Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

379. Delegation Record Meeting⁰

Geneva, June 10, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

SMALL STAFF MEETING

PRESENT

• The Secretary
• Mr. Merchant
• Ambassador Thompson
• Mr. Becker
• Mr. Berding
• Mr. Irwin
• Mr. Reinhardt
• Mr. Smith
• Mr. Sullivan
• Mr. Wilcox
• Mr. Krebs

Secretary’s Evaluation of Conference Outlook

1. The Secretary said that today would be crucial in view of the Russian ultimatum given to us yesterday at the private meeting.¹ He then outlined the substance of the Russian proposal commenting that it took us back to November 27; we have retrogressed seriously. He noted that Mr. Merchant had prepared a good draft of a statement² for him to make at the plenary session today. The Secretary continued that Gromyko had refused to give us a paper embodying the Russian proposal. He observed that Gromyko for the last two days had spoken in Russian and that there were more Russian advisers present. No doubt, the Secretary surmised, Gromyko was speaking for their benefit. He thought Gromyko would publicize the Russian proposal at the plenary today. Obviously, he continued, we are at the break-off point if Gromyko puts up his proposal today. The Secretary then suggested we might consider recessing until July 20. The French feel this is the best thing to do now and that the British, although hesitant at first, appear to think it is the best move. The Secretary said it was necessary for us to point out that the Russian proposal is an ultimatum. He concluded by saying that we have reached a serious point in negotiations and the prospects are not cheery.

Conference Tactics

2. Mr. Smith thought that there was an important difference between this ultimatum and the ultimatum of November 27 which, as he argued it, seemed to lie in the fact that the present proposal would not become a threat unless or until we accepted it. He suggested that we should guard our flank against Gromyko saying at the plenary session today that what he was putting forward was a proposal and not an ultimatum. Mr. Becker expressed the view that we should publish the Common Declaration or Communiqué we gave the Russians on June 8³ in order to bring out as soon as possible our position if the conference should break up. The Secretary thought that since this is really our minimum position there would be disadvantages in disclosing it at this time. Mr. Merchant suggested that if the Soviets refuse a recess and break off the conference, we should then publish our offer.

Ambassador Thompson suggested that the Secretary not propose a recess at first; a private session could be held. Afterwards we might propose a recess. The Secretary said that we made it clear yesterday to Gromyko that this proposal is a threat. He thought it interesting that Gromyko refused to give us the text of his proposal, but instead said he wished to do so at the plenary session. The Secretary digressed to comment on the dangers that faced the Alliance. He thought that the Russians may very well be acting tough because they think that NATO is about to break up (viz. the French attitude) and that there are internal strains in the UK (viz. recent criticism of Lloyd).

Press Matters

3. Mr. Berding said that we should create the impression in the press that the present situation has been produced by the new Soviet move and that the conference has really been thrown back to November 27 last. Mr. Irwin said that he thought an abrupt recess would cause concern all over the world and he thought it important to place the onus for this directly on the Soviets. In this connection Mr. Merchant noted Mr. Hillenbrand is preparing a question and answer guidance for Mr. Berding.

Possible Recourse to UN on Berlin Issue

4. Mr. Becker expressed the view that the Russian proposal may have been calculated to force us to break off negotiations and thus open the way for the Russians to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany within two or three days. Mr. Wilcox agreed that this might be a deliberate move. If a treaty appeared to be in prospect, we should consider moving into the UN as soon as it was signed. The Secretary said there was no question about this and asked Mr. Wilcox whether he had prepared a draft resolution for the Security Council. Mr. Wilcox indicated that he had done so⁴ and that the problem was being studied in Washington this week. Mr. Wilcox said that if there is a recess followed by signature of a peace treaty, we must be sure that our case is as clean as is possible. We must be able to say we did all we could to continue the negotiations. Mr. Merchant said that we would be covered by having suggested a recess. If the Soviets act unilaterally, during this time it will be they who will bear the onus.

Briefing on Private Meeting for Germans

5. Mr. Merchant said that the British had agreed to brief Grewe on yesterday’s meeting but wanted to defer doing so until this morning. Grewe came into the Delegation Office last night at 11 o’clock asking to see Mr. Merchant to get a run-down of the private meeting. Mr. Merchant said that he had given Grewe a sanitized version of the private meeting to be transmitted only to von Brentano.⁵

Stand-by Plane for Secretary

6. Mr. Merchant expressed the view that it would be wise psychologically and otherwise for the Secretary to order a plane to stand by. (See attached telegrams—Cahto 100 and Tocah 92.)⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1371. Secret.
1. See Document 377.
2. Presumably this is the statement circulated as RM/DOC/43, June 11, which is printed in Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 267–271 or Cmd. 868, pp. 157–160.
3. See Document 372.
4. The draft resolution has not been found.
5. A seven-line memorandum for the record of Merchant’s briefing of Grewe is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1384.
6. Cahto 100, June 10, requested that a plane be put on standby. (Ibid., Central Files, 110.11–HE/6–1059) Tocah 92, also June 10, reported that a plane would be on 4-hour alert beginning June 11. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1331)