374. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State0
Cahto 92.
Dear Mr. President:
Last evening Selwyn and Couve dined with me at my Villa. Following dinner and bridge we talked with Merchant only other person present about state we now found ourselves in at conference. Couve is firmly convinced we are at dead end now confirmed at highest level by [Page 862] Khrushchev’s Budapest statement.1 To him disengagement only question before us and he urged strongly that we close conference in next day or so with agreement that Foreign Ministers reassemble here in mid-July (incidentally Soviet press spokesman at open briefing last night contrary to fairly consistent earlier expressions of optimism stated that conference was drawing to close and gave as reason that four weeks about normal duration such affairs).
Selwyn strongly opposed Couve’s view though agreed some action needed to indicate to Soviets our disquietude over their intransigeance. He said he had considered at close of yesterday’s session refusing to agree to meet today but decided against doing so on grounds newspapers would blow it up into crisis. Selwyn’s prescription is that we should state we desire recess of four or five days to reflect and consult. He is already planning to spend weekend in London and this would extend his period there. It would also enable him to attend a Cabinet meeting which otherwise would have to be set for Sunday, evoking memories of last Sunday Cabinet meeting at height Suez crisis.
Selwyn’s main argument, however, was concentrated on increased desirability of summit meeting, believing we had now reached point on matter of our rights which only heads of government could resolve. He believes West Berlin civilian population susceptible insidiously slow strangulation in absence of reaching new agreements with Soviets on access. Agreement he optimistically believes would ensure freedom and economic life West Berlin until day reunification comes. Question of rights in his mind becoming almost theological point. As I followed his argument he would seek detailed terms of agreement here which would then be presented to summit conference with preface pointing out West had one view on continuing validity its basic rights and Soviet another. Heads would then decide which basic view would prevail and he based expectation favorable decision on combination Khrushchev’s vanity and your persuasiveness. He was unmoved by argument Khrushchev’s Budapest statement had internally and externally nailed Khrushchev’s personal prestige to the mast and that public backdown at summit hence improbable. (At one point he characterized Khrushchev’s statement as impetuous inadvertence rather than calculated pronouncement.) He referred to risks of war and at one point stated that he considered Khrushchev a madman like Hitler capable of anything.
I did not commit myself to either view though I think it was obvious I found Selwyn’s arguments in good part unacceptable. I told them that I would have to await instructions in reply to a message I was despatching to you giving my estimate of where we now stood.
[Page 863]At Selwyn’s suggestion we will meet again today at noon privately at my villa without the Germans or advisers. Incidentally neither Selwyn nor Couve at any point suggested that I talk to Gromyko privately in effort to break deadlock. I suspect you will shortly be receiving a message from Harold urging decision along lines Selwyn proposes.
Faithfully yours,
Chris.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/6–959. Secret; Priority.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 373.↩