Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

377. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, June 9, 1959, 9 p.m.

Cahto 97. Eyes only for Ambassadors; Moscow, Berlin and USRO eyes only for Charge, Gufler and Burgess. Paris pass USRO.

At private meeting today at Secretary’s Villa Gromyko presented set of new proposals described as taking into account Western positions expressed in recent meetings. He said Soviet Union would not insist on immediate complete abrogation of occupation status of West Berlin. It could accept temporary maintenance of certain Western occupation rights in West Berlin for one year period. During this period an all-German committee of GDR and GFR on parity basis should work out problem of reunification; agree on principles of a peace treaty; and facilitate development and broadening of contacts between each other. One year limit would be fixed for successful completion of negotiations in order prevent West Germany from delaying peace treaty indefinitely.

Soviet Union would agree to temporary one-year recognition of certain occupation rights in West Berlin on basis following conditions:

1. Western powers to reduce the level of forces and armaments to symbolic number.

2. Hostile propaganda against GDR and other Socialist countries from territory of West Berlin to be stopped.

3. All organizations in West Berlin engaged in espionage and hostile activities against GDR and other Socialist countries to be liquidated.

4. Western powers to assume obligation not to station atomic or rocket installations in West Berlin.

If these conditions accepted, USSR ready to maintain communications between West Berlin and outside world as now exist.

All above would constitute provisional status of West Berlin. This status would be guaranteed first by four powers, on basis of protocol of guarantee submitted by Soviet Union; secondly, by government of GDR which has expressed in principle its willingness to respect agreed status of West Berlin. Soviet Union willing to make access commitments either in general agreement on West Berlin status or in separate document as Western powers desire. Documents would be registered with UN.

If understanding reached making West Berlin free demilitarized city in conformity with Soviet proposals as put forward at this conference, access commitments would be maintained until reunification of Germany.

In view of Soviets, there should be four power supervisory commission to watch out for violations of agreements and to take appropriate measures to ensure fulfillment agreement without touching sovereign rights of GDR.

Gromyko said if Western powers would not agree to above, he wanted to stress that Soviet Union will not give consent that present regime in West Berlin be continued. If Western powers or West Germany hampered achievement of peace treaty within time limit, Soviet Union with other belligerents in war with Germany would be compelled to sign own peace treaty with GDR.

Gromyko refused to furnish paper on proposals to other Ministers but indicated he would put his proposals forward at tomorrow’s plenary meeting.¹

Gromyko claimed time limit on work of All-German Committee similar to time limit we set for All-German Committee. Secretary pointed out their action at conclusion of committee’s work if agreement not reached would be unilateral peace treaty step, our action would be making progress on reunification by submitting both plans to the German people for vote.

Lloyd commented that Soviet offer was really accompanied by threat. Couve remarked that we were being asked to accept 95 percent if not 100 percent of Soviet demands and being given one-year’s grace with curtailed rights to accept it. Secretary stated this amounted to postponing May 27 ultimatum to one-year from beginning of All-German Committee work.

Gromyko denied threat of signing peace treaty was really threat. It had long been discussed in Soviet statements and mentioned often here at Conference. This was different from West’s action on such agreements with GFR as Paris Accords and on atomic weapons and missile bases.² Soviets were merely stating how they understood situation. If they signed peace treaty without warning this would be “fait accompli.” West had in past taken position if Soviets would not agree on method of reunifying Germany, then they would proceed (as in fact they did) with agreements rearming GFR in NATO. He claimed we had told Soviet Union in San Francisco in 1951 that if they did not join us we would conclude separate peace treaty with Japan and then did. When it was pointed out we had preserved Soviet rights, he said Soviets had been interested in Japan becoming peace loving country posing no threat to anyone but instead rights had been granted for foreign military bases and foreign troops. In answer to Lloyd’s question as to what would be position of our troops after Soviets signed peace treaty with GDR, Gromyko first sought to evade answer by saying Soviet desire was to reach negotiated agreement. He finally said in effect that GDR would then become sovereign nation to which occupation rights would not be applicable.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6–959. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin. A detailed nine-page memorandum of this meeting is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1340.
1. See Document 381.
2. For texts of the Nine- and Four-Power Agreements, signed at Paris, October 23, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1435–1457; for text of the agreement for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense, signed at Bonn May 5, 1959, see 10 UST 1322.