprises us that this question is represented now as the main obstacle to the attainment of agreement. Indeed also in the socalled “comprehensive plan” of the Western powers it was proposed for example to limit the work of the all-German committee by a definite period; however, we did not consider such a proposal about a period as an ultimatum. Naming a period from our side, we proceed from the fact that it is impossible endlessly to drag out a peaceful settlement with Germany and to preserve the occupation regime in West Berlin. It is impossible to permit such a situation so that the world would find itself in a state of tension because of the uncompromising position taken, let us say by the Government of Adenauer. Can one fail to take into account such statements of Adenauer in which he openly declared that if any kind of organ for consideration of German questions will be created, then it will be possible to carry on negotiations in it for many years. In this time under the cover of such an organ the policy of militarization of West Germany and the policy of preparation of war would be continued.
The establishment of a definite period will serve only peaceful purposes, will answer the vital interests of the peoples. If the one-year period named by the Soviet Union does not suit the Western powers, then it is possible to agree on another period, acceptable for all interested sides. Both sides have named periods; now it is necessary to seek to find something in the middle (chto-to sredneye) and to reach an agreed decision. We are sure that if we will have agreement on the main, fundamental questions, then no difficulties will be met in agreement on the necessary periods.
I agree with you, Mr. President, that the situation in the Geneva Conference is now such that it demands of all its participants efforts in the direction of drawing together the points of view. The Soviet Government has given the necessary instructions to its Minister and we expect that similar steps will be undertaken also by the governments of the Western powers.
On the other hand, if the Ministers also do not succeed in reaching the necessary understanding, then in our opinion a Summit meeting [Page 917] will become even more urgently necessary. We cannot, taking into account our responsibility before the peoples, fail to use all means for attainment of an easing of tension and strengthening of peace.
I would like to say that I consider this exchange of personal letters on an unofficial basis useful and we agree with you that these should not be given publicity.
With profound respect, (signed)
N. Khrushchev”
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1378. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Geneva as telegram 145, which is the source text.↩
- See Document 176.↩
- See Document 194.↩