384. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State0
Cahto 105. I called on Gromyko at his villa at four this afternoon as arranged. I had Merchant with me. Gromyko was attended by Soldatov and an interpreter who incidentally is extremely poor.
Just prior to this call I had met with Couve, Lloyd and Grewe at which meeting we had agreed that I would not propose recess but would confine myself to impressing on Gromyko seriousness with which we took last two days’ developments with particular reference to ultimative aspect of proposal he had introduced Tuesday in private session and then insisted on making public at Wednesday’s plenary. Abandonment proposal to Gromyko today of three or four week recess was in large part based on Lloyd’s communication to me during morning of Macmillan’s objections and fact that Couve had July commitments which made difficult establishment resumption date for conference.1
Gromyko received me in serious but friendly manner. We talked for nearly two hours but he insisted on speaking Russian himself and having my remarks translated to him in Russian despite his fluency in English. Apart from reiteration his disclaimers any intent to pose threat or ultimatum (which disclaimer he authorized me to announce to press) there was little of real significance which emerged from our talk. He rehearsed at length previously expressed arguments for Soviet proposals over past month with particular emphasis on free city. I gained distinct impression he was stalling probably in absence any reaction from Moscow to what he must have reported last night concerning strength of Western reaction to his proposal. In any event he gave no serious indication of regarding this, my first private bilateral talk with him, as welcome initiation of series US-Soviet dialogues. We meet tomorrow at ten in plenary and we agreed to resume private meetings Monday with my parting emphasis on fact that results such private meetings for first three days of next week would determine fate of conference. Detailed report of conversation follows.
Secretary opened by stating he had certain matters on his mind relating to justification for continuing negotiations. He said Gromyko’s [Page 880] proposal presented at private meeting2 to us had been so disturbing as to result in his requesting that aircraft for return to Washington be placed on four-hour alert. His impression was that, as confirmed at plenary yesterday,3 Soviets in effect were putting up ultimatum for solution Berlin and conclusion treaty with DDR which made it almost impossible to contemplate continuation present negotiations. He realized that Soviet spokesman previous evening had asserted no dictate was intended but wording of proposal seemed to place it on take it or leave it basis giving no indication that it was document subject to negotiation. Furthermore had suggested strangulation access to Berlin when separate treaty was signed.
The Secretary said that he came to Geneva with authority from President to negotiate agreement. There were however certain principles approved by the President which underlay US position as follows: (1) no negotiation under threats presence of which would of course make Summit impossible; (2) allies have certain rights and Soviets certain obligations with respect to Berlin which cannot be unilaterally abrogated but only modified by consent of parties; and (3) West Berliners view us not as occupiers but as their protectors against surrounding hostile forces.
The Secretary went on to say the President had reaffirmed to him after Khrushchev’s Budapest statement that as Secretary of State he speaks for US Government with authority enter into agreements, within broad policy guidelines, which US Government will honor. In absence such authority diplomatic process breaks down and if Foreign Ministers can make no progress how can Heads of Government expect to.
Secretary said his purpose in call was not to negotiate but to avoid misunderstanding by making clear that progress at conference was necessarily within limits of what US could agree to and by securing clarification of apparent ultimative aspects of Gromyko’s proposal of day before.
The Secretary concluded by saying that he sought to satisfy himself that Gromyko’s statement constituted proposal for negotiation and not fixation of conditions with time limit accompanied by announcement specific actions would be taken at end of specified time limit. If progress was to be made hard work and frankness were required. Unhappily previous day’s plenary session has turned us back to last November.
Gromyko then asked if the Secretary’s time permitted the use of an interpreter and, upon the Secretary’s agreement, the conversation was thenceforth conducted through him.
[Page 881]Gromyko opened by stating formally that he considered bilateral exchange of views between Ministers useful as well as Conference sessions. As to substance, he said that when he had outlined new Soviet proposal on Tuesday he had clearly stated it was not to be considered as a threat or ultimatum. He had repeated this at the plenary session and hence failed to understand why this question should again be asked. It must be assumed, he said, that Soviet Government would be obliged to act as stated in event no agreement reached. He complained over Western tendency to place false interpretations on Soviet proposals and look in every corner for evil motives.
Gromyko then said he understood US and allies would not negotiate under threats and he repeated that in his proposal there were no such threats or ultimatum.
Gromyko then turned to Summit Conference, which he said Secretary had linked to Foreign Ministers Conference. To Soviets, he said, a Summit Conference is too important to be made an object of bargaining, and he added that he had understood President to say at White House when four Foreign Ministers saw him4 that a Summit Conference could turn the tide and end cold war if mutual desire existed to attain positive results. He said if US interested in peace then it was unthinkable to bargain over Summit Conference. “We think if one or another state such as US raised artificial barriers to Summit or series of Summits by referring to unsatisfactory results at Foreign Ministers Conference then such state assumes very heavy responsibility.”
Gromyko said Secretary should understand Soviet reaction when told Summit depended on Ministers’ talks, which in effect meant Soviets must pay concessions to secure Summit. In fact he said it made Soviets think in terms of ultimatum being put to them.
Gromyko resumed with reference to Secretary’s second point, which he described as Allied occupation rights and regime in West Berlin. He said Soviet position clear it could not agree to occupation regime for indefinite period of time notwithstanding apparent Western satisfaction with present situation. Soviets and DDR do not like it and believe West Berlin source of daily friction. He then detailed inconsequential incident of recent chase of Algerian by two French military policemen across DDR border, concluding with statement that such incidents frequent and will not all be insignificant.
Gromyko then reverted to earlier Soviet proposal for Free City and repeated in detail arguments already used in its support. He did however place emphasis on variant involving symbolic quadripartite troop contingents which he said would create “new qualitative status” with [Page 882] access thereby assured as well as guarantees for regime. He said he considered this “good way out for Western allies” and asked why we were frightened of this proposal.
Gromyko went on that, having met wall of resistance, Soviet decided to submit its last proposal, which provided for a short period of continuation occupation status on curtailed basis. This was linked with establishment all-German committee toward which he had been surprised Western Ministers had not on previous day reflected positive attitude.
The Secretary interrupted Gromyko at this point to say he had no desire to retread history of previous month but had called to talk on (1) the threat or ultimatum aspect of Soviet proposal, and (2) prospect for Summit Conference. On first point, Secretary said he hoped for precision from Gromyko on denial ultimative appearance. Conditions posed for continuing occupation were humiliating, almost insulting. Threat was that at year-end rights would be extinguished and both civil and military access placed in hands of DDR with power strangulation without reference our rights or Soviet obligations. The Secretary said he trusted this threatening element would be removed and that Soviets would make clear proposal was put forward for negotiation and not as threat, which reminded him of past history of Hitler’s dictats to inferiors.
On Summit Conference, Secretary noted, Gromyko had said in effect no relation existed with Ministers’ Conference. Secretary could not share this view and recalled that during entire exchange of notes emphasis was placed on purpose of Foreign Ministers to prepare way for profitable Summit which could discuss broader issues and decide narrowed points of issue. He reminded Gromyko that President had said on occasion referred to (as he had often stated publicly) that he would go any time anywhere to Summit if he felt it could achieve agreements and thereby lessen tensions. Hence Ministers’ task is to prepare for such a meeting. Secretary added that President had set no single specific precondition but that Ministers must provide some hope that a Summit could achieve some positive result and thereby avoid failure which would increase tensions. Definite relationship existed between present Conference and Summit but no element of ultimatum.
Secretary then reverted to necessity removal Gromyko’s implied threat in order to resume negotiations. He hoped after five weeks’ exchange of views groundwork was laid for some agreement. Secretary concluded by saying he hoped by hard work and long hours in first three days of next week, and assuming removal any ultimative aspect, it would be possible reach sufficient agreement to record real progress.
[Page 883]Gromyko then angrily challenged Secretary’s reference to Hitlerian tactic in connection Soviet proposal and asked if intent was to aggravate situation or to provoke sharp exchange.
Secretary retorted he had given his own reaction to proposal and was not attempting pass judgment on Soviet intent.
Gromyko then said he would confine himself to substance and had nothing to add to past statements on subject threats or ultimatums. He said he interpreted Western position as making proposals and then saying if they were not accepted there could be no agreement. This was faulty method negotiation and induced Soviet belief we had no serious intention of reaching agreement. Moreover Soviets would never agree to undersigning indefinite continuation of occupation regime of Berlin.
Secretary replied he thought we could agree on term “indefinite.” West had no desire to keep troops in Berlin or retain occupation status forever. We sought interim agreement until reunification Germany. Since both Soviets and we agreed on this object matter could be discussed further though we could not accept Soviet position that matter exclusively for Germans themselves to decide. He reminded Gromyko West had made proposals going long way to meet expressed Soviet desiderata and had proposed thirty-month period for conclusion agreement on modalities with provision lack of agreement would result in Germans themselves freely expressing their desires. However he had no desire to negotiate at this meeting but wanted to make clear we ourselves have given no ultimatum but have stated firmly that our legal rights cannot be unilaterally extinguished. On free city proposal we had expressed ourselves. Secretary then said that Gromyko had been clear on absence any intended threat or ultimatum in his proposal and asked if he would have any objection to Secretary telling press after meeting that Gromyko had made statement to this effect.
Gromyko replied that on Tuesday, Wednesday and again today he had said that it was incorrect to represent Soviet proposal as form of dictat and that he had no objection whatsoever to the Secretary so stating to the press.
The Secretary then commented that if Gromyko had used the word “indefinite” instead of “one year” the entire presentation of this proposal would have left a different impression.
Gromyko with a three quarter smile asked the Secretary not to expect any changes today in the Soviet proposal. He then observed that in the Western press there had been growing pessimism, starting a few days ago with homeopathic doses but ending today with an elephantine dosage.
The Secretary said that he shared that pessimism.
[Page 884]Gromyko said we must now both look for an agreement which the Soviets sincerely sought. More than Soviet good will was needed however and there was no point in continuing to force our own proposals on him. He then made a joking reference to fact he had not ordered up a plane for himself, to which Secretary replied that his considered interpretation of last Soviet move had been that it represented intention and desire to end conference.
Gromyko said this was the wrong interpretation and in fact proposal had been designed to meet our desire to retain occupation status in Berlin. He then referred to Secretary’s earlier mention of three days of private talks and said that Soviets were prepared to work long hours with no deadline set for conclusion their efforts.
Secretary said he considered next few days would enable arrival at conclusion as to whether any agreement was possible. In leaving Gromyko noted that US-USSR relations were not satisfactory, not due any lack of desire on Soviet part but because of apparent absence such desire on part US.
Secretary said we had expressed ourselves on this matter many times. Need now is to agree on practical measures which would lead to improvement and that he hoped present negotiation would not prove futile. Secretary then left, interview having lasted nearly two hours.
From Gromyko’s villa Secretary drove to Lloyd’s where he reported conversation in detail to Lloyd, Couve and Grewe. Thereafter four agreed on common line to be taken with press.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1328. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Merchant.↩
- Merchant talked with Lloyd at 11:45 a.m. and the Foreign Secretary told him that Macmillan was opposed to a lengthy recess in the conference. Lloyd suggested that it would be better not to raise the question with Gromyko until he had a chance to raise the question at a British Cabinet meeting on Monday, June 15. (Memorandum of conversation, US/MC/94; ibid., CF 1340)↩
- See Document 377.↩
- See Document 381.↩
- See Document 338.↩