Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

373. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, June 9, 1959, 11 a.m.

Cahto 91. For the President from the Secretary.

“Dear Mr. President:

Today marks the opening of the fifth week of our conference and I have reached the conclusion that we are at a crossroads which requires a new initiative on our part. The situation today, as I see it, is that we have presented the Western peace plan and persuasively supported it in semi-public plenary sessions. We have also in same forum disposed of Soviet package. For past two weeks real dialogue has been in private meetings with severely restricted attendance.

These sessions have concentrated on possible nature of arrangements for West Berlin pending reunification, the latter an event probably years distant.

During last week of private meetings it has been accepted, I believe, by Gromyko that we will not consider his free city proposal. He has equally made it clear that Soviets will not consider our united Berlin proposal. Much underbrush has been cleared away. Significantly Gromyko has acknowledged that our present presence in Berlin is by right. He consistently refuses, however, to contemplate any reference to our rights in any agreement which might be reached here. He has not insisted on the DDR being a party to such agreement and he has accepted our reiterated refusal to accord DDR recognition. He affirms that any agreement reached here will be scrupulously adhered to by the Soviets until reunification and also by DDR who would accept obligation in bilateral collateral arrangement between Soviets and DDR or some comparable method which I think could be worked out satisfactorily to us.

Essence of the position as I see it today is that an agreement reached here on Berlin with Soviets which lacked any reference to our rights (and to variety of agreements and arrangements based on them during past fourteen years) would make it difficult in future to contest claim by Soviets on such future day as they choose to conclude separate peace treaty with DDR that all rights, obligations and arrangements not specifically covered in any agreement reached and recorded here at Geneva would from that day forward be extinguished. It is conceivable that some other way could be found to protect us on this point, such as a declaration by us which the Soviets would accept without denial, but I am dubious, particularly in view of Khrushchev’s recent statement in Budapest¹ which. Gromyko reflected in sterile private session.

As I said earlier, I believe a new attempt to break the deadlock is required. To be effective with the Soviets it must come from the United States. Otherwise we will not only waste time from now on but more important risk misinterpretation by the Soviets of the solidity of our basic position. Accordingly I would appreciate your guidance on the following course of action which I recommend. If approved by you I would then seek the agreement of Selwyn, Couve and von Brentano to my talking without delay to Gromyko alone along the lines I am about to suggest.

I would then plan to tell Gromyko:

(1) That the conference is clearly now getting nowhere though each side has usefully obtained a clearer picture of the other’s position.

(2) That the Allied position on the following points is immovable and not open to negotiation:

(A) That any agreement reached here must reflect the fact that it is without prejudice to the continuation in force of our rights of presence in and access to Berlin.

(B) That we might ourselves consider in the future some modest reduction in the strength of our garrisons, depending on circumstances, but that we will not admit a Soviet detachment to join them in West Berlin nor reduce them to what he apparently considers “symbolic.” In this connection I would emphasize that Gromyko has agreed our garrisons have no military significance.

(C) That we have no intention of recognizing the DDR. He accepts though he disagrees. Hence provision for the DDR to respect any agreement reached with Soviets is matter to be worked out between them and DDR in a form acceptable to us.

(D) That no agreement is in order on propaganda and similar activities since Soviets state they attach little importance to this. Each side, however, might undertake to exercise restraint in common interest of avoiding aggravation tensions.

(E) That clarification of access procedures would of course protect all civilian traffic as well as garrisons’ needs and in effort to meet Soviets’ expressed desires we could accept turnover by Soviet to DDR of ‘functions’ relating to military traffic on basis implying no Western recognition DDR and providing it accepted that in case of any future complaints on our part our recourse would continue to be to the USSR.

(3) I would plan to conclude by telling Gromyko that if agreement can be reached at this conference which takes into account the foregoing desiderata, then I believe you would be prepared to agree to a summit conference this summer or fall. I would ask him to consider my statement in all seriousness and add that I would be prepared to accept a brief recess if he desired to consult Moscow in light of what I had just told him. Finally I would suggest that the prolongation of a sterile conference would seem to add little to the relaxation of tensions which we seek and which purpose we assume Soviets share.

A word on the atmosphere. Gromyko remains relatively moderate in debate both public and private. He and his entourage are making considerable effort to give impression of friendly and serious effort to reach agreement, but are completely inflexible.

Couve is an excellent partner, articulate and forceful. Relations with the French Delegation which is large and well staffed with Soviet experts are excellent. The West Germans are on the whole quiet but solid. They stay in the background and in the last few days have been obviously disturbed by Adenauer’s reversal of his decision on the presidency.

Selwyn has played the Allied game faithfully. He remains highly sensitive but I think our relations with him and his delegation are very good. Certainly they are far better than during the opening days of the conference. In debate he is often too ready to inject a moderating remark and to profess to see points of agreement with the Soviet when in fact none exists. I now expect no real difficulty with sudden British initiatives. Indeed Selwyn has consistently hung back rather than tried to assume any role of leadership. I suspect British ‘flexibility’ will be held in reserve for a summit conference. This is not to say, however, that they do not very badly want a summit conference and if signs were to multiply that we will break up here without agreement our lines might not hold.

In sum, as I have written, I think the time has come for me to take a direct initiative with Gromyko in the effort to reach an acceptable agreement. I am satisfied that Gromyko will accept seriously what I say to him alone, whereas the same statement made in one of our private quadripartite meetings is likely to be interpreted by him as a negotiating position. There is a risk, of course, that this conference will end with no accomplishment and in this connection we are working very secretly on a contingency basis for a public presentation and posture to cover our disengagement. This risk, however, has been inherent since our acceptance of the conference and I believe the time has come to push the issue. I would appreciate your instructions. In light of Neil McElroy’s participation in the Conference you may want to make a copy of this message available to him. Faithfully, Signed: Chris”

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6–959. Secret; Niact. Transmitted in two sections.
1. At a press conference in Budapest on June 7, Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union could not accept an agreement on Berlin that perpetuated the occupation regime. Extracts from the press conference were printed in Pravda June 8.